Just because your current theory of apples refers to quantum fields doesn’t mean quantum fields are essential to appleness. I would think your concept of apple is continous with the concept of apples before the discovery of quantum fields. And even if we abandoned belief in quantum fields we would probably still keep the concept of apple and it would survive such an ontological shift. Anything that has a true definition that would involve quantum fields could not survive such an ontological crisis.
I am suspecting that you are using a definition of “qualia” that has ontological commitments built in. The term really doesn’t have those and you need to get your terms straight. If you want to talk about those ontological commitment use words that directly access them.
I maybe too generous in assuming that you mean what “qualia” means. The example of insisting that people are blindsighted is what I understand for someone that doesn’t believe in qualia. The version that treats qualia as “explanations” of how things can work as they do utilise a sense of the word that it does not have.
It feels like you mean”qualia” as a bit of ontology that is not material which would explain why you see materialism as it’s antonym. What you really ought to use are words like “metaphysical organ” or “soul” or “mental” as ontolgocial primitive in contrast to materia. Those words have a lot worse ring because claims involving them tend to be somewhat ridicilous.
There might be an interesting argument of the lines of “materialism doesn’t explain experience so we need to entertain the possibility of non-physical bits into our ontology”. “qualia” refer to the “experience is a thing that happens” part but not to the hypothetical ontology extension. Like gravity anomalies might found assumptions into the existence of dark matter there migth be a danger of taking “dark matter” to be a synonym or shorthand for the gravity anomalies. But conceptually these are separate and there are physicist that think that discovering better gravitation laws addresses the anomalies without supposing new categories of substance (ie dark matterless theories are seen as viable).
It might be interesting to try to steelman the soul question. For example in a morph environment there might be a question of which actors are NPC and which are PC. And it’s true there that on a game world level PCs and NPCs are similar functionning. But PCs can go “afk” and they require wetware to sit in front of a keyboard. Somebody that thought that the game world is the place where the cognitive machinery lies might think that there is no reason to posit that keyboards even exit and esoteric “biological” components would be explanationarily needless for understanding what happens in the game world. In particular examining part of the game code/world that is involved in netcode one might quess tht the cognition lies inside that bit of code instead of locating outside it.
And in general for video games the perception for the game world is primary to the existence of the game world itself. You infer the existence of a 3d world because of what flashes on your screen and because 3d terminology is an effective way to talk about different screen states. And in the case of games we know the worlds are fictious they can only upkeep an apperance and keeping up that appearance uses up cpu cycles. If somebody would try to get inductive on what is shown on the screen they could get a very different concpetion of what world forces there are present than one that assumes that there is a source code that dictates what happens.
In a conception that is popoular in these days it’s easy to tell a story where the effective phenomena that we see are representative of the mechanisms that generate our expereiences. We think we can see the workings of the world, we think we have access to the source code. But if we could hit a soft or hard wall on figuring out the source code of a video game from the inductive screen patterns how could we tell whether we have hit such a wall in the real world?
It might be that explainining things like healthbars are very unnaturally explained in a theory that tries to treat the 3d game world as the actually existing layer of existence. Someone that has a lot of skill that is built on a 3d conception of the world might be tempted to not even try to explain healthbars and rather try to argue that they don’t exist. But it’s still a different thing to note that healthbars exist than to theorise background entities that might be responcible for them.
I once saw a blind kid on TV that had developed a way of clicking with his mouth that he could use it to navigate sidewalks. This was pretty cool and it made me pay attention to my own sense of hearing and wondering what it must be like to use that kind of ability. I payed close attention to situations that it might be possible to hear the place of walls etc. Doing this for sometime it changed my relationship to my hearing.
I became aware when a sound is louder because additional bounces of wave energy hit my ear rather than having only the direct line-of-sight propagation. I picked up the threshold where I hear the primary sound and it’s echo as simultanous sound or as two separate sounds. After paying attention to things that I theorethically knew why they would happen I could tap into kinds of “feels” in the sound. My mind somehow clicked and connected geometric forms to the echo timing profile. In understand only discrete sounds conciously but the prolonged direction-changing continous echo that a sloped wall makes I could sense intrisically. And I found out that for example claps are very directional and you can kind of like cast different claping to a wall like you would shine a flashlight.
All in all my sense of hearing became much more like my sense of seeing with good 3D-structure. Experiencing this new way of hearing was very interesting and cool. However once I got settled how to hear like a echolocator I had trouble conceptualising what it is like not to hear like it. My guess is that if you don’t pay that much attention a lof information goes unextracted. But it was a big surprise that it wasn’t “obvious” how much information a given hearing includes. I didn’t gain a better ear. The amount of information I was receiving would have needed to stay same, but I guess I previously couldn’t structure them properly.
And I realised that i had atleast two hearing modes even before this new “3D” mode. A mono mode where you can decipher what kind of sound it is and can recognise what causing it with only knowing that it is “nearby within hearing distance” and couldn’t be able to face the sound and need to visually look for clues where the sound is coming. Then there is kinda “arrow” mode where you know to look at the direction where the sound is coming from. But it is kinda cool when in “3D” mode I can hear around the corner on what kind of space there is which I can’t do in “arrow” mode.
Thinking about how sound waves work it kinda makes sense how the perception changes between “mono” and “arrow mode”. If you are in a empty room and make big enough noise there is significant echo going from every direction. Without able to read the timing finestructure it feels like coming from everywhere. However if you in the same kind of room don’t make quite as much noise then the component directly going towards you will dominate the echoes. There is also an explanation why the “arrow” isn’t a pinpointer but a fuzzy approximation, when you try to read the texture/shape information as location information it will give a slightly contradictory result.
I am using language here where I first feel a certain way and then be puzzled on why it would feel this way and then start theorising in this way. I guess it’s worth noting that having more theory won’t give you insight in what your experience is. It was kinda mindopening to be able to target those feelings relatively theory-free and then the joy of finding the explanation. For example how sound propagation first felt “waterlike” and only afterwards confirming that that makes perfect sense as the waves are not equal in strength in all directions and do have dampening as they propagate.
I really couldn’t confirm that I wasn’t just reading too much into what I was supposedly experiencing, that I have just pretended to experience things while only actually wanting to experience them so. But then after I aquired the skill I passively would first pick up sounds and have 3D impressions of them when not actively pursuing to hear anything (and usually be frightened about it) and only then turning to look at them that this was a legit change in perception when the expectations formed by hearing would be confirmed by sight. For example I would drive by a post with a bike and suddenly be very aware of something square on my right, the wheel sounds giving enough echo basis that the post would pop-up against the background a lot more than it visually does. Or driving alleys making a sudden echo chamber on an otherwise echoless street. I also found out that glass sticks out a lot more than other materials (oh there is a large object to my right, oh it’s just a window).
For me I have discovered what it is to be like an echolocator which I guess is supposed to be the main alien part in the bat metaphor. There is also a joke on how drugs make you “taste blue” but I have come to experience that and how it makes sense to “see sound”. But the behavioural effects of this different kind of experiencing are not that telling or direct. I would not pass the vampire turing test because that isn’t to the point, it would need to be refined to be that but it is not trivial how that would be made.
The operation that made me undergo this change seems to be paying attention. It doesn’t seem to be that I learned a new fact. Althougth I clearly see that having atheory why I am feeling what I am feeling did have aguiding effect. Maybe call it a imagination aid? I would say it might be a deficiency in understanding and not knowledge that limits people not being able to experience bats. And it is possible for humans to understand what it is to be an echolocator. I would guess that if I had sufficiently clear descriptions on what kinds of “facets” my perceptions include I should be able to play it out how I would experience the situation had I that kind of a sense. So I think it might be possible to imagine seeing 4 primary colors but it takes skill in this “pay attention to your qualia structures” thingy that people are not in general very good at.
I had hard time to track down what is the refefrent to the abuse mentioned in the parent post.
It does seem that the concept was employed in a political context. To my brain politizing is a particular kind of use. I get that if you effectively employ any kind of argument towards a political end it becomes politically relevant. However it would be weird if any tool employed would automatically become part of politics.
If beliefs are to pay rent and this particular point is established / marketed to establish a specific another point I could get on board with a expectation to disclose such “financial ties”. Up to this point I know that this belief is sponsored by another belief but I do not know which belief and I don’t fully get why it would be troublesome to reveal this belief.
The negation that “Popular ideas attract disproportionally good advocates” seems also worth attention. People accept sloppy thinking a lot more readily if they agree with the conlusion. This can be used as a dark art where you present a sloppy thinking argument for obvious truth or uplifting conlusion and then proceed to use the same technique to support the payload. The target is less likely to successfully deploy resistance.
Also it’s quite often that a result that is produced in a rigorous way is rederived in a sloppy way by those that are told about the result.
I think most people will say that they have “visual experiences” ie that they can see and experience themselfs as seeing something when they use their eyes.
There are “blindsighted people” that say that they are blind, but if you throw them a ball they can catch it. This seems to involve using eye information to coordinate hands. But it seems plausible that they lack the experience of seeing atleast on some of their conscious levels.
A person that denies the existence of qualia would seem to neccesarily claim that most/all people are blindsighted, sure they can benefit from visual information but they don’t experience it. This is not a common claim.
Yet it seems common for people to understand that computers are not persons and that getting mad at computers is misguided and that there lacks a foundation to claim that there is something to “be” a desktop computer. But when considering their fellow humans they do not have any stronger claims that experience is necceary when referring to humans. (and it’s common to claim that you are having experiences AND that you are not especially experienceful and it’s common to see that computer-equivalency and viewpoint-symmetry lead to incompatible results). Referring to this mostly pretheoretic notion mess is probably not well done with any -ism.
I am guessing you are leaving out important presuppositions which are probably worth discussing.
I know of a set of norms where if you want to decline an invitation you can make up an excuse and if it is discovered that the excuse doesn’t hold water it’s no big deal. Additionally I have seen norms where just saying a flat unexplained “no” is seen as more erroneous than obviously false excuse. I am of personally the inclination that if I don’t have conflicting plans I won’t fabricate them and it making the “unwillingness” more bare seems to get under some peoples nerves. This might be that some people value “keeping face” more than honesty. But there is a funny effect in that if somebody has just announced that they have an excuse not to go at some specific time and you make a suggestion for another actvity for exact same time they might declare to be free to do that. If everybody is “in on the game” that it’s all “face” this doesn’t seem to cause problems.
I do have a problem where if somebody makes what seems like english level claim of fact I tend to favour it being a claim of fact and having trouble when it’s infact something else like invitation rejection. I also have bad understanding why people value “face-culture” and have trouble imagining what kinds of things would go wrong in a “faceless” dystopia.
Be a human gatherer tribe. Go hunt rabbits for a week. Tribe member sits around campfire for a week. You both have 0 rabbits at the end of the week. It would seem that atleast you tried is meaningful. I get that someone that hunts for only one day and gets 1 rabbit is better than both. And it might be that you are getting “expected rabbit” even if not actual rabbit.
I know it’s the typical outcome, but I don’t know why it would be inevitable or obvious. A person that verbally asks for an “honest” answer but punishes is not in fact asking for a honest answer. Part of the reason why people add the qualifier is the belief that those kinds “give you more positive affect”.
If you try to shoot for an actual honest opinion you have to care to differentiate between asking for “dishonestly honest” opinions. For the kind of mindset that has “whatever can be destroyed by the truth should be destroyed” actually honest opinions are what to shoot for. But I have bad models on what attracts people to “dishonestly honest” opinions. I suspect that that mindset could benefit from different framing (“I have your back” vs “yes” ie forgo claims on state of the world in favour of explicit social moves).
This lesswrong post might make someone seek out more “dishonest positivity” by applying a “rejection danger” in pursuit of “belief strengthening”. I feel that there is an argument to be made that when rejection danger realises you should just eat it in the face without resisting and the failure mode prominently features resisting the rejection. And on the balance if you can’t withstand a no then you will not have earned the yes and should not be asking the question in the first place.
That is on the epistemic side there is a “conservation of expected evidence” but on the social side there is a “adherence to recieved choice”, you can’t give control of an area of life conditional on how that control would be used, if you censor someone you are not infact giving them a choice.
Developing a rationalist identity is harmfull. Promoting a “-ism” or group affilication with the label “rational” is harmful.
Note that in 1 if you want to avoid the “lackluster doing” outcome you have to genuinely be willing to not do / take pessimism effectively in to account when you do the group discussion: It seems to be a very distinct skill which is not very obvious.
In 9 it’s kinda weird that a bayesian wants to increase a probability of a proposition. Someone that takes conservation of expected evidence into hearth would know that a too high number would be counterproductive hubris. I guess it could mean “I want to make X happen” vs “I want to believe X will happen”. I get how the reasoning works on the belief side but effecting the world side I am unsure the logic even applies.
“Counterspells” are supposed to be useful.
MtG counterspell is a card but it’s also a spell category. Spell in that category usually cost less the more specific their target restrictions are. They also all accomplish the same thing in that ultimately nothing happens (ie a cancellation).
Using magic here as a metaphor might be fitting as the point of such a move is to reveal that the machinery supposed to be employed actually doesn’t do anything ie that magic doesn’t work and is just wishful thinking. The worry would be that by acknowledging the attempted methods you “steep down to their level” ie employ magic yourself despite not believing in it.
This is very close to on how on magic color philosophy white sees red as dangerous, that order is required to keep chaos at bay. And lot of the of the standard counterarguments apply, red can argue that compromise stiffles freedom and having a to find a single solution that works for everyone takes forever compared to making quick local solutions to the persons that are affected by them.
For example it’s probably not a error state that the globe has multiple states in it instead of a single super country. Instead of intolerable chaos it’s more like diversity to be celebrated.
There is the argument that if you are a pack hunter then you need to be compromising enough to be able to form the hunt group instead of everyone hunting for themselfs. But then again people form villages and instead of doing a single super village around 150 they split of into multiple independent groups (this hints at hidden costs of unity).
Unity is not an unconditional requirement. Some things need / benefit from unity but the need is often finite or only in regards to some aspect. And it might be possible to solve the same need with some other method rather than unity.
The concept of a core game loop seems to point to similar phenomenon when explictly setting up games.
Your thought experiement has failed to actually look at the world, you still do not have any empirical evidence. If the Galileo argumenters had made a thought-experiment and concluded “thus blessed by mysterious rituals falls faster” the result would still be firmly “within philosophy”.
Good advice tends to have it’s opposite to be good advice too. I am often struggling with the failure mode where I try to solve a version of the problem that is general. it ends up being hard and I end up not doing, doing it only in small part or doing it inefficiencty. In these kinds of situations it could benefit me from exploiting the peculiar properties of people that I am in fact in direct contact with rather coming up with a “dealing with people in general”. Sometimes “we will worry about that once it gets relevant” means it gets relevant and there is no longer notice or possiblity to deal wiht it but on the other hand if you knew it will become a problem it can be easier to notice and set out to solve the problem.
Just being aware what you can handle can be valuable. “What you do if you don’t have oxygen surrounding your body?”, “You are silly humans have oxygen around their bodies no need to worry about it”, “Hey with this scuba tank you can visit places that do not have breathable athmospheres without dying”
I would also think that case 4 is not htat helpless. If you tell what has happened to you to a friendly culture they probably will tell “Well among us we would do X instead of Y in this situation?”, “But yeah but what if other people are doing Y how you carry on from that” (“People do not do Y” would be valid if actual filter bubble exists but if there is concrete telling of another persons life tha tis indeniable proof that some person has done Y making this not an option) “That’s is so weird to do Y that is so bad, wrong and what would even be the point of that?” (If we would make this in a shared culture “Y is bad” can be seen as demand not to Y but when talking about a foreign culture there seems ot be a better formed problem of “how to effectively demand fo Y abolitinition without being outright rejected”). This can easily lead to recognition that things function differently in the other context it can easily spark curiosity for the function differences and it is likely to give recognition and tools to deal with experiences of alienation or akwardness. Sure lines with structure like “Oh in responce to Y you do Z” are likely to be missing but a lot of other positive stuff is likely to come up. Trying to do the troubleshooting wihtin the foregin context would lead to diffulcties of the kind of “you expected and want X to happen, what kind of weirdo are you?”
With tacit knowledge there are arising new forms of text that can make them a lot more transferrable. A good video game will have player participation designed in the process and is designed to work with widish amount of player types. They are currently mainly shooting for fun rather than knowledge transfer but they circumvent the “purely teorethical” barrier which would mean that a frozen game code can preserve the “guiding structure” of an expert long after the expert is dead.
In posts about circular preferences that was appointed the role of “busy work amount to nothing” and the highest scorer on the utility function as the “optimal solution”. However here roles are pretty much reversed in that cyclical movement is “productive work” and stable maximisation is “death”.
The text also adds a lot of interpretative layer in addition to the experimental setups. Would not derive same semantics from the setups only.