Surreals have multiples and are ordered, yet they contain multiple different archimedian fields. You can have for all r in reals and all s in surreals that r*s exists and that there is another surreal that is greater than all of r*s. Arbitrarily large finite is a different thing than an infinitely large value. You can’t “inch” your way to infinity. If you have a single bad experience and “inch” around it you will only reach one archimedian field but how do you know that you have covered the whole space of bad experience?
If you would copy my brain but make it twice as large that copy would be as “lonely” as I would be and this would remain after arbitrary doublings. Single individuals can be extended in space without communicating with other individuals.
The “extended wire” thought experiement doesn’t specify enough how that physical communication line is used. It’s plausible that there is no “verbalization” process like there is an step to write an email if one replaces sonic communication with ip-packet communication. With huge relative distance would come speed of light delays, if one twin was on earth and another on the moon there would be a round trip latency of seconds which probably would distort how the combined brain works. (And I guess with doublign in size would need to come with proportionate slowing to have same function).
I think there is a difference between a information system being spatially extended and having two information systems interface with each other. Say that you have 2 routers or 10 routers on the same length of line. It makes sense to make a distinction that each routers functions “independently” even if they have to be able to suggest each other enough that packets flow throught. To the first router the world “downline” seems very similar whether or not intermediate routers exist. I don’t count information system internal processing as communicating thus I don’t count “thinking” into communicating. Thus the 10 router version does more communicating than the 2 router version.
I think the “verbalization” step does mean that even highbandwidth connection doesn’t automatically mean qualia sharing. I am thinking of plugings that allow programming languages to share code. Even if there is a perfect 1-to-1 compatibility between the abstractions of the languages I think still each language only ever manipulates their version of that representation. Cross-using without translation would make it illdefined what would be correct function but if you do translation then it loses the qualities of the originating programming language. A C sharp integer variable will never contain a haskel integer even if a C sharp integer is constructed to represent the haskel integer. (I guess it would be possible to make a super-language that has integer variables that can contain haskel-integers and C-sharp integers but that language would not be C sharp or haskel). By being a spesific kind of cognitive architechture you are locked into certain representation types which are unescaable outside of turning into another kind ot architechture.
The Tatiana and krista experiment is quite interesting but stretches the concept of communication to it’s limits. I am inclined to say that having a shared part of your conciousness is not communication in the same way that sharing a house is not traffic. It does strike me that communication involves directed construction of thoughts and it’s easy to imagine that the scope of what this construction is capable would be vastly smaller than what goes on in the brain in other processes. Extending the construction to new types of thoughts might be a soft border rather than a hard one. With enough verbal sentences it should be in principle to be able to reconstruct an actual graphical image, but even with overtly descriptive prose this level is not really reached (I presume) but remains within the realm of sentence-like data structures.
In the example Tatiana directs the visual cortex and Krista can just recall the representation later. But in a single conciouness brain nothing can be made “ready” but it must be assembled by the brain itself from sensory inputs. That is cognitive space probably has small funnels and for signficant objects they can’t travel them as themselfs but must be chopped off into pieces and reassembled after passing the tube.
I have a previous high impliciation uncertainty about this (that would be a crux?). ” you can’t accelerate enough to turn around ” seems false to me. The mathematical rotation seems like it ought to exist. The prevoius reasons I thought such a mathematical rotation would be impossible I have signficantly less faith in. If I draw a unit sphere analog in spacetime having a visual observation from the space-time diagram drawn on euclid paper is not sufficient to conclude that the future cone is far from past cone. And thinking that a sphere is “all within r distance” it would seem it should be continuous and simply connected under most instances. I think there also should exist a transformation that when repeated enough times returns to the original configuration. And I find it surprising that a boost like transformation would fail to be like that if it is a rotation analog.
I have started to believe that the standrd reasoning why you can’t go faster than light relies on a kind of faulty logic. With normal euclidean geometry it would go like: there is a maximum angle you can reach by increasing the y-coordinate and slope is just the ratio of x to y so at that maximum y maximum slope is reached so maximum angle that you can have is 90 degrees. So if you try to go at 100 degrees you have lesser y and are actually going slower. And in a way 90 degrees is kind of the maximum amount you can point in another direction. But normally degrees go up to 180 or 360 degrees.
In the relativity side c is the maximum ratio but that is for coordinate time. If somebodys proper time would start pointing in a direction that would project negatively on the coordinate time axis the comparison between x per coordinate time and x per proper time would become significant.
There is also a trajectory which seems to be timelike in all segments. A=(0,0,0,0),(2,1,0,0),B=(4,2,0,0),(2,3,0,0),C=(0,4,0,0),(2,5,0,0),D=(4,6,0,0). It would seem awfully a lot like the “corner” A B C would be of equal magnitude but opposite sign from B C D. Now I get why physcially such a trajectory would be challenging. But from a mathematical point of view it is hard to understand why it would be ill-defined. It would also be very strange if there is no boost you can make at B to go from direction AB to direction BC. I get why you can’t rotate from AB to BD (can’t rotate a timelike distance to spacelike distance if rotation preserves length).
I also kind of get why yo woudl need infninte energy make such “impossibly sharp” turns. But as energy is the conserved charge of time translation, the definition of time might depend on which time you choose to derive it from. If you were to gain energy from an external source it would have to be tachyon or going backwards in time (which are either impossible or hard to produce). But if you had a thruster with you with fuel the “proper time energy” might behave differently. That is if you are going at signficant C and the whole universe is frozen and whissing by you should still be able to fire your rockets according to your time (1 second of your engines might take the entire age of the universe to external observers but does that prevent things happening from your perspective?). If acceleration “turns your time direction” and not “increases displacement per spent second” at some finite amount of acceleration experienced you would come full circle or atleast long enough that you are now going to the negative direction that you started in.
As we lack the means to represent the different options we probably do not have a law that paradoxes will be avoided (partly because we do not have a technical analogoue for “paradox”)
In the extended ontology what corresponds to old time would be an open question. That is if you have a multivalued state in the past and some of the values of that are effects of (partial) values in the future it’s still pretty much “time travel”.
I also thought that qunatum mechanics is pretty chill with superposition. Could not one extend the model by having a different imaginary unit and then have a superposition of amplitudes? And I thought getting a sure eigenvalue is a special case. Isn’t the non-eigenvalue case already covering a simultanoues attribution of multiple real values? I case there are two cases 1) we do not represent that currently in our models or 2) Our representations used in our models can not represent that.
Does Gödel metric say anything about prohibition of paradoxes?
I have found that assigment of 0 to a paradoxical configuration is an opinion or assumption and not a result or a theorem.
For example the electron wave function negative solutions were dismissed as unrealistic math artefacts at one point and later adopted as a valid way to reason about positrons. Would it have been correct to say that “obviously electrons have a negative charge?. In modern terms you can distinguish between claims of “leptons have negative charge” and “electrons have negative charge”. But if the only lepton you know is an electron is “positive electron” a valid thing?
While things add up to normality unusual circusmstances can exhibit unsual phenomena.
Having played Achron I have visited the thought space a lot before.
The thing that allows for time travel might break a lot of your other presumptions. If the moon was made of cheese were would all the milk would have come from?
I would like to point out that the assumtion that timelines are stable is a separate assumption from time travel. I think it needs argument and argument from lack of imagination is not a very convincing one.
However even if you go outside of this assumtion were similar things still happen. In another attempt one could argue that if a grandafther paradox has 2 viable states then both of those states should sum in probablity to a state that is “stable”. So you assign less probability to things that can grandfather paradox. If a thing can attempt to paradox in multiple ways you have keep splitting the “measure”. The end result is that a thing that can constantly paradox will be vanishingly unlikely to hang around. This is different than “mysteriously prevented” but for these purposes serves a similar function.
After all if quantum superpositions are not prevented why would “timeline superpositions” be incompatible?
It is noteworthy that invention of timetravel technology is an event that probably has causes. Anything that utilises such technology would be causally dependent on that event. But that even is causally dependent on other events. Thus it might be counterproductive to have any timetravel technology effect any cause of time travel technology. This would effectively mean that all of pre-timetravel history would be “natural reserve” on the pain of death of all timetravel history.
The is a reverse effect where is a time machine can help with its construction it might be tempted to do so provided it doesn’t undo it more than do it. Even the slightest chance of a working time travel method would be blown to optimally early time travel (within the constraints).
That is fiction has plenty of timetravel reasoning to throw around. Specifying your poison would go for a long way. For example rpg game continuum has slipshanking. Having a sudden fight? Grab a pistol from nearest container. Then after fight go to a shop buy gun, go to past and put gun into said container. Timeline is stable, but it feels weird taht realising that you could try do somethign makes it possibel for you to do so (this kind of reasoning has limitations, if you have openend the box and seen it empty you obviosly can’t slipshank a pistol out of it. But being strategically ignorant in order to maximise slipshanking possiblities is interesting). The ultimate slipshank would be to do it before time travel is invented with the intention to invent time travel to pull it off
I find it important in philosophy to be on the clear what you mean. It is one thing to explain and another to define what you mean. You might point to a yellow object and say yellow and somebody that misunderstood might think that you mean “roundness” by yellow. The accuracy is most important when the views are radical and talk in very different worlds. And “disproving” yellow by not being able to pick it out from ostensive differentation is not an argumentative victory but a communicative failure.
Even if we use some other term I think that meaning is important to have. “Plogiston” might sneak in claims but that is just the more reason to have terms that have as little room for smuggling as possible. And we still need good terms to talk about burning. “oxygen” literally means “black maker” but we nowadays understand it as a term to refer to a element which has definitionally very little to do with the color black.
I think the starting point that generated the word refers to a genuine problem. Having qualia in category three would mean that you claim that I do not have experiences. And if qualia is a bad loaded word to refer to the thing to be explained it would be good to make up a new term that refers to that. But to me qualia was just that word. I word like “dark matter” might experience similar “highjack pressure” by having wild claims thrown around about it. And there having things like “warm dark matter”, “wimpy dark matter” makes the classification more fine making the conceptual analysis proceed. But requirements of clear thinking are different from tradition preservance. If you say that “warm dark matter” can’t be the answer the question of dark matter still stands. Even if you succesfully argue that “qualia” can’t be a attractive concept the issue of me not being a p-zombie still remains and it would be expected that some theorethical bending over backwards would happen.
We do not telepathically receive experiemnt results when they are performed. In reality you need ot intake the measumrent results from your first-person point of view (use eyes to read led screen or use ears to hear about stories of experiments performed). It seems to be taht experiments are intersubjective in that other observers will report having experiences that resemble my first-hand experiences. For most purposes shorthanding this to “public” is adequate enough. But your point of view is “unpublisable” in that even if you really tried there is no way to provide you private expereience to the public knowledge pool (“directly”). “I now how you feel” is a fiction it doesn’t actually happen.
Skeptisim about the experiencing of others is easier but being skeptical about your own experiences would seem to be ludicrous.
A physicist might discover that you can make computers out of matter. You can make such computers produce sounds. In processing sounds “homonym” is a perfectly legimate and useful concept. Even if two words are stored in far away hardware locations knowing that they will “sound detection clash” is important information. Even if you slice it a little differently and use different kinds of computer architechtures it woudl still be a real phenomenon.
In technical terms there might be the issue whether its meaningful to differntiate between founded concepts and hypothesis. If hypotheses are required then you could have a physicist that didn’t ever talk about temperature.
You seem to have similar characteristic in your beliefs I encountered on less wrong before.
There is the phenomenon of qualia and then there is the ontological extension. The word does not refer to the ontological extension.
It would be like explaining lightning with lightning. Sure when we dig down there are non-lightning parts. But lightning still zaps people.
Or it would be a category error like saying that if you can explain physics without coordinates by only positing that energy exists you should drop coordinates from your concepts. But coordinates are not a thing to believe in, it’s a conceptual tool to specify claims not a hypothesis in itself. When physists believe in a particular field theory they are not agreeing with the greek philosphers that think that the world is made of a type of number.
More on green errors, I think they do exists. There is a difference between an invasive species and a predator. Green probably allows for predators easier than white or black that would call them murderes. But being disruptive to the harmony is an actual violation green registers.
Imagine you have a snake problem in your houses yard. You could get angry and kill every snake you see (haphazard, random and laboursome the red way to address it). You could poison your yard (but then your flowers might die or your food supply gets fouled, the black way). For wheel completeness sake, wall (white way) or scarecrow (blue way). Or you could introduce a predator species that eats snakes (the green way). Even if the effect is to diminish a component you address it by constructing more components (add species). And likely when the problem is “solved” the predator and prey are in balance and in a way the snakes existence functions as a foundation for the foodchain for the predator.
The hard thing about green as it is the anti-color of the agent color black it doesn’t engage in problem solving. Nature by itself is a defenceless victim. People who care about nature and are naturalistic are a bit different thing. In making a choice what “harmony” you are defending you are probably injecting somewhat of a agentic subjective choice.
This reads to me about magic the gathering terms how it’s useful to be green over being black, althought it mostly uses black terminology.
The violin parenting situation is a good example how black is about certain costs for uncertain benefits and green is about foregoing certain advantages to avoid uncertain disadvantages.
Black is very local, me, this game, this battle and green is very global, ecosystem, species, bordering beyond the unknown.
The linked article had more focus on laziness where it was more anti-black where blue and green attitudes are somewhat mixed up. It is very uncharastic of blue ot have ”??????” steps in the plan and in general less blue shades. I do think the word “medicority” is a very black/blue way of characterising the proprerty as would be expected when the word is derived to be an antonym for their core concepts. I think actually the part where you get to the middle is more active, green wants you to “grow up” and “go be you” but it doesn’t like going over carrying capacity or attempt things not in your nature. In away blue doesn’t bother to the same extent as illusion and visions are adequate and when black cuts something out it cuts it out to 0 if not negative.
I could for example think that green calls “corruption” what black would call “excellence” or “expertise” and “minimal” what blue calls “optimal”. It would be interesting what would be the green concept for the green ideal but my intuition seems to be weaker, maybe “vibrant” (seems to capture diversity well but is not so directly a counterpart to mediocrity)?
It was linked in a lesswrong norm thread. Couldn’t relocate it easily as I don’t remember which thread it was on.
Magic colors and errors
Reading Writers guild policy doc there was a principle of “the vase is already broken”. The whole document is a lot how you make a red organization and most of the princples are anti-white.
The principle makes sense but I found it be foregin to my culture. Things are made to be replaced. And if something is done wrong today we will try to do right the next day.
In contrast the blue way is much more familiar with me. Accept only true things, set up things for perpetuity. In the contrast I noticed that the blue thing is focused on avoiding to making mistakes. You slow down enough that everything can be verified. In the red way you speed up so things can be corrected.
In blue if you make a mistake you will build a machine that will do damage for to the forseeable future. In contrast in red if you feel the wrong way today you will not be inspired to feel so tomorrow and the energy will whimper. “Energy denial” seemed like a new perpective that I hadn’t considered.
Other colors probably also have ways to treat errors. Green probably adapts, there are no “mistakes” only “happy little accidents”. Oxygen catastrophe is not armageddon but new conditions to build upon. Never say “no” but always “yes and” and just keep the harmony in front of your mind, keep the scene going.
Black is proably ready to backstab their friends to death should they turn on them. It’s not about what damage the mistake does but whether it proves your character whether you are safe to keep around. On the flip side having good enough goals means arbirarily bad means can be swallowed.
White probably does courts and maybe a balance of rights: even if we set a monumentally bad law it will need to resolve itself against other core principles. A bad nomination is limited by the powers of the position being limited.
I would count that as compiling in to two things.
But the point I was after everykind of separation we make it will in the end be undone. In that integration the leakyness will make itself apparent.
If you have a reference implementation then your “rule” can’t leak because the code just is what it is. What would be a bug or inconsistency can be redefined to be a feature. But any kind of spesification that is not an instantiation doesn’t contain enough information to construct an instantation yet programs are instances thus instances contain more information than the abstract rules.
I could not clean information to get a picture what is the percieved problem. The closest I got was guessing that the game Uplink had a mission trakcing system that was a mission per email.
If someone tells you to do something you can exercise your own judgement whether you will do it. If a person tells you to jump into a well and you do jump into a well the problem is not that people are able to talk to you (unrestrictidly) but that you are way too suggestible than is good for your own health.
You can say no. You can control who you reveal your which email address to. You can control what kind of connectivity you ask for. (I have to pay because you lack filtering skills?)
It’s also weird that burning social capital is undesirable but burning money would be. And the moloch toolbox link mainly adviced to the contrary. The “magic tower” metaphor critises that just taking 4 years off people is not a good way to select employess. It would seem you need to believe that burning $1 or $10 would somehow make the content more quality? It would also seem that paying to cry wolf would be a more tempting joke as more extreme reactions would be expected (and the cost being “adequate compensation” for the disruption, there was a phenomenon where making a trivial cost on picking your kids late from kindergarden made the parents late more and not sorry).
There could be something interesting about how mechanics of email leads to “drive-by-burdening” where you skip the negotiation phase whether some committed can be formed and just simply proceed to assume that it will be done. But I would asssume the solution or problem formulation would be more social or communication centric. And would guess the solutions could be “stop making everyone your boss, make commitments that you don’t plan on keeping (spam your business card with email on it to ‘network’ and then not wanting to reply when people use it, are you in or out in this networking thing?) and avoid legimate turning down just because it’s icky”. And in the case of your actual employer boss leaving too much emails a line of “you have to talk about overburdening with management and be prepared to leave employement that doesn’t fit your life”
I also have a bad feeling about baggage that economical thinking will bring with it. It is dissatisying to me that the reservations are nebolous to me. But if communication is free I can focus on whether the idea has merit, on paid communication I might tend to shift to a frame where I “assume merit” rather than “verify merit”. And rather than being confident in my communication because I speak the truth I could be confident because of sunk-cost fallacies etc.
One of the reasons might be that one human is a individual information processing system. You need feedback loops to have context for your sensory data. If you link two brains by a magic interface there is the issue that the remote brain doesn’t have any context what the data from the local eye means. Two individuals might also be using totally different framworks for incorporating knowledge. Someone might be more visual based, someone more kinetic. Now if you transfer a kinetic encoded knowledge to a brain that uses visual representations the data is just structure incompatible with the receiver and unable to be used for any purpose. You have to actually translate the data to information types that can actually be utilised by the brain and this work can’t be skipped by arbitrary fast data transfer ie communication is not a substitute for understanding.
A species that used a standardised locked-in information scheme could do such tranfers as any data generatred in any brain would be usable verbatim in other brains. But a species that allows individual organism run on different operating systems can discover new types of operating systems, tailor operating system to environment and benefit from commuinities that have information trade between different types of OSes. And while lossless perfect transfer might be powerful, dialogue between two archtechture migth be even better. Instead of losses you get gains. Settling at 100% might mean leaving money at the table.
Part of the miracle of language might be that you get interoperability with full implementation freedom. And note that there is nothing stopping you from intaking information on the various human languages. But the chances are you only undersand 1 or couple of them and if an expert somewhere near a dozen. Most languages have dialects ie they are at the risdk of breaking into even small languages. In the limit world where every human speaks their own language thoughts would travel very slowly. But all islands of interoperability need energy upkeep to keep that interoperability going. Silence is the default, sharing requires effort.
I am assuming US context for the question. I don’t have such a good model on how the american mindset works so to me I just spot qualititive differences and I would be out of my league to guess on quantity data.
If there was a baby that was hungry, did not have it’s diaper changed and did not socially interact with adults all day asking whether we can effect the chances of crying by altering the properties of tears would be strange way to frame the problem. Yet it would make sense that the child should not learn that hissyfits are the effective way to get your needs taken care of. And I would still encourage parents to pay attention to the reason why the crying happens even if they “should not give in” to the crying rather than dismiss it as illegimate. And “stop the crying” should not be the main objective althought it might be the difference between the illusion of being an effective parent / happy child and needing to attend to reality.
America has much more stronger ideas that place responciblity for individuals to fix things and if you can’t do this having a “loser” status is much more likely rather than being “left out” or “abandoned”. As a “loser” it makes more sense to try to “win” via violence and in a society that genuinely doesn’t support it’s citizens it might make sense to treat the situation as an informal war. It’s a balancing act how the roles of society and individuals are organized. It seems that an american citizen can respectably and publicically prepare to use lethal force or use it as a threat. Coloring the guns would change the “respectability” aspects of those mechanics and the important bit might be that gun usage would be assigned a “frowned upon” or “try to avoid but we are not outlawing it” status. There is also a strange “evil people are gonna evil” narrative when more of a “poor people are gonna desperate” is more popular elsewhere. So rather than trying to lessen direct violence situations the american mindset is more about doing it effectively and correctly and on the correct targets. It leads to a strange “semi-duel” situation to what my sensibilities are “where is the police, why isn’t this resolved with litigation?”. The “semi-duel” situation keeps legimate gun use close to illegimate gun use which makes it difficult to sort correctly.
If in my society somebody got shot by a person with troubles, my instinct would not be to demand that more defence options in the immidiate situation should have been available but the danger factors what drove someone to be violent should be addressed. To an american this can sound a lot more like “evil won this one” but to me it’s much more tragic that mental health pressures leave people with no options so I end up asking for people to have non-violent options so that the usage of violent options goes down or that they don’t have troubles in the first place that need desperate solving attempts. If I am in a village that contains 10% mentally unstable enough persons that could do violent crime based on that I would be alarmed on why the health system isn’t correcting this error state where an american might be “it’s fine if they dont enter my house/neighbourhood” and ask for effective ways to keep them on the right side of their fence. I don’t want my fence to be a warzone delineator for that semi-duel. I want the combatants out of the game before the firing starts, I don’t want to win that I don’t want to play that. But that can lead to caring about peoples private business more than is customary in that part of the world. That can mean taking coersively tax money to alleviate societal pressure just for the sake of societal stability. Some people want to earn more and skimp on defence/stability. But at some point the tax savings might be lost on making an adequate wall.
To me the idea of solving a problem by raising a gun to my fellow human is making a PvP situation what is actually a PvE situation. If you shoot me the environment wins and we both lose. Thefore I don’t want that the gun user loses. I want that we win. Even if reality is more of amix of PvP and PvE elements human-life is so deeplly in PvE domain that the sheer destructiveness of it should make sensible players to see that using it would be an error. Sure lets keep economical competition but lets keep violence out of it and make armed robbery not happen. If you are interested in getting your daily bread I want that to involve my life and not my death. Likewise my life should involve your bread and not hunger and wat the very least my death should not involve your bread.
I want to focus on the claimed logical fallacy.
“Assume X. X-> Y is inappropriate. We do Y. Why we are doing Y as it is pointless?” is kind of sloppy or incomplete logical thinking. One is mixing assumtions and observations. However the repair options seem pretty obvious that automatic steelmanning seems temping to assume.
“Assume X. X-> Y is inappropriate. We do Y. We do not seem to believe X” is perfectly fine argument ad absurdum.
“X- > Y is inappropriate. We do Y. Thefore not X.” is also fine argument ad absurdum.
On the actual determinism side:
If I have a perfectly clockwork piece of code I can talk about the code doing stuff even if there is no possibility that it would run differently. It’s illustrative to think how things would turn out if a piece of code was missing/different but it is not needed fundamentally to give the concepts meaning. On human level affairs “freedom” means something along the lines of “the system has degrees of freedom that include multiple meaningful outcomes” and we don’t differentiate strongly between epistemic degrees of freedom and ontological degrees of freedom. Determinism works on a differnt concept layer and while it’s not totally irrelevant it doesn’t enter as directly relevant as a sloppy thinker would say.
It is possible that a system could be non-deterministic in the determinism way and fail to be determnistic in the human living way. A system that has degrees of freedom all of which correlate to one meaningful outcome would be humanlevel clockwork and physics level non-clockwork. And a physics level clockwork can still be unknown so that socially we must account for all meaningful categories it could turn out to be. For example if a code has a bug the programmer in the course of debugging will narrow down the search on which exact version of the code actually exist as the previous coding actions are consistent for multiple of them. Unchecked portions of it then exhibit “freedom” althought on mechanical level the code runs in only one way.
Crossing from “reasonable doubt” to “beyond reasonable doubt” has little to do with ontology and is analogous to the code bug hunt. Being deterministic is not an effective defence to claim that you do not contain bugs.