T431

• T431Oct 14, 2022, 4:21 AM

  1 point

  0

  on: rodeo_flag­el­lum’s Shortform

  Thoughts, Notes: 10/​14/​0012022 (1)

  Contents:

  1. Summary, comment: Climate change and the threat to civilization (10/​06/​2022)

  2. Compression of (1)

  3. Thoughts: writing and condensing information

  4. Quote: my friend Evan on concision

  To the reader: Please point out inadequacies in my writing.

  1.

  Article: Climate change and the threat to civilization (10/​06/​2022)

  Context: My work for Rumtin Sempasspour (gcrpolicy.com) includes summarizing articles relevant to GCRs and GCR policy.

  Summary: An assessment of the conditions under which civilizational collapse may occur due to climate change would greatly improve the ability of the public and policymakers to address the threats from climate change, according to academic researchers Steela et al. in a PNAS opinion piece. While literature on climate change (e.g., reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) typically covers the deleterious effects that climate change is having or will have on human activities, there has been much less focus on exactly how climate change might factor into different scenarios for civilization collapse. Given the deficits in this research topic, Steela et al. outline three civilizational collapse scenarios that could stem from climate change—local collapse, broken world, and global collapse—and then discuss three groups of mechanisms—direct impacts, socio-climate feedbacks, and exogenous shock vulnerability—for how these scenarios might be realised. (6 October 2022)

  Policy comment: Just as governments and policymakers have directed funding and taken action to mitigate the harmful, direct effects of climate change, it seems natural that they should take the next step and address making the aspects of civilization most vulnerable to climate change more robust. The recommendation in this paper for policymakers and researchers alike to promote more rigorous scientific investigation of the mechanisms and factors of civilizational collapse involving climate change seems keen. While this paper does not perform a detailed examination of the scenarios and mechanisms of civilizational collapse that it proposes, it is a call-to-action for more work to understand how climate change affects civilization stability and the role of climate change in civilization collapse.

  2.

  A condensed version of the summary and policy comment in (1)

  Summary: Humanity must understand how climate change (CC) could engender civilizational collapse. Coverage of this topic is sparse relative coverage of CC’s direct effects. Steela et al.’s PNAS opinion piece is a call to action for more research on this topic; they contribute an outline of 3 collapse scenarios—local collapse, broken world, and global collapse—and 3 collapse mechanisms—direct impacts, socio-climate feedbacks, and exogenous shock vulnerability (6 October 2022).

  Policy comment: Policymakers and researchers need to promote research on the effects of climate change on civilizational stability so that critical societal institutions and infrastructure are protected from collapse. Such research efforts would include further investigations of the many scenarios and mechanisms through which civilization may collapse due to climate change; Steela et al. lay some groundwork in this regard, but fail to provide a detailed examination.

  3.

  One issue I have is being concise with my writing. This was recently pointed out to me by my friend Evan, when I asked him to read (1), and I want to write some thoughts of mine that were evoked by the conversation.

  My first thought: What do I want myself and others to get from my writing?

  I want to learn, and writing helps with this. I want to generate novel and useful ideas and to share them with people. I want to show people what I’ve done or am doing. I want a record of my thinking on certain topics

  I want my writing to help others learn efficiently and I want to tell people entertaining stories, ones that engender curiosity.

  My next thought: How is my writing inadequate?

  I aim for transparency, informativeness, clarity, and efficiency in my writing, but feel that my writing is much less transparent, informative, clear, and efficient than it could be.

  • W.r.t. transparency, my model is Reasoning Transparency. My writing sometimes includes answers to these questions^[1] (this comment).

  • W.r.t. informativeness, I assume someone has already thought about or attempted what I am working on, so I try not to repeat (Don’t repeat yourself) and to synthesize works when synthesizing has not yet occurred or has occurred but inadequately.

  • W.r.t. clarity, I try to edit my work multiple times and make it clear what I want to be understood. I read my writing aloud to determine if hearing it is pleasurable.

  • W.r.t. efficiency, my sense of where to allocate attention across my writing is fuzzy. I use editing and footnotes to consolidate, but still have trouble.

  I don’t have good ways to measure or assess these things in my writing, and I haven’t decided which hypothetical audiences to gear my writing towards; I believe this decision affects how much effort I expend optimizing at least transparency and efficiency.

  I will address my writing again at some point, but think it best I read the advice of others first.

  4.

  My friend Evan on concision:

  Yelling at people on the internet is a general waste of time, but it does teach concision. No matter how sound your argument, if you say something in eight paragraphs and then your opponent comes in and summarizes it perfectly in twenty words, you look like an idiot. Don’t look like an idiot in front of people! Be concise.

  1. ^

     • Why does this writing exist?

     • Who is this writing for?

     • What does this content claim?

     • How good is this content?

     • Can you trust the author?

     • What are the author’s priors?

     • What beliefs ought to updated?

     • What has the author contributed here?

• T431Oct 14, 2022, 1:06 AM

  1 point

  0

  on: Good Bets and In­ter­nal Resources

  Sometimes failing at things makes it harder to try in future even if you expect things to go well, and sometimes people are so afraid that they give up on trying, but you can break out of this by making small, careful bets with your energy.

  reminds me of this article

  Researchers and educators have long wrestled with the question of how best to teach their
  clients be they humans, non-human animals or machines. Here, we examine the role of a
  single variable, the difficulty of training, on the rate of learning. In many situations we find that
  there is a sweet spot in which training is neither too easy nor too hard, and where learning
  progresses most quickly.

  ...the optimal error rate for training is around 15.87% or, conversely, that the optimal training accuracy is about 85%

  One might benefit from modulating their learning so that their failure rate falls in the above range (assuming the findings are accurate).

• T431Oct 10, 2022, 10:29 PM

  6 points

  0

  on: rodeo_flag­el­lum’s Shortform

  Thoughts and Notes: October 10th 0012022 (1)

  Summary: Introduction (I introduce this shortform series), Year 0 for Human History (I discuss when years for humanity should begin to be counted)

  Introduction

  This shortform post marks the beginning of me trying to share on LessWrong some of the thoughts and notes I generate each day.

  I suspect that every “thoughts and notes” shortform I write will contain a brief summary of its content at the start, and there will very likely be days where I post multiple shortforms of this nature, hence the (X) after the date.

  As for the year in the date on these posts, I want to use something other than the Gregorian calendar’s current year. Moreover, I want to better capture the time of origin for a key moment in human history, such as the origin of agriculture, writing, or permanent settlement. The rest of this shortform consists of some notes on this topic.

  A Starting Year for Our Calendars

  In 2019, after I watched the Kurzgesagt—In a Nutshell video A New History for Humanity – The Human Era (2016), I opted to change the year in the date in my journal entries from 2019 to 12019. This Kurzgesagt video describes the idea that different choices for “year 0” for the “human era” result in different perceptions of human history.

  Regarding this claim, I generally agree. If “year 0” for humanity began when the first anatomically modern humans appeared, then the year would be ~202022, and if “year 0″ began when the first nuclear weapon was deployed, the “human era” would be only 77 years old. These scenarios seem to strongly allocate my attention in different areas, with the former placing my attention on the thickness and mysteries of what we today call “prehistory” and the latter focusing my attention on the rapid progress and dangers that are characteristic of modernity.

  The Kurzgesagt video explores the idea of setting “year 0” to 12000 years ago (the 10th millennium BC), which is apparently around the time the first large scale human construction project seems to have taken place. Having 12000 years ago be “year 0″ means that, when the current year is being considered, more attention would likely be allocated to the emergence of widespread agriculture, writing, and intensive construction of settlements and cities than is currently allocated.

  Some notes for the preceding paragraph:

  Agriculture seems to have started roughly 12k years ago (see History of agriculture).

  Agriculture began independently in different parts of the globe, and included a diverse range of taxa. At least eleven separate regions of the Old and New World were involved as independent centers of origin. The development of agriculture about 12,000 years ago changed the way humans lived. They switched from nomadic hunter-gatherer lifestyles to permanent settlements and farming.^[1]

  Wild grains were collected and eaten from at least 105,000 years ago.^[2] However, domestication did not occur until much later. The earliest evidence of small-scale cultivation of edible grasses is from around 21,000 BC with the Ohalo II people on the shores of the Sea of Galilee.

  Following the emergence of agriculture, construction and architectural practices became more complex, leading to larger projects and settlements (see History of construction and Neolithic architecture)

  The Neolithic, also known as the New Stone Age, was a time period roughly from 9000 BC to 5000 BC named because it was the last period of the age before woodworking began.

  Neolithic architecture refers to structures encompassing housing and shelter from approximately 10,000 to 2,000 BC, the Neolithic period.

  Architectural advances are an important part of the Neolithic period (10,000-2000 BC), during which some of the major innovations of human history occurred. The domestication of plants and animals, for example, led to both new economics and a new relationship between people and the world, an increase in community size and permanence, a massive development of material culture, and new social and ritual solutions to enable people to live together in these communities.

  The oldest known surviving manmade building is Göbekli Tepe, which was make between 12k to 10k years ago (this is the structure alluded to in the Kurzgesagt video I mentioned earlier).

  Located in southern Turkey. The tell includes two phases of use, believed to be of a social or ritual nature by site discoverer and excavator Klaus Schmidt, dating back to the 10th–8th millennium BC. The structure is 300 m in diameter and 15 m high.

  Writing systems are believed to have emerged independently of each other, with the oldest instance of writing being in Mesopotamia potentially as early as 3.4k BCE.

  However, the discovery of the scripts of ancient Mesoamerica, far away from Middle Eastern sources, proved that writing had been invented more than once. Scholars now recognize that writing may have independently developed in at least four ancient civilizations: Mesopotamia (between 3400 and 3100 BCE), Egypt (around 3250 BCE),^[4][5][2] China (1200 BCE),^[6] and lowland areas of Southern Mexico and Guatemala (by 500 BCE).^[7]

  Given that these historical developments I have outlined above seem very valuable to consider in context of modern civilizational progress, I’ve decided to take “year 0” to be 12000 years ago. The official name for this calendar system is actually the Holocene calendar, which was developed by Cesare Emiliani in 1993. The current year in the Holocene calendar is 12022 HE. Below are two comments on the benefits and accuracy, respectively, of the Holocene calendar’s Wikipedia page:

  Human Era proponents claim that it makes for easier geological, archaeological, dendrochronological, anthropological and historical dating, as well as that it bases its epoch on an event more universally relevant than the birth of Jesus. All key dates in human history can then be listed using a simple increasing date scale with smaller dates always occurring before larger dates. Another gain is that the Holocene Era starts before the other calendar eras, so it could be useful for the comparison and conversion of dates from different calendars.

  When Emiliani discussed the calendar in a follow-up article in 1994, he mentioned that there was no agreement on the date of the start of the Holocene epoch, with estimates at the time ranging between 12,700 and 10,970 years BP.^[5] Since then, scientists have improved their understanding of the Holocene on the evidence of ice cores and can now more accurately date its beginning. A consensus view was formally adopted by the IUGS in 2013, placing its start at 11,700 years before 2000 (9701 BC), about 300 years more recent than the epoch of the Holocene calendar.^[6]

  So, why is the year on this shortform 0012022 and not just 12022? There are two reasons for this. The first is that I would like for myself to think more deeply and frequently about my own future and about humanity’s long-term future.

  An organization developed around the idea of thinking about and safeguarding humanity’s future is the Long Now Foundation (LNF), which most LWers have likely heard of. This is its description:

  The Long Now Foundation

  is a nonprofit established in 01996 to foster long-term thinking.

  Our work encourages imagination at the timescale of civilization — the next and last 10,000 years —
  a timespan we call the long now.

  The LNF’s foundation year consists of 1996 with a 0 appended to the front, indicating that the timeframe under consideration − 10k years—is slowly being reached, one year at a time.

  I aim to do a similar thing but believe that the timescale of 10k years is too short, so I instead opt for 1 million years, given that 1 million years is roughly the base rate for hominin species survival duration. It is also very interesting to imagine what humanity will be doing (should they persist) 1 million years following the start of the agricultural revolution. So, 12022 $\to$ 0012022.

  From An upper bound for the background rate of human extinction (Snyder-Beattie et al., 2019)

  Snyder-Beattie, Andrew E., Toby Ord, and Michael B. Bonsall. “An upper bound for the background rate of human extinction.” Scientific reports 9, no. 1 (2019): 1-9.

  Hominin survival times. Next, we evaluate whether the upper bound is consistent with the broader hominin fossil record. There is strong evidence that Homo erectus lasted over 1.7 Myr and Homo habilis lasted 700 kyr [21], indicating that our own species’ track record of survival exceeding 200 kyr is not unique within our genus. Fossil record data indicate that the median hominin temporal range is about 620 kyr, and after accounting for sample bias in the fossil record this estimate rises to 970 kyr [22] . Although it is notable that the hominin lineage seems to have a higher extinction rate than those typical of mammals, these values are still consistent with our upper bound. It is perhaps also notable that some hominin species were likely driven to extinction by our own lineage [34], suggesting an early form of anthropogenic extinction risk.

  I will close this shortform post here, but definitely want to parse out my thoughts concerning humanity’s future more in subsequent posts, and enjoyed writing this first post.

[Linkpost] “Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights”—Office of Science and Tech­nol­ogy Policy, USA (2022)

[Linkpost] “In­ten­sity and fre­quency of ex­treme novel epi­demics” by Mar­i­ani et al. (2021)

• T431Sep 25, 2022, 9:07 PM

  4 points

  2

  on: Open & Wel­come Thread—Au­gust 2022

  Has anyone here considered working on the following?:

  https://​​www.super-linear.org/​​prize?recordId=recT1AQw4H7prmDE8

  $500 prize pool for creating an accurate, comprehensive, and amusing visual map of the AGI Safety ecosystem, similar to XKCD’s map of online communities or Scott Alexander’s map of the rationalist community.

  Payout will be $400 to the map which plex thinks is highest quality, $75 to second place, $25 to third. The competition will end one month after the first acceptable map is submitted, as judged by plex.

  Resources, advice, conditions:

  • This is a partial list of items which might make sense to include.

  • You are advised to iterate, initially posting a low-effort sketch and getting feedback from others in your network, then plex.

  • You may create sub-prizes on Bountied Rationality for the best improvements to your map (if you borrow ideas from other group’s public bounties and win this prize you must cover the costs of their bounty payouts).

  • You may use DALL-E 2 or other image generation AIs to generate visual elements.

  • You may collaborate with others and split the prize, but agree internally on roles and financial division, and distribute it yourselves.

  • You can use logos as fair-use, under editorial/​educational provision.

  • You can scale items based on approximate employee count (when findable), Alexa rank (when available), number of followers (when available) or wild guess (otherwise).

  • You agree to release the map for public use.

  I asked about FLI’s map in this question and it received some traction. I might go ahead and try this, starting with FLI’s map and expanding off of it.

• T431Sep 25, 2022, 4:45 AM

  2 points

  0

  in reply to: Shmi’s comment on: Pri­ori­tiz­ing the Arts in re­sponse to AI automation

  Same question here as well.

• T431Sep 22, 2022, 3:58 PM

  3 points

  0

  in reply to: Gyrodiot’s comment on: Up­dates on FLI’s Value Alig­ment Map?

  I am sorry that I took such a long time replying to this. First, thank you for your comment, as it answers all of my questions in a fairly detailed manner.

  The impact of a map of research that includes the labs, people, organizations, and research papers focused on AI Safety seems high, and FLI’s 2017 map seems like a good start at least for what types of research is occurring in AI Safety. In this vein, it is worth noting that Superlinear is offering a small prize of $1150 for whoever can “Create a visual map of the AGI safety ecosystem”, but I don’t think this is enough to incentivize the creation of the resource that is currently missing from this community. I don’t think there is a great answer to “What is the most comprehensive repository of resources on the work being done in AI Safety?”. Maybe I will try to make a GitHub repository with orgs., people, and labs using FLI’s map as an initial blueprint. Would you be interested in reviewing this?

• T431Sep 20, 2022, 9:30 PM

  2 points

  0

  on: An­nounc­ing the In­tro­duc­tion to ML Safety course

  I applied to this several days ago (5 days, I believe). Is /​ was there any formal confirmation that my application was received? I am mildly concerned, as the course begins soon. Thank you.

[Question] Up­dates on FLI’s Value Alig­ment Map?

• T431Aug 31, 2022, 4:56 AM

  3 points

  0

  in reply to: mukashi’s comment on: How to plan for a rad­i­cally un­cer­tain fu­ture?

  This entire post reminded me of this section from Human Compatible, especially the section I’ve put in bold:

  “There are some limits to what AI can provide. The pies of land and raw materials are not infinite, so there cannot be unlimited population growth and not everyone will have a mansion in a private park. (This will eventually necessitate mining elsewhere in the solar system and constructing artificial habitats in space; but I promised not to talk about science fiction.) The pie of pride is also finite: only 1 percent of people can be in the top 1 percent on any given metric. If human happiness requires being in the top 1 percent, then 99 percent of humans are going to be unhappy, even when the bottom 1 percent has an objectively splendid lifestyle. It will be important, then, for our cultures to gradually down-weight pride and envy as central elements of perceived self-worth.”

  In scenarios where transformative AI can perform nearly all research or reasoning tasks for humanity, my pride will be hurt to some degree. I also believe that I will not be in the 1% of humans still in work, perhaps overseeing the AI, and I find this prospect somewhat bleak, though I imagine that the severity of this sentiment would wane with time, especially if my life and the circumstances for humanity were otherwise great as a result of the AI.

  The first point of your response calms me somewhat. Focusing more in the near-future on my body, health, friends, family, etc… the baselines would probably be good preparation for a future where AI forwards the state of human affairs to the point where humans are not needed for reasoning or research tasks.

• T431Aug 30, 2022, 5:52 PM

  5 points

  0

  in reply to: Dagon’s comment on: How to plan for a rad­i­cally un­cer­tain fu­ture?

  My suggestions regarding the epistemics of the original post are fairly in line with the content in your first paragraph. I think allocating decision weight in proportion to the expected impacts different scenarios have on your life is the correct approach. Generating scenarios and forecasting their likelihood is difficult, and there is also a great deal of uncertainty with how you should change your behavior in light of these scenarios. I think that making peace with the outcomes of disastrous scenarios that you or humanity cannot avoid is a strong action-path for processing thinking about uncontrollable scenarios. As for scenarios that you can prepare for, such as the effects of climate change, shallow AI, embryo selection /​ gene-editing, and forms of gradual technological progress, among other things, perhaps determining what you value and want if you could only live /​ live comfortably for the next 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, etc… years might be a useful exercise, since each of these scenarios (e.g., only living 5 more years vs. only living 10 more years vs. only more 5 years in global business-as-usual) might lead you to make different actions. I am in a similar decision-boat as you, as I believe that in coming years the nature of the human operations in the world will change significantly and on many fronts. I am in my early 20s, I have been doing some remote work /​ research in the areas of forecasting and ML, want to make contributions to AI Safety, want to have children with my partner (in around 6 years), do not know where I would like to live, do not know what my investment behaviors should be, do not know what proportion of my time should be spent doing such things as reading, programming, exercising, etc… A useful heuristic for me has been to worry less. I think moving away from people and living closer to the wilderness have benefitted me as well; the location I am in currently seem robust to climate change and mass exoduses from cities (should they ever occur), has few natural disasters, has good air quality, is generally peaceful and quiet, and is agriculturally robust w/​ sources of water. Perhaps finding some location or set of habits that are in line with “what I hoped to retire into /​ do in a few years or what I’ve always desired for myself” might make for a strong remainder-of-life /​ remainder-of-business-as-usual, whichever you attach more weight to.

• T431Aug 15, 2022, 12:02 AM

  2 points

  0

  in reply to: malliavin’s comment on: Paper read­ing as a Cargo Cult

  This is great; thank you! I will send an email in the coming month. Also, I suppose a quick clarification, but what’s the relation between: MQTransformer: Multi-Horizon Forecasts with Context Dependent and Feedback-Aware Attention and MQTransformer: Multi-Horizon Forecasts with Context Dependent Attention and Optimal Bregman Volatility

• T431Aug 9, 2022, 4:17 PM

  3 points

  0

  in reply to: Hastings’s comment on: Paper read­ing as a Cargo Cult

  If there are any paper reading clubs out there that ask the presenter to replicate the results without looking at the author’s code, I would love to join

  This is something that I would be interested in as well. I’ve been attempting to reproduce MQTransformer: Multi-Horizon Forecasts with Context Dependent and Feedback-Aware Attention from scratch, but I am finding it difficult, partially due to my present lack of experience with reproducing DL papers. The code for MQTransformer is not available, at least to my knowledge. Also, there are several other papers which use LSTMs or Transformers architectures for forecasting that I hope to reproduce and/​or employ for use on Metaculus API data in the coming few months. If reproducing ML papers from scratch and replicating their results (especially DL for forecasting) sounds interesting (perhaps I could publish these reproductions w/​ additional tests in ReScience C) to anyone, please DM me, as I would be willing to collaborate.

• T431Jun 9, 2022, 6:14 PM

  2 points

  0

  in reply to: jimrandomh’s comment on: Model­ing hu­man­ity’s ro­bust­ness to GCRs?

  I did not inquire anywhere about a way to measure human migration patterns under present-day circumstances.

  I understand this is already known.

  What the question concerns is a way to measure some aspects of humanity’s reaction to a global catastrophe.

  “If a line of bacteria or virus could be bred to reflect human migration and habitation patterns, then it might be possible to determine a rough estimate of humanity’s robustness to the direct effects and subsequent environmental effects of a global catastrophe in terms of population resilience and migration patterns.”

  I am saying that if these known-migration patterns can be engineered into a culture of bacteria, then we might be able to test how these cultures react to catastrophes, and since the culture is a reflection of human population and migration, then we may be able to get some data on how humanity writ large would react to a global catastrophe, since there is a paucity of data on “how humans react to global catastrophes”.

  Do you have updated sentiments following this comment?

[Question] Model­ing hu­man­ity’s ro­bust­ness to GCRs?

• T431May 28, 2022, 6:37 PM

  2 points

  0

  in reply to: stavros’s comment on: Can growth con­tinue?

  I would like to think about this more, but thank you for posting this and switching my mind from System I to System II

• T431May 20, 2022, 1:20 PM

  5 points

  0

  on: How has the to­tal amount of gain-of-func­tion re­search wor­ld­wide grown/​shrunk over time?

  While I have not tried to measure whether search term frequency is closely correlated with the amount of interest or activity in a field of research, I often find it useful, and believe that the search term growth rate likely corresponds somewhat to change in funding and/​or research activity and its offshoots.

  Below, I have searched three terms (with quotes) on Google Scholar, not including citations, for years in the close interval [2000, 2021]. Note that (1) corresponds to cumulative results, and (2) corresponds to results for that particular year.

  

  

  I am unsure how to resolve the massive differences between the number of search results for “gain-of-function” and “gain-of-function research”. From skimming the articles that appeared after each search, one explanation might be that there is indeed a lot of gain-of-function research that only uses the term gain-of-function (e.g., “gain-of-function mutation”). I still don’t suspect the overwhelming majority of the results from searching “gain-of-function” actually refer to gain-of-function research, but the evidence that many of the results are What We Want leads me to believe that this graph is probably useful for looking at the growth in the field.

[Question] Con­fi­dence Levels in Fore­casts and Psy­cholog­i­cal Surveys

• T431Mar 19, 2022, 8:26 PM

  3 points

  0

  in reply to: Garrett Baker’s comment on: Thoughts on the SPIES Fore­cast­ing Method?

  Nice, I didn’t know OpenPhil had calibration training.

  It is difficult to use SPIES for the calibration training—I kept running out of time when using my implementation in Python. To still compare the methods, I copied some questions and gave a confidence interval and SPIES estimate. Here are the results; I’ve only included 5 questions, but from what I’ve done, it seems SPIES helps me to narrow might 80% confidence intervals.

  1. In which year was the US Open decided for the first time by ‘sudden death’?

  • CI: 1900-2000

  • SPIES: 1938-2000 : 1900-1924 16.54%; 1925-1948 24.63%; 1949-1972 29.41%; 1973-1996 29.41%

  • Actual Value: 1990

  2. In what year did Emerson Fittipaldi first win the World Championship?

  • CI: 1910-2010

  • SPIES: 1939-2010 : 1910-1935 18.18%; 1936-1960 11.36%; 1961-1985 36.36%; 1986-2010 34.09%

  • Actual Value: 1972

  3. In what year was rayon first produced in the United States?

  • CI: 1780-2005

  • SPIES: 1836-1996 : 1780-1836 16.28%; 1837-1892 27.91%; 1893-1948 27.91%; 1949-2005 27.91%

  • Actual Value: 1910

  4. When was the first Winter Olympics held?

  • CI: 1880-1980

  • SPIES: 1914-1980 : 1880-1905 13.04%; 1906-1930 21.74%; 1931-1955 26.09%; 1956-1980 39.13%

  • Actual Value: 1924

  5. In which year did Frankie Goes to Hollywood form?

  • CI: 1910-2000

  • SPIES: 1938-2000 : 1910-1932 15.0%; 1933-1954 20.0%; 1955-1976 30.0%; 1977-2000 35.0%

  • Actual Value: 1980