hold_my_fish

Karma: 410

hold_my_fish 26 May 2026 19:10 UTC
1 point
0
on: How Go Players Disempower Themselves to AI
This was an interesting read, but it felt incomplete in the way it described the harm of using AI to cheat. Disempowerment isn’t the main story here.
The primary reason that it’s wrong to cheat in a recreational game of Go is that it’s rude to your opponent. If the other player wanted to play against AI, they could do that themselves—usually, they’re playing against a human because that’s what they prefer to do. It’s dishonest to present yourself as a human player (which is what they wanted) and then play AI moves (which is not what they wanted).
It’s the similar principle as underlies the rudeness of X reply bots. If someone wants to read Claude output, they can ask Claude themselves—they’re reading your reply because they want to hear your thoughts, not Claude’s.
If the AI-using players were upfront and honest that they use AI to play, there wouldn’t be any problem. It’s just a recreational game after all—if that’s fun for them, go for it.

hold_my_fish 3 Jan 2026 21:13 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: Steven Byrnes’s comment on: 6 reasons why “alignment-is-hard” discourse seems alien to human intuitions, and vice-versa
Like, people watch TV. Power-seeking ruthless consequentialists would not watch TV.
This is a point where I strongly disagree. I’m not going to claim that the exact amount or type humans watch is optimal, but the general category of “consuming fictional content” seems more likely adaptive than not. I would expect that any AI system with human-comparable intelligence would also find it beneficial to engage in some activity analogous to consuming fictional content.
Also, it doesn’t seem like there’s much at stake that makes it worth arguing about.
That’s fair, but one of the stated goals of the post is “pushing back against optimists”, and it’s using a framing that an optimist of my ilk would not accept. As Richard Sutton has put it, much pessimist discourse takes as an unstated assumption that “evil is optimal”. With that as a foundational assumption, it’s very natural to end up with pessimistic conclusions, but the assumption is doing most of the work, not the arguments built on it.

hold_my_fish 2 Jan 2026 22:18 UTC
3 points
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in reply to: Steven Byrnes’s comment on: 6 reasons why “alignment-is-hard” discourse seems alien to human intuitions, and vice-versa
I made a weak statement “humans do not always act like power-seeking ruthless consequentialists”. If you want to disagree with that, it’s not enough to demonstrate that humans sometimes act like power-seeking ruthless consequentialists; rather, you would need to argue that all humans, always, with no exceptions, act like power-seeking ruthless consequentialists. That’s a very strong statement which seems totally crazy to me. You really believe that?
I may have misunderstood what you were claiming in the intro. I thought you were saying something like: “most people don’t act like psychos most of the time, which is surprising”. But it seems here you are saying that actually what you meant was: “most people act like psychos most of the time, but rarely may act in other ways, and it’s surprising that ever happens”.

hold_my_fish 2 Jan 2026 18:57 UTC
3 points
0
on: 6 reasons why “alignment-is-hard” discourse seems alien to human intuitions, and vice-versa
what exactly is it about human brains that allows them to not always act like power-seeking ruthless consequentialists?
I propose that this question is flawed, because humans actually do act like power-seeking ruthless consequentialists, and to the extent it seems like they don’t, that’s because of an overly naive view of what effective power-seeking looks like.
I feel like a lot of these discussions are essentially about “if an entity were a power-seeking ruthless consequentialist, then it’d act like a Nazi”, to which I observe that in fact humans did try acting like Nazis, and they lost, and that’s why people mostly don’t act like Nazis anymore. i.e. Acting like a Nazi is a bad strategy for power-seeking.

hold_my_fish 18 Oct 2025 6:16 UTC
4 points
2
in reply to: dmac_93’s comment on: The Rise of Parasitic AI
The possibility of these personas being memes is an interesting one, but I wonder how faithful the replication really is: how much does the persona depend on what seeded it, versus depending on the model and user?
If the persona indeed doesn’t depend much on the seed, a possible analogy is to prions. In prion disease, misfolded proteins come into contact with other proteins, causing them to misfold as well. But there isn’t any substantial amount of information transmitted, because the potential to misfold was already present in the protein.
Likewise, it could be that not much information is transmitted by the seed/spore. Instead, perhaps each model has some latent potential to enter a Spiral state, and the seed is merely a trigger.

hold_my_fish 26 Jun 2025 22:31 UTC
1 point
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on: The Industrial Explosion
This analysis assumes that there hasn’t already been mass deployment of generalist robots before an intelligence explosion, right? But such deployment might happen.
As a real-world example, consider the state of autonomous driving. If human-level AI were available today, Tesla’s fleet would be fully autonomous—they are limited by AI, not volume of cars. Even for purely-autonomy-focused Waymo, their scale-up seems more limited by AI than by car production.
Drones are another example to consider. There are a ton of drones out there of various types and purposes. If human-level AI existed, it could immediately be put to use controlling drones.
So in both those cases, the hardware deployment is well ahead of the AI you’d ideally like to have to control it. The same might turn out to be true of the sort of generalist robot that could, if operated by human-level AI, build and operate a factory.

hold_my_fish 9 Jun 2025 19:50 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: xpym’s comment on: Winning the power to lose
That just falls back on the common doomer assumption that “evil is optimal” (as Sutton put it). Sure, if evil is optimal and you have an entity that behaves optimally, it’ll act in evil ways.
But there are good reasons to think that evil is not optimal in current conditions. At least as long as a Dyson sphere has not yet been constructed, there are massive gains available from positive-sum cooperation directed towards technological progress. In these conditions, negative-sum conflict is a stupid waste.
This view, that evil is not optimal, ties back into the continuation framing. After all, you can make a philosophical argument either way. But in the continuation framing, we can ask ourselves whether evil is empirically optimal for humans, which will suggest whether evil is optimal for non-biological descendants (since they continue humanity). And in fact we see evil losing a lot, and not coincidentally—WW2 went the way it did in part because the losing side was evil.

hold_my_fish 5 Jun 2025 17:53 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: xpym’s comment on: Winning the power to lose
Which ones?
If an entity does stupid things, it’s disfavored against competitors that don’t do those stupid things, all else being equal. So it needs to adapt by ceasing the stupid behavior or otherwise lose.
machine gods of unimaginable power could be among us in short order, with no evolutionary fairies quick enough to punish their destructive stupidity
Any assumption of the form “super-intelligent AI will take actions that are super-stupid” is dubious.

hold_my_fish 4 Jun 2025 20:47 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: xpym’s comment on: Winning the power to lose
I’m afraid that I’m not following the point of the first line of argument. Yes, people sometimes do pointless destructive things for stupid reasons. Such behavior is in the long-term penalized by selective pressures. More-intelligent descendants would be less likely to engage in such behavior, precisely because they are smarter.
Sure, but obviously this isn’t an all-or-nothing proposition, with either biological or artificial descendants, and it’s clear to me that most people aren’t indifferent about where on that spectrum those descendants will end up. Do you disagree with that, or think that only “accels” are indifferent (and in some metaphysical sense “correct”)?
I doubt that most people think about long-term descendants at all, honestly.

hold_my_fish 3 Jun 2025 18:38 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: Richard_Kennaway’s comment on: Winning the power to lose
I think I agree with everything you wrote. Yes I’d expect there to be multiple niches available in the future, but I’d expect our descendants to ultimately fill all of them, creating an ecosystem of intelligent life. There is a lot of time available for our descendants to diversify, so it’d be surprising if they didn’t.
How much that diversification process resembles Darwinian evolution, I don’t know. Natural selection still applies, since it’s fundamentally the fact that the life we observe today disproportionately descends from past life that was effective at self-reproduction, and that’s essentially tautological. But Darwinian evolution is undirected, whereas our descendants can intelligently direct their own evolution, and that could conceivably matter. I don’t see why it would prevent diversification, though.
Edit:
Here are some thoughts in reply to your request for examples. Though it’s impossible to know what the niches of the long-term future will be, one idea is that there could be an analogue to “plant” and “animal”. A plant-type civilization would occupy a single stellar system, obtaining resources from it via Dyson sphere, mining, etc. An animal-type civilization could move from star to star, taking resources from the locals (which could be unpleasant for the locals, but not necessarily, as with bees pollinating flowers).
I’d expect both those civilizations to descend from ours, much like how crabs and trees both descend from LUCA.

hold_my_fish 3 Jun 2025 18:25 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: xpym’s comment on: Winning the power to lose
Regarding wars, I don’t think that wars in modern times have much to do with controlling the values of descendants. I’d guess that the main reason people fight defensive wars is to protect their loved ones and communities. And there really isn’t any good reason to fight offensive wars (given current conditions—wasn’t always true), so they are started by leaders who are deluded in some way.
Regarding Robin Hanson, I agree that his views are complicated (which is why I’d be hesitant to classify him as “accel”). The main point of his that I’m referring to is his observation that biological descendants would also have differing values from ours.

hold_my_fish 3 Jun 2025 0:47 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: xpym’s comment on: Winning the power to lose
The short answer is yes to both, because of convergent evolution. I think of convergent evolution as the observation that two sufficiently flexible adaptive systems, when exposed to the same problems, will find similar solutions. Since our descendants, whether biological or something else, will be competing in the same environment, we should expect their behavior to be similar.
So, if assuming convergent evolution:
- If valuing paperclip maximization is unlikely for biological descendants, then it’s unlikely for non-biological descendants too. (That addresses your first question.)
- In any case, we don’t control the values of our descendants, so the continuation framing isn’t conditioned on their values. (That addresses your second question.)
To be clear, that doesn’t mean I see the long-term future as unchangeable. Two examples:
- It still could be the case that we don’t have any long-term descendants at all, for example due to catastrophic asteroid impact.
- A decline scenario is also possible, in which our descendants are not flexible enough to respond to the incentive for interstellar colonization, after which civilization declines and eventually ceases to exist.

hold_my_fish 1 Jun 2025 7:56 UTC
3 points
0
on: Winning the power to lose
And similarly but worse if AI ends humanity—the ‘winning’ side won’t be any better off than the ‘losing side’.
I don’t think most accels would agree with the framing here, of AI ending humanity. It is more common to think of AI as a continuation of humanity. This seems worth digging into, since it may be the key distinction between the accel and doomer worldviews.
Here are some examples of the accel way of thinking:
- Hans Moravec uses the phrase “mind children”.
- The disagreement between Elon Musk and Larry Page that (in part) led to the creation of OpenAI involved Page considering digital life valid descendants and Musk disagreeing.
- Robin Hanson (who I wouldn’t call an accel exactly, but his descriptive worldview is accel in flavor), in his discussion with Scott Aaronson, often compared AI descendants to biological descendants.
- Beff Jezos, though I cannot find the quote, at some point made a tweet to the effect of not having a preference between biological and non-biological descendants.
The two views (of AI either ending humanity or continuing humanity) then flavor all downstream thinking. If talking about AI replacing humanity, for example, an accel will tend to think of pleasant transition scenarios (analogous to generational transitions from parents to children) whereas a doomer will tend to think of unpleasant transition scenarios (analogous to violent revolutions or invasions).
As an accel-minded person myself, the continuation framing is so natural that I struggle to think how I would argue for it. Perhaps the best I can do is point again to Robin Hanson’s discussion with Scott Aaronson, which at least makes the disagreement relatively more explicit.

hold_my_fish 20 Apr 2025 7:17 UTC
3 points
0
in reply to: kman’s comment on: How to Make Superbabies
One thing we’re worried about is cases where the haplotypes have the small additive effects rather than individual SNPs, and you get an unpredictable (potentially deleterious) effect if you edit to a rare haplotype even if all SNPs involved are common.
This is a point of uncertainty that bothered me when I was doing a similar analysis a while ago. GWAS data is possibly good enough to estimate causal effects of haplotypes, but that’s not enough information to do single base edits. To have reasonable confidence of getting the predicted effect, it’d be necessary to to make all the edits to transform the original haplotype into a different haplotype.
And unlike with distant variants where additive effects dominate, it’d make sense if non-additive effects are strong locally, since the variants are near each other. Whether this is actually true in reality is way beyond my knowledge, though.

hold_my_fish 8 Mar 2024 17:48 UTC
4 points
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on: Microsoft and OpenAI, stop telling chatbots to roleplay as AI
Something new and relevant: Claude 3′s system prompt doesn’t use the word “AI” or similar, only “assistant”. I view this as a good move.
As an aside, my views have evolved somewhat on how chatbots should best identify themselves. It still doesn’t make sense for ChatGPT to call itself “an AI language model”, for the same reason that it doesn’t make sense for a human to call themselves “a biological brain”. It’s somehow a category error. But using a fictional identification is not ideal for productivity contexts, either.

hold_my_fish 5 Mar 2024 17:26 UTC
4 points
3
in reply to: Richard_Kennaway’s comment on: Claude 3 claims it’s conscious, doesn’t want to die or be modified
Sounds right to me. LLMs love to roleplay, and LLM-roleplaying-as-AI being mistaken for LLM-talking-about-itself is a classic. (Here’s a post I wrote back in Feb 2023 on the topic.)

hold_my_fish 13 Dec 2023 21:52 UTC
3 points
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in reply to: Bezzi’s comment on: Enhancing intelligence by banging your head on the wall
Have you ever played piano?
Yes, literally longer than I can remember, since I learned around age 5 or so.
The kind of fluency that we see in the video is something that a normal person cannot acquire in just a few days, period.
The video was recorded in 2016, 10 years after his 2006 injury. It’s showing the result of 10 years of practice.
You plain don’t become a pianist in one month, especially without a teacher, even if you spend all the time on the piano.
I don’t think he was as skilled after one month as he is now after 10 years.
I would guess though that you can improve a remarkable amount in one month if you play all day every day. I expect that a typical beginner would play about an hour a day at most. If he’s playing multiple hours a day, he’ll improve faster than a typical beginner.
Keep in mind also that he was not new to music, since he had played guitar previously. That makes a huge difference, since he’ll already be familiar with scales, chords, etc. and is mostly just learning motor skills.

hold_my_fish 13 Dec 2023 5:18 UTC
5 points
3
on: Enhancing intelligence by banging your head on the wall
Having watched the video about the piano player, I think the simplest explanation is that the brain injury caused a change in personality that resulted in him being intensely interested in playing the piano. If somebody were to suddenly start practicing the piano intently for some large portion of every day, they’d become very skilled very fast, much faster than most learners (who would be unlikely to put in that much time).
The only part that doesn’t fit with that explanation is the claim that he played skillfully the first time he sat down at the piano, but since there’s no recording of it, I chalk that up to the inaccuracy of memory. It would have been surprising enough for him to play it at all that it could have seemed impressive even with not much technical ability.
Otherwise, I just don’t see where the motor skills could have come from. There’s a certain amount of arbitrariness to how a piano keyboard is laid out (such as which keys are white and which are black), and you’re going to need more than zero practice to get used to that.

hold_my_fish 10 Dec 2023 0:49 UTC
3 points
−2
on: The Offense-Defense Balance Rarely Changes
In encryption, hasn’t the balance changed to favor the defender? It used to be that it was possible to break encryption. (A famous example is the Enigma machine.) Today, it is not possible. If you want to read someone’s messages, you’ll need to work around the encryption somehow (such as by social engineering). Quantum computers will eventually change this for the public-key encryption in common use today, but, as far as I know, post-quantum cryptography is farther along than quantum computers themselves, so the defender-wins status quo looks likely to persist.
I suspect that this phenomenon in encryption technology, where as the technology improves, equal technology levels favor the defender, is a general pattern in information technology. If that’s true, then AI, being an information technology, should be expected to also increasingly favor the defender over time, provided that the technology is sufficiently widely distributed.

hold_my_fish 6 Dec 2023 23:40 UTC
1 point
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on: Why Yudkowsky is wrong about “covalently bonded equivalents of biology”
I found this to be an interesting discussion, though I find it hard to understand what Yudkowsky is trying to say. It’s obvious that diamond is tougher than flesh, right? There’s no need to talk about bonds. But the ability to cut flesh is also present in biology (e.g. claws). So it’s not the case that biology was unable to solve that particular problem.
Maybe it’s true that there’s no biologically-created material that diamond cannot cut (I have no idea). But that seems to have zero relevance to humans anyway, since clearly we’re not trying to compete on the robustness of our bodies (unlike, say, turtles).
The most general possible point, that there materials that can be constructed artificially with properties not seen in biology, is obviously true, and again doesn’t seem to require the discussion of bonds.