Someone tried to solve a big schlep of event organizing.
Through this app, you:
Pledge money when signing up to an event
Lose it if you don’t attend
Get it back if you attend + a share of the money from all the no-shows
For some reason it uses crypto as the currency. I’m also not sure about the third clause, which seems to incentivise you to want others to no-show to get their deposits.
Anyway, I’ve heard people wanting something like this to exist and might try it myself at some future event I’ll organize.
H/T Vitalik Buterin’s Twitter
Thanks for pointing that out. I was aware of such superhuman programs, but the last sentence failed to make the self-play condition sufficiently clear. Have updated it now to reflect this.
I think of it like “95% confidence interval of where the mean of Elizabeth’s estimate would land after 10 hours of further research”.
I’ve found personally this format is often useful when giving quick probability estimates. Precision is costly.
I’m curious what software this was made with, and how habryka made it readable?
What important book that needs fact-checking is nobody fact-checking?
I also don’t know if “this answers my objection” means “oh, then I’d use it” or “other problems still seem to big” (though I’d bet on the latter).
The development of modern formal logic (predicate logic, modal logic, the equivalence of higher-order logics and set-theory, etc.), which is of course deeply related to Zermelo, Fraenkel, Turing and Church, but which involved philosophers like Quine, Putnam, Russell, Kripke, Lewis and others.
The model of scientific progress as proceeding via pre-paradigmatic, paradigmatic, and revolutionary stages (from Kuhn, who wrote as a philosopher, though trained as a physicist)
As I understand it, the point of a costly signal is that it’s supposed to be relatively more affordable if you actually have that quality.
Yeah. In hindsight the terminology of “costly signal” is a bit unfortunate, because the payment here would actually work a bit like Mario’s jump or LessWrong karma—it’s a very simple mechanism which can co-opted to solve a large number of different problems. In particular, the money is not intended to be burnt (as would be the case with status signals, or proof-of-work as mentioned in some other comments), but actually paid to you.
Overall appreciate you writing up those points, they’re pretty helpful in understanding how people might (and might not) use this.
That’s a great point, I will do that.
This was crossposted to the EA forum replacing all mentions of “rationality” with “EA”, mutatis mutandis.
Yup, I think one of the main use cases is to enable a way of contacting people much higher status/more busy than you that doesn’t require a ton of networking or makes their lives terrible. (N.b. I have lots of uncertainty over whether there’s actually demand for this among that cohort, which is partly why I’m writing this.)
Updated the OP to clarify this. Will hold off on replying until I know whether this changes Scott’s mind or not!
Yeah, referrals are important.
They also have some problems:
Requires you to already know the right people
If the referer doesn’t know how valuable the recipient will think this is, they might just avoid it as opposed to risking burning reputation (same problem as outlined above)
It’s still costly for the recipient. E.g. it doesn’t have any way of compensating the recipient for giving them the “reduce option value” vs “slightly harm relationship” trade-off
There are probably large differences between how important each of these problems are, though I’m moderately confident that at least the first presents are real and important user case. If the options are “Pay $50 to message X” or “Try to network with people who can then introduce you to X”, the first might be better and save us some social games.
Thanks, this is a good data-point.
Though I want to ask: if people know that you have this problem, as things stand currently, they might just avoid messaging you (since they don’t have any way of compensating you for marginally making the burden on you worse)? Moreover, your time and energy are presumably exchangeable for money (though not indefinitely so)?
So it still seems paid emails might help with that?
(PS. I don’t think it’s only about information asymmetries and having too many emails, though I realise the OP quite strongly implies that. Might rewrite to reflect that.)
I don’t get this.
If businesses can simply buy their way around the problem they’ll do exactly that.
There’s a finite amount of money such that, if you got paid that amount, you’d be happy receiving an unsolicited ad email. There’s also a finite amount of money such that, if they had to pay that amount, it wouldn’t be worth it for advertisers to send you an email.
In equilibrium (probably given lots of additional specification of details) this makes the content you receive worth it.
I don’t see where this goes wrong in a way that’s solved by PoW.
This seems to be saying:
“assuming a large team of full-time devs and ability to push whatever solution out to everyone who uses email, what should we build?”
which is quite different from what the post is asking for:
“should just the rationality community coordinate to make this move, to marginally adding on something to current email, using an already existing software tool?”