philosophybear

• philosophybear 18 Mar 2023 9:53 UTC

  7 points

  in reply to: NicholasAndresen’s comment on: Six eco­nomics mis­con­cep­tions which I’ve re­solved over the last few years

  The monopsony approach to the labor market says they’re the rule. A company doesn’t actually formally have to be the only buyer of labor power in its region to hold monopsony power.

• philosophybear 17 Mar 2023 12:41 UTC

  1 point

  0

  in reply to: cousin_it’s comment on: Ra­tion­al­ism and so­cial rationalism

  I added this to the blog post to explain why I don’t think your objection goes through:

  “[Edit: To respond to an objection that was made on another forum to this blog- advocate for in the context of this section does not necessarily mean the claim is true. If the public thinks the likelihood of X is 1%, and your own assessment, not factoring in the weight of others’ judgments, is 30%, you shouldn’t lie and say you think it’s true. Advocacy just means making a case for it, which doesn’t require lying about your own probability assessment.]”

Ra­tion­al­ism and so­cial rationalism

• philosophybear 21 Feb 2023 4:17 UTC

  3 points

  3

  on: The idea that ChatGPT is sim­ply “pre­dict­ing” the next word is, at best, misleading

  Here’s an analogy. AlphaGo had a network which considered the value of any given board position. It was separate from it’s monte carlo tree search network- which explicitly planned the future. However it seems probable that in some sense, in considering the value of the board, AlphaGo was (implicitly) evaluating the future possibilities of the position. Is that the kind of evaluation you’re suggesting is happening? “Explicitly” ChatGPT only looks one word ahead, but “implicitly” it is considering those options in light of future directions of development for the text?

  What links here?

  • Plan­ning in LLMs: In­sights from AlphaGo by jco (4 Dec 2023 18:48 UTC; 8 points)

Repub­lish­ing an old es­say in light of cur­rent news on Bing’s AI: “Re­gard­ing Blake Le­moine’s claim that LaMDA is ‘sen­tient’, he might be right (sorta), but per­haps not for the rea­sons he thinks”

ChatGPT un­der­stands language

• philosophybear 13 Jan 2023 4:20 UTC

  4 points

  0

  in reply to: the gears to ascension’s comment on: The AI Con­trol Prob­lem in a wider in­tel­lec­tual context

  Thankyou, I will start to have a read. At first glance, this reminds me of the phenomena of reference magnetism often discussed in philosophy of language. I suspect a good account of natural abstractions will involve the concept of reference magnetism in some way, although teasing out the exact relationship between the concepts might take a while.

The AI Con­trol Prob­lem in a wider in­tel­lec­tual context

Ver­bal par­ity: What is it and how to mea­sure it? + an ed­ited ver­sion of “Against John Searle, Gary Mar­cus, the Chi­nese Room thought ex­per­i­ment and its world”

Lan­guage mod­els are nearly AGIs but we don’t no­tice it be­cause we keep shift­ing the bar

Against John Searle, Gary Mar­cus, the Chi­nese Room thought ex­per­i­ment and its world

Re­gard­ing Blake Le­moine’s claim that LaMDA is ‘sen­tient’, he might be right (sorta), but per­haps not for the rea­sons he thinks

• philosophybear 28 Dec 2022 0:49 UTC

  1 point

  0

  in reply to: avturchin’s comment on: Theod­icy and the simu­la­tion hy­poth­e­sis, or: The prob­lem of simu­la­tor evil

  I see your point now, but I think this just reflects the current state of our knowledge. We haven’t yet grasped that we are implicitly creating- if not minds, then things a-bit-mind-like every time we order artificial intelligence to play a particular character.
  
  When this knowledge becomes widespread, we’ll have to confront the reality of what we do every time we hit run. And then we’ll be back to the problem of theodicy- the God being the being that presses play- and the question being- is pressing play consistent with their being good people?* If I ask GPT-3 to tell a story about Elon Musk, is that compatible with me being a good person?
  
  * (in the case of GPT-3, probably yes, because the models created are so simple as to lack ethical status, so pressing play doesn’t reflect poorly on the simulation requester. For more sophisticated models, the problem gets thornier.)

Re­cent ad­vances in Nat­u­ral Lan­guage Pro­cess­ing—Some Woolly spec­u­la­tions (2019 es­say on se­man­tics and lan­guage mod­els)

• philosophybear 27 Dec 2022 0:23 UTC

  1 point

  0

  in reply to: Anon User’s comment on: Theod­icy and the simu­la­tion hy­poth­e­sis, or: The prob­lem of simu­la­tor evil

  Certainly, it is possible, but I see little to guarantee our descendants won’t create simulations that are like the world we live in now.

  1. Our descendants may well not regard sims as having the same rights as persons.

  2. Even if they do, if even a small number of rogue beings (or nations etc.) conducted such simulations, unethical as they may be, it is possible that simulations would soon outnumber real people- especially for critical junctures in history (e.g., right before the discovery of AGI.)

  3. The essay gives at least two ethical reasons which, in my view at least, may offer enough good to outweigh the suffering- such that even a person who cared deeply about sims might still sanction the existence of a world in which they suffer to achieve their aims.

  So given those factors, we may be in a simulation, and given that, I think an interesting question is “is our being in a simulation compatible with our simulators being good people”

• philosophybear 27 Dec 2022 0:16 UTC

  1 point

  0

  in reply to: avturchin’s comment on: Theod­icy and the simu­la­tion hy­poth­e­sis, or: The prob­lem of simu­la­tor evil

  I have to disagree here. I strongly suspect that GPT, when it, say, pretends to be a certain character, is running a rough and ready approximate simulation of that character’s mental state and its interacting components (various beliefs, desires etc.) I have previously discussed this in an essay, which I will soon be posting.

Theod­icy and the simu­la­tion hy­poth­e­sis, or: The prob­lem of simu­la­tor evil