What I’m saying is that when you say the word “ought”, you mean something. Even if you can’t quite articulate it, you have some sort of standard for saying “you ought do this, you ought not do that” that is basically the definition of ought.
I’d object to this simplification of the meaning of the word (I’d argue that ‘ought’ means lots of different things in different contexts, most of which aren’t only reducible to categorically imperative moral claims), but I suppose it’s not really relevant here.
I’m pretty sure we agree and are just playing with the words differently.
There are certain things one ought to do—and by ‘ought’ I mean you will be motivated to do those things, provided you already agree that they are among the ‘things one ought to do’
and
There is no non-circular answer to the question “Why should I be moral?”, so the moral realists’ project is sunk
seem to amount to about the same thing from where I sit. But it’s a bit misleading to phrase your admission that moral realism fails (and it does, just as paperclip realism fails) as an affirmation that “there are things one ought to do”.
No kidding! Haligonian lurker here too.