Consider a 2x2 grid. On the top row we have “naive deontological strategies.” On the bottom row we have “consequentialist strategies.” On the left we have “Truth.” On the right we have “Teams.”
Level 1: Top left: Naive deontological + Truth = You assert the statement if you think it is true, and not otherwise.
Level 3: Top right: Naive deontological + Teams = You assert the statement if you identify as part of the team associated with the statement, and not otherwise. (In some cases the statement is associated with being part of any team other that a certain team, i.e. the statement roughly means “I’m not part of team X.” In this case you assert the statement if you identify with some opposing team, and not otherwise.)
Level 2: Bottom left: Consequentialist + Truth = You assert the statement if you desire your listener to think you think it is true, and not otherwise. Lying is a special case of this, but you need not be lying to be doing this.
Level 4: Bottom right: Consequentialist + Teams = You assert the statement if you desire your listener to think you identify as part of the team associated with the statement, and not otherwise. (Or, the corresponding thing in case the statement is anti-team-X.)
I haven’t thought this through that much or compared it to the “primary texts” so I would bet that my interpretation is at least somewhat different from that of others.
There’s an obvious tendency for communities operating at level 1 to devolve into level 2, and from 3 to 4.
There’s a less obvious tendency for communities operating at level 2 to devolve into level 3, or so people claim, and I find this somewhat plausible.
Because the local discussion of this framework grew out of Jessica Taylor’s reading ofWikipedia’s reading of continental philosopher Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation, about how modern Society has ceased dealing with reality itself, and instead deals with our representations of it—maps that precede the territory, copies with no original. (That irony that no one in this discussion has actually read Baudrillard should not be forgotten!)
I feel sufficiently correctly shamed by this that I’ve ordered the book and will try and read it as soon as possible. It’s clearly worth the effort at this point.
As my other comment here notes, I do think the two models fit together, but it’s going to be tough to properly describe how.
There is some chance, for reasons actually completely unrelated to the current discussion, that I might actually try to read the original work. Would be kinda interested in book-clubbing it.
I agree that’s a fun irony, but I don’t think it’s a perfect irony—e.g. if I had actually read Baudrillard and tried to represent their thought in my answer, that would be a more perfect instance of the phenomenon they are talking about than what actually happened. I wasn’t talking about Baudrillard’s or anyone else’s concept, but only about my own, and said so. So I was dealing with territory itself, so to speak.
My answer:
Consider a 2x2 grid. On the top row we have “naive deontological strategies.” On the bottom row we have “consequentialist strategies.” On the left we have “Truth.” On the right we have “Teams.”
Level 1: Top left: Naive deontological + Truth = You assert the statement if you think it is true, and not otherwise.
Level 3: Top right: Naive deontological + Teams = You assert the statement if you identify as part of the team associated with the statement, and not otherwise. (In some cases the statement is associated with being part of any team other that a certain team, i.e. the statement roughly means “I’m not part of team X.” In this case you assert the statement if you identify with some opposing team, and not otherwise.)
Level 2: Bottom left: Consequentialist + Truth = You assert the statement if you desire your listener to think you think it is true, and not otherwise. Lying is a special case of this, but you need not be lying to be doing this.
Level 4: Bottom right: Consequentialist + Teams = You assert the statement if you desire your listener to think you identify as part of the team associated with the statement, and not otherwise. (Or, the corresponding thing in case the statement is anti-team-X.)
I haven’t thought this through that much or compared it to the “primary texts” so I would bet that my interpretation is at least somewhat different from that of others.
There’s an obvious tendency for communities operating at level 1 to devolve into level 2, and from 3 to 4.
There’s a less obvious tendency for communities operating at level 2 to devolve into level 3, or so people claim, and I find this somewhat plausible.
Interesting. I like the grid model and in some ways it is more natural than the four seperate levels.
But what’s that got to do with simulacra in any other sense?
I’m not sure what you mean. If you are asking why the name “simulacra” was chosen for this concept, I have no idea.
Because the local discussion of this framework grew out of Jessica Taylor’s reading of Wikipedia’s reading of continental philosopher Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation, about how modern Society has ceased dealing with reality itself, and instead deals with our representations of it—maps that precede the territory, copies with no original. (That irony that no one in this discussion has actually read Baudrillard should not be forgotten!)
I feel sufficiently correctly shamed by this that I’ve ordered the book and will try and read it as soon as possible. It’s clearly worth the effort at this point.
As my other comment here notes, I do think the two models fit together, but it’s going to be tough to properly describe how.
There is some chance, for reasons actually completely unrelated to the current discussion, that I might actually try to read the original work. Would be kinda interested in book-clubbing it.
I agree that’s a fun irony, but I don’t think it’s a perfect irony—e.g. if I had actually read Baudrillard and tried to represent their thought in my answer, that would be a more perfect instance of the phenomenon they are talking about than what actually happened. I wasn’t talking about Baudrillard’s or anyone else’s concept, but only about my own, and said so. So I was dealing with territory itself, so to speak.