What’s your evidence that your experience of color is ontologically primitive?
That’s not what I’m saying. Experiences can have parts, qualia can have parts. I’m saying that you can’t build color or experience of color, just from the “geometric-causal-numerical” ingredients of standard physical ontology. Given just those ingredients in your ontological recipe, “subjective feels” don’t come for free. You could have the qualia alongside the geometric-causal-numerical (property dualism), or you could have the qualia instead of that (monistic panpsychism), or you might have some other relationship between qualia and physics. But if you only have physics (in any form from Newton to the present day), you don’t have qualia.
or you could have the qualia instead of that (monistic panpsychism)
Physics is monistic panpsychism—there are no just geometric-causal-numerical ingredients, there is also implicit statement that universe that equations describe has intrinsic property of existence.
That’s not what I’m saying. Experiences can have parts, qualia can have parts. I’m saying that you can’t build color or experience of color, just from the “geometric-causal-numerical” ingredients of standard physical ontology. Given just those ingredients in your ontological recipe, “subjective feels” don’t come for free. You could have the qualia alongside the geometric-causal-numerical (property dualism), or you could have the qualia instead of that (monistic panpsychism), or you might have some other relationship between qualia and physics. But if you only have physics (in any form from Newton to the present day), you don’t have qualia.
Oh, ok, I misunderstood you.
Physics is monistic panpsychism—there are no just geometric-causal-numerical ingredients, there is also implicit statement that universe that equations describe has intrinsic property of existence.