I guess my approach is slightly different to the approach discussed in that article.
I’m not entirely certain about this, but In regards to non-partisanship, is there perhaps some sort of screening process/background check that can be carried out to identify individuals who are non-partisan (for joining the proctoring committee)? Something like the Harvard Implicit Bias test but for motivated reasoning? Asking people to quickly make decisions in situations susceptible to motivated reasoning? This test has been criticized but also has some research in support so it may be the best option. Could a blockchain system eliminate bias within the proctoring committee?
Thanks for your feedback. I just want to go over some of your points:
Motivated reasoning plays into most high stakes decisions in big organisations as the decisions matter.
I came up with my proposal as a possible solution to the problem mentioned in the following article: (https://80000hours.org/problem-profiles/improving-institutional-decision-making/). I guess I should have mentioned this article in my proposal.
when you give a lot of political power to your “checks and balance”-committee that’s going to act politically as well and won’t just follow norms of abstract reasoning.
I mentioned in my proposal that the members of the committee are supposed to be non-partisan, so the members of the committee are not politically motivated. I didn’t mention anything in my proposal about the checks and balances committee being regulated, and that is a modification that I should make.
How does the committee determine if the reasoning was motivated?
This is a good question. My proposal is entirely theoretical and still in the rough draft stage at this point, and getting any feedback would be of great benefit. I haven’t fully worked out how the members of the committee would go about determining if motivated reasoning influenced the decision-making process.
Why not just have the committee make the decision in the first place?
The committee is acting as a check against the decision-making institution, and the ledger system used by the committee acts as an incentive for the decision-making institution to avoid motivated reasoning.