Melbourne Less Wrong Meetup

Fall 2010 Meta Thread

Ra­tion­al­ity Power Tools

Pop­u­lar moral­ity: spare those on the left

Ra­tional Health Optimization

The Mean­ing of Life

Com­part­men­tal­iza­tion in epistemic and in­stru­men­tal ra­tio­nal­ity

Open Thread, Septem­ber, 2010-- part 2

The con­scious tape

LW’s first job ad

Bayes’ rule =/​= Bayesian inference

Perfect procrastination

In­tel­li­gence Am­plifi­ca­tion Open Thread

Link: “You’re Not Be­ing Rea­son­able”

Self-Im­prove­ment or Shiny Dis­trac­tion: Why Less Wrong is anti-In­stru­men­tal Rationality

Cam­bridge Less Wrong Meetup Sun­day, Sep 19

The Affect Heuris­tic, Sen­ti­ment, and Art

In­tel­lec­tual Hip­sters and Meta-Contrarianism

I don’t clean be­cause the house is never dirty

Septem­ber 2010 South­ern Cal­ifor­nia Meetup

The Effec­tive­ness of Devel­op­ing World Aid

Re­minder: Weekly LW meet­ings in NYC

The Science of Cut­ting Peppers

Steps to Achieve­ment: The Pit­falls, Costs, Re­quire­ments, and Timelines

Ig­no­rance of non-ex­is­tent preferences

Memetic Hazards in Videogames

More art, less stink: Tak­ing the PU out of PUA

Rea­son is not the only means of over­com­ing bias

My plans

Hu­mans are not au­to­mat­i­cally strategic

Septem­ber Less Wrong Meetup aka Eliezer’s Bayesian Birth­day Bash

A “Failure to Eval­u­ate Re­turn-on-Time” Fallacy

Some­thing’s Wrong

Con­trol­ling Con­stant Programs

Rea­son­ably Fun

An­thro­po­mor­phic AI and Sand­boxed Vir­tual Uni­verses

Fru­gal­ity and work­ing from finite data

Test

AI in­differ­ence through util­ity manipulation

Ra­tion­al­ity quotes: Septem­ber 2010

Berkeley LW Meet-up Sun­day Septem­ber 5

Less Wrong: Open Thread, Septem­ber 2010

Dreams of AIXI

Mo­ral­ity as Parfi­tian-filtered De­ci­sion The­ory?

Harry Pot­ter and the Meth­ods of Ra­tion­al­ity dis­cus­sion thread, part 3

Ex­ploita­tion and co­op­er­a­tion in ecol­ogy, gov­ern­ment, busi­ness, and AI

Cry­on­ics Questions

Self-fulfilling correlations

Cri­te­ria for Ra­tional Poli­ti­cal Conversation

The prior of a hy­poth­e­sis does not de­pend on its complexity