Well, like, the whole point of Boltzman brain possibility is that your memory is unreliable, and could be created wholesale. You just remember it, there is no like verified history you can rely on
That’s beside the point, really.
Whether you are created wholesale with all your memories or you accumulate experiences during you life, the fact that these memories appear to be ordered, lawful and from the same body—unlike being Canaletto at moment t1 and Jeff Bezos at monent t2, for example - is evidence against you being a boltzman brain and evidence against being randomly sampled among people.
That’s not how evidence works, you have two theories, and you have some observation. Is this observation expected on H1? Yes. On H2? Yes. So, it’s not evidence either way.
The point that Eliezer (cited from Feynman) makes, is that given Boltzman brains, you would expect partially unordered instantiations to be more frequent. Partially unordered as a part of momentary experience.
Not, “first me, then Bezos”, this point still uses reliable history as a primitive.
That’s not how evidence works, you have two theories, and you have some observation. Is this observation expected on H1? Yes. On H2? Yes. So, it’s not evidence either way.
How does reflecting on your memories and noticing that they correspond to living in consistent and lawful universe is expected on BB?
You reflect on your memories. You notice that they point to living in a consistent universe. This is expected on living in a consistent universe. This is not expected on being a BB. Therefore you update in favor of not being a BB.
And the same applies for whether you should be indifferent between observer moments or theories.
Well, then you take that consistent universe at face value and notice it should (maybe) produce shitton of BBs. That’s the point of discussion of this post, I guess.
We started from considering two types of probability experiments:
Sample between all the observer moments
Sample between being and not being BB
P(BB|1) ~ 1
P(BB|2) = 1⁄2
By the principle of uncertainty we are indifferent between the two.
P(1) = P(2) = 1⁄2
Therefore
P(BB) = P(BB|1)P(1) + P(BB|2)P(2) ~ 3⁄4
And only then we account for the evidence, reflecting on our stable memories. Which simultaneously update us in favor of 2. and against being BB in general
P(SM|2) >>P(SM|1)
P(SM|BB) << P(SM|not BB)
Therefore
P(1|SM) ~ 0
P(2|SM) ~ 1
Which very quickly updates us to near certainty that we are not BBs.
That’s beside the point, really.
Whether you are created wholesale with all your memories or you accumulate experiences during you life, the fact that these memories appear to be ordered, lawful and from the same body—unlike being Canaletto at moment t1 and Jeff Bezos at monent t2, for example - is evidence against you being a boltzman brain and evidence against being randomly sampled among people.
That’s not how evidence works, you have two theories, and you have some observation. Is this observation expected on H1? Yes. On H2? Yes. So, it’s not evidence either way.
The point that Eliezer (cited from Feynman) makes, is that given Boltzman brains, you would expect partially unordered instantiations to be more frequent. Partially unordered as a part of momentary experience.
Not, “first me, then Bezos”, this point still uses reliable history as a primitive.
How does reflecting on your memories and noticing that they correspond to living in consistent and lawful universe is expected on BB?
Yeah, it doesn’t, but not through your argument.
That is my argument.
You reflect on your memories. You notice that they point to living in a consistent universe. This is expected on living in a consistent universe. This is not expected on being a BB. Therefore you update in favor of not being a BB.
And the same applies for whether you should be indifferent between observer moments or theories.
Well, then you take that consistent universe at face value and notice it should (maybe) produce shitton of BBs. That’s the point of discussion of this post, I guess.
We already did it.
We started from considering two types of probability experiments:
Sample between all the observer moments
Sample between being and not being BB
P(BB|1) ~ 1
P(BB|2) = 1⁄2
By the principle of uncertainty we are indifferent between the two.
P(1) = P(2) = 1⁄2
Therefore
P(BB) = P(BB|1)P(1) + P(BB|2)P(2) ~ 3⁄4
And only then we account for the evidence, reflecting on our stable memories. Which simultaneously update us in favor of 2. and against being BB in general
P(SM|2) >>P(SM|1)
P(SM|BB) << P(SM|not BB)
Therefore
P(1|SM) ~ 0
P(2|SM) ~ 1
Which very quickly updates us to near certainty that we are not BBs.
P(BB|SM) ~ 0