I’m curious who the half is and why. Is it that they are half a rationalist? Half (the time?) in Berkeley? (If it is not half the time then where is the other half?)
Also. The N should be equal to the cardinality of the entire set of rationalists you interacted with, not just of those who are going insane; so, if you have been interacting with seven and a half rationalists in total, how many of those are diving into the woo? Or if you have been interacting with dozens of rationalists, how many times more people were they than 7.5?
There was a web thing with a Big Red Button, running in Seattle, Oxford (and I think Boston also).
Each group had a cake and if they got nuked, they wouldn’t get to eat the cake.
At the time when the Seattle counter said that the game was over for 1 second, someone there puched the button for the lulz, but the Oxford counter was not at zero yet and so they got nuked, then they decided to burn the cake instead of just not eating it.
Aumann’s agreement theorem says that two people acting rationally (in a certain precise sense) and with common knowledge of each other’s beliefs cannot agree to disagree. More specifically, if two people are genuine Bayesian rationalists with common priors, and if they each have common knowledge of their individual posterior probabilities, then their posteriors must be equal.
With common priors.
This is what does all the work there! If the disagreeers have non-equal priors on one of the points, then of course they’ll have different posteriors.
Of course applying Bayes’ Theorem with the same inputs is going to give the same outputs, that’s not even a theorem, that’s an equals sign.
If the disagreeers find a different set of parameters to be relevant, and/or the parameters they both find relevant do not have the same values, the outputs will differ, and they will continue to disagree.
“the problem with lesswrong : it’s not literally twitter”
Thank you so much for writing this! I remember reading a tumblr post that explained the main point a while back and could never find it again -because tumblr is an unsearchable memory hole- and kept needing to link it to people who got stuck on taking Eliezer’s joking one-liner seriously.
It may be that the person keeps expounding their reasons for their wanting you to do the thing because it feels aversive to them to stop infodumping, and/or because they expect you to respond with your reasons for doing the thing so that they know whether your doing the thing is an instance of 2 or of 3.
The AIs still have to make atoms move for anything Actually Bad to happen.
No. Correct models are good. Or rather, more correct models, applied properly, are better than less correct models, or models applied wrongly.
All those examples, however, are bad:
Calories in / Calories out is a bad model because different sources of calories are metabolized differently and have different effects on the organism. It is bad because it is incomplete and used improperly for things that it is bad at.
It stays true that to get output from a mechanism, you do have to input some fuel into it; CICO is good enough to calculate, for example, how many calories one should eat in, say polar climates where one needs many thousands of them to survive the cold; that is not an argument against using a Correct model, it is an argument for using a model that outputs the correct type of data for the problem domain.
Being unwilling to update is bad, yes, that is a problem with the user of the model, not a problem with the model one is using. Do you mean that knowing and using the best known model makes one unwilling to update on the subsequent better model? Because that is still not a problem with using a Correct model.
That is an entirely different definition of Bad. “Bad for the person holding the model (provided they can’t pretend to hold the more socially-accepted model when that is more relevant to staying alive and non-ostracized)” is absolutely not the same thing as “Bad at actually predicting how reality will react on inputs”.
That is also a problem with the users of the model, both those making the prediction and those accepting the predictions, in domains that the model is not good at predicting.
Still not a problem due to using a Correct model. Also, bad outcomes for who? If immigration is good for the immigrants in some respsect and bad for them in some other respect, that is neither all good or all bad; if it is good for some citizens already there in some ways but bad in others (with some things being a lot of good for some citizens and some other things being a little bad, while also some things being a little good and other things being a lot of bad for other citizens), then the Correct model is the one that takes into account the entirety of all the distributions of the good and the bad things, across all citizens, and predict them Correctly.
( and now please in the name of Truth let this thread not devolve into an object-level discussion of that specific example >_< )
Not easy, no. But there is a shorter version here : http://nonsymbolic.org/PNSE-Summary-2013.pdf
Is this enlightenment anything like described in https://aellagirl.com/2017/07/07/the-abyss-of-want/ ?
Also possibly related : http://nonsymbolic.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/PNSE-Article.pdf (can you point on that map where you think you found yourself)
I’m thinking of something like a section on the main lesserwrong.com page showing the latest edits to the wiki, so that the users of the site could see them and choose to go look at whether what changed in the article is worth points.
I think the lesswrong wiki was supposed to be that repository of the interesting/important things that were posted to the community blog.
It could be a good idea to make a wiki in lw2.0 and award site karma to people contributing to it.
welp, 2⁄4 current residents and the next one planned to come there are trans women so um, what gender ratio issue again?
Why yes, there should be such a list; I don’t know of any existing one.
Well so far it’s … a group house; with long late night conversations, also running self-experiments (currently measuring results of a low-carb diet), and organizing the local monthly rationalist meetup.
We are developing social tech solutions such as a database of competing access needs and a formal system for dealing with house logistics.
I am confused about what sort of blog post you are requesting people write. I assume you don’t mean that people should list off a variety of interesting facts about the Bay Area, e.g. “the public transit system, while deeply inadequate, is one of the best in the country,” “UCSF is one of the top hospitals in the United States for labor and delivery,” “everything in San Francisco smells like urine,” “adult night at the Exploratorium is awesome,” “there are multiple socialist pizza places in Berkeley which schismed over whether to serve beer.” This seems of limited interest to people who don’t live in the Bay Area and of equally limited interest to people who live in the Bay Area (they know). If people are moving to the Bay Area I assume they’d discuss this with their friends who already live here.
Those posts would be useful indeed.
Specifically because :
If you are ignorant of verifiable facts about the Bay Area like “it is relatively uncommon to commute by car”, I have to question your ability to make accurate statements about more subtle and hard-to-check issues of social dynamics. If you have not talked to enough Berkeley residents to hear “gotta go, train’s here”, then I doubt your ability to comment on why our social demographics are the way they are.
You literally just pointed out that people are not writing about the practical details of living there, and you’re dismissing Ben’s points that reference the things that he ostensibly knows because people are writing about them, because he does not know the things that you yourself pointed out that people are not writing about!
This means you are trying to Procustes the human squishiness into legibility, with consistent values. You should, instead, be trying to make pragmatic AIs that would frame the world for the humans, in the ways that the humans would approve*, taking into account their objectively stupid incoherence. Because that would be Friendly and parsed as such by the humans.
*=this doesn’t mean that such human preferences as those that violate meta-universalizability from behind the veil of ignorance should not be factored out of the calculation of what is ethically relevant; but it means that the states of the world that violate those preferences should still be hidden from the humans who have those preferences. This obviously results in humans being allowed to more accurately see the states of the world, the more their preferences are tolerant of other people’s preferences; there is absolutely nothing that could possibly ever go wrong from this, considering that the AIs, being Friendly, would simply prevent them from sociopathically exploiting that information asymmetry since that would violate the ethical principle.
Note, last year’s survey was also run by /u/ingres