Max Tegmark

AI Re­searchers, Ask Your­self Th­ese 6 Ques­tions to Strengthen Your Mo­ral Muscles

Which side of the AI safety com­mu­nity are you in?

Scal­ing Laws for Scal­able Oversight

• Max Tegmark 15 Oct 2024 17:39 UTC

  9 points

  1

  in reply to: Orpheus16’s comment on: The Hopium Wars: the AGI En­tente Delusion

  Thanks Akash! As I mentioned in my reply to Nicholas, I view it as flawed to think that China or the US would only abstain from AGI because of a Sino-US agreement. Rather, they’d each unilaterally do it out of national self-interest.

  • It’s not in the US self-interest to disempower itself and all its current power centers by allowing a US company to build uncontrollable AGI.

  • It’s not in the interest of the Chinese Communist Party to disempower itself by allowing a Chinese company to build uncontrollable AGI.

  Once the US and Chinese leadership serves their self-interest by preventing uncontrollable AGI at home, they have a shared incentive to coordinate to do the same globally. The reason that the self-interest hasn’t yet played out is that US and Chinese leaders still haven’t fully understood the game theory payout matrix: the well-funded and wishful-thinking-fueled disinformation campaign arguing that Turing, Hinton, Bengio, Russell, Yudkowski et al are wrong (that we’re likely to figure out to control AGI in time if we “scale quickly”) is massively successful. That success is unsurprising, given how successful the disinformation campaigns were for, e.g., tobacco, asbesthos and leaded gasoline – the only difference is that the stakes are much higher now.

• Max Tegmark 15 Oct 2024 11:30 UTC

  10 points

  3

  in reply to: Niki Dupuis’s comment on: The Hopium Wars: the AGI En­tente Delusion

  Thanks Nicholas for raising this issue. I think your framing overcomplicates the crux:
  the root cause of an inspiring future with AI won’t be international coordination, but national self-interest.

  • It’s not in the US self-interest to disempower itself and all its current power centers by allowing a US company to build uncontrollable AGI.

  • It’s not in the interest of the Chinese Communist Party to disempower itself by allowing a Chinese company to build uncontrollable AGI.

  Once the US and Chinese leadership serves their self-interest by preventing uncontrollable AGI at home, they have a shared incentive to coordinate to do the same globally. The reason that the self-interest hasn’t yet played out is that US and Chinese leaders still haven’t fully understood the game theory payout matrix: the well-funded and wishful-thinking-fueled disinformation campaign arguing that Turing, Hinton, Bengio, Russell, Yudkowski et al are wrong (that we’re likely to figure out to control AGI in time if we “scale quickly”) is massively successful. That success is unsurprising, given how successful the disinformation campaigns were for, e.g., tobacco, asbesthos and leaded gasoline – the only difference is that the stakes are much higher now.

  What links here?

  • Nathan Helm-Burger's comment on Yud­kowsky on The Tra­jec­tory podcast by Seth Herd (25 Jan 2025 18:50 UTC; 4 points)

• Max Tegmark 15 Oct 2024 11:10 UTC

  28 points

  12

  in reply to: avturchin’s comment on: The Hopium Wars: the AGI En­tente Delusion

  Wow – I’d never seen that chillingly prophetic passage! Moloch for the win.
  “The only winning move is not to play.”
  A military-AGI-industrial-complex suicide race has been my worst nightmare since my teens.
  But I didn’t expect “the good guys” in the Anthropic leadership pouring gasoline on it.

• Max Tegmark 14 Oct 2024 9:41 UTC

  24 points

  17

  in reply to: Bogdan Ionut Cirstea’s comment on: The Hopium Wars: the AGI En­tente Delusion

  Salut Boghdan!

  I’m not sure this line of reasoning has the force some people seem to assume. What would you expect the results of hypothetical, similar referendums would have been e.g. before the industrial revolution and before the agricultural revolution, on those changes?

  I’m somewhat horrified by this comment. This hypothetical referendum is about replacing all biological humans by machines, whereas the agricultural and industrial revolutions did no such thing. If you believes in democracy, then why would you allow a tiny minority to decide to kill off everyone else against their will? I find such lackadaisical support for democratic ideals particularly hypocritical from people who say we should rush to AGI to defend democracy against authoritarian governments,

• Max Tegmark 14 Oct 2024 0:23 UTC

  10 points

  0

  in reply to: Tamsin Leake’s comment on: The Hopium Wars: the AGI En­tente Delusion

  Right, Tamsin: so reasonable safety standards would presumably ban fully unrestricted superassistants too, but allow more limited assistants that could still be incredibly helpful. I’m curious what AI safety standards you’d propose – it’s not a hypothetical question, since many politicians would like to know.

• Max Tegmark 14 Oct 2024 0:20 UTC

  27 points

  21

  in reply to: Noosphere89’s comment on: The Hopium Wars: the AGI En­tente Delusion

  Thanks Noosphere89 for your long and thoughtful comment! I don’t have time to respond to everything before putting my 1-year-old to bed, but here are some brief comments.
  
  1) Although I appreciate that you wrote out a proposed AGI alignment plan, I think you’ll agree that it contains no theorems or proofs, or even quantitative risk bounds. Since we insist on quantitative risk bounds before allowing much less dangerous technology such as airplanes and nuclear reactors, my view is that it would be crazy to launch AGI without quantitative risk bounds—especially when you’re dealing with a super-human mind that might actively optimize against vulnerabilities of the alignment system. As you know, rigorously ensuring retained alignment under recursive self-improvement is extremely difficult. For example, MIRI had highly talented researchers work on this for many years without completing the tast.

  2) The point you make about fear of 1984 vs fear of extinction. However, if someone assicns P(1984) >> P(extinction) and there’s no convincing plan for preventing AGI loss-of-control, then I’d argue that it’s still crazy of them (or for China) to build AGI. So they’d both forge ahead with increasingly powerful yet controllable tool AGI, presumably remaining in a today’s mutually-asssured destruction paradign where neither has an incentive to try to conquer the other.

  I have yet to hear a version of the “but China!” argument that makes any sense if you believe that the AGI race is a suicide race rather than a traditional armsrace. Those I hear making it are usually people who also dismiss the AGI extinction risk. If anything, the current Chinese leadership seems more concerned about AI xrisk than Western leaders.

• Max Tegmark 13 Oct 2024 20:05 UTC

  7 points

  0

  in reply to: Gordon Seidoh Worley’s comment on: The Hopium Wars: the AGI En­tente Delusion

  Excellent question, Gordon! I defined tool AI specifically as controllable, so AI without a quantitative guarantee that it’s controllable (or “safe”, as you write) wouldn’t meet the safety standards and its release would be prohibited. I think it’s crucial that, just as for aviation and pharma, the onus is on the companies rather than the regulators to demonstrate that products meet the safety standards. For controllable tools with great potential for harm (say plastic explosives), we already have regulatory approaches for limiting who can use them and how. Analogously, there’s discussion at the UNGA this week about creating a treaty on lethal autonomous weapons, which I support.

The Hopium Wars: the AGI En­tente Delusion

• Max Tegmark 3 Nov 2022 18:41 UTC

  8 points

  0

  in reply to: Ben Pace, the Vacationing Vagabond’s comment on: Open Let­ter Against Reck­less Nu­clear Es­ca­la­tion and Use

  I indeed meant only “worst so far”, in the sense that it would probably kill more people than any previous disaster.

Open Let­ter Against Reck­less Nu­clear Es­ca­la­tion and Use

• Max Tegmark 11 Oct 2022 8:55 UTC

  52 points

  9

  in reply to: Andrew AJ’s comment on: Why I think there’s a one-in-six chance of an im­mi­nent global nu­clear war

  I’m typing this from New Zealand.

• Max Tegmark 11 Oct 2022 8:53 UTC

  2 points

  0

  in reply to: 1a3orn’s comment on: Why I think there’s a one-in-six chance of an im­mi­nent global nu­clear war

  Important clarification: Neither here nor in the twitter post did I advocate appeasement or giving in to blackmail. In the Venn diagram of possible actions, there’s certainly a non-empty intersection of “de-escalation” and “appeasement”, but they’re not the same set, and there are de-escalation strategies that don’t involve appeasement but might nonetheless reduce nuclear war risk. I’m curious: do you agree that halting (and condemning) the following strategies can reduce escalation and help cool things down without giving in to blackmail?

  1. nuclear threats

  2. atrocities

  3. misleading atrocity propaganda

  4. assassinations lacking military value

  5. infrastructure attacks lacking military value (e.g. Nordstream sabotage)

  6. shelling the Zaporizhzhya nuclear plant

  7. disparaging de-escalation supporters as unpatriotic

  I think it would reduce nuclear war risk if the international community strongly condemned 1-7 regardless of which side did it, and I’d like to see this type of de-escalation immediately.

• Max Tegmark 9 Oct 2022 0:44 UTC

  2 points

  1

  in reply to: DirectedEvolution’s comment on: Why I think there’s a one-in-six chance of an im­mi­nent global nu­clear war

  The more items on the list of nuclear near-misses, the more convinced you should be that de-escalation works, no matter how close we get to nuclear war.

  That’s an interesting argument, but it ignores the selection effect of survivor bias. If you play Russian roulette many times and survive, that doesn’t mean that the risk you took was small. Similarly, if you go with the Xia et al estimate that nuclear winter kills 99% of Americans and Europeans, the fact that we find ourself being in that demographic in 2022 doesn’t mean that the past risks we took were small: if you do the Bayesean calculation, you’d find the most likely world for a surviving Americans or European in 2022 would be a world where no nuclear winter had occurred, even if the ab initio risk was quite large.

  You can also make direct risk estimates. For example, JFK estimated that the risk of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis was about 33%. And he said that not knowing about the Arkhipov incident. If Orlov’s account is accurate, then there was a 75% chance of a nuclear attack on the US that day, since there was only a 25% probability that Arkhipov would have been on that particular one of the four nuclear-armed subs.

• Max Tegmark 9 Oct 2022 0:28 UTC

  1 point

  −16

  in reply to: Algon’s comment on: Why I think there’s a one-in-six chance of an im­mi­nent global nu­clear war

  Algon, please provide references to peer-reviewed journals supporting your claims that smoke predictions are overblown, etc. Since there’s a steady stream of peer-reviewed papers quantifying nuclear winter in serious science journals, I find myself unconvinced by criticism that appears only on blogs and without the detailed data, GitHub code, etc. that tends to accompany peer-reviewed research. Thanks!

• Max Tegmark 9 Oct 2022 0:18 UTC

  10 points

  8

  in reply to: Ege Erdil’s comment on: Why I think there’s a one-in-six chance of an im­mi­nent global nu­clear war

  Ege, if you find the framework helpful, I’d love to hear your estimates for the factor probabilities 30%, 70%, 80%. I’d also be very interested in seeing alternative endpoint classifications and alternative frameworks. I sense that we both agree that it’s valuable to estimate the nuclear war risk, and basing the estimate on a model that decomposes into pieces that can be debated separately rather than basing it on just gazing into our belly-buttons and tossing out a single probability that feels right.

• Max Tegmark 9 Oct 2022 0:10 UTC

  3 points

  1

  in reply to: ChristianKl’s comment on: Why I think there’s a one-in-six chance of an im­mi­nent global nu­clear war

  Russia also wanted to withdraw of US troops from the baltic states which is also a nonstarter.

  Yeah, that was clearly a non-starter, and perhaps a deliberate one they could drop later to save face and claim they’d won a compromise. My point was simply that since the West didn’t even offer a promise not to let Ukraine into NATO, I don’t think they’d ever agree to a “Kosovo”.

• Max Tegmark 9 Oct 2022 0:00 UTC

  48 points

  5

  in reply to: Ege Erdil’s comment on: Why I think there’s a one-in-six chance of an im­mi­nent global nu­clear war

  Thanks David and Ege for these excellent points! You’re giving me too much credit by calling it a “thesis”; it was simply part of my reasoning behind the 30% number. Yeah, I did consider the Gulf War as an important counterexample. I’ll definitely consider revising my 30% number downward in my next update, but there are also interesting examples on the other side:

  • The Falklands War: The Argentinian military junta’s 1982 invasion of the British Falkland Islands was humiliatingly defeated. This became the final nail in the coffin for a dictatorship facing a collapsing economy and increasing domestic resistance, and collapsed shortly thereafter. Most of the members of the Junta are currently in prison for crimes against humanity and genocide.

  • The Yom Kippur War: The 1973 invasion of Israeli-held territory by an Arab coalition was unsuccessful. Although the Arab national leaders were able to remain in power, some military leaders fared less well. Syrian Colonel Rafik Halawi, who’s infantry brigade allowed an Israeli breakthrough, was executed before the war even ended.

  • Survival of nation versus leader: Although mainstream Western media often portrays Putin as the main driving force behind the invasion, there’s also broad and well-documented local sentiment that the West has been seeking to weaken, fragment and dominate Russia for decades, with Ukraine being a red line. Whether such sentiment is valid or not is irrelevant for my argument. In other words, the “escalate-or-die” dynamic may be playing out not only in Putin’s head, but also at a national level. Ukraine itself is a shining example of how powerful such national self-preservation instincts can be.