A basic argument against free will: free will for an agent implies that the agent could have done something else
There is more than one definition of free will. According to compatibilitism, the agent only needs to be generally capable, and uncoerced.
If an agent is identified with a particular physical configuration, then, given the same physics / inputs / stochastic bits (which can be modeled as non-temporal extra parameters, per previous discussion), there is only one possible action
If you think of stochastic bits as pre calculated, but hidden until they are needed, that may be the case. Under the more conventional view, where indeterministic value occur, as needed, “on the fly”, rather than being retrieved, it’s clearly the case that alternative possibilities can exist: the outcome of quantum counts toss, is unknowable, even to Laplace’s demon.
we can move any stochasticity into independent random variables, and have everything be a deterministic consequence of those.
But that’s not an accurate, lossless alternative model of indeterminism, because , according to it”everything is deterministic”!
The precalculated “stochastic” variables thing, and the on-the-fly calls to the universe’s rand() aren’t the same thing, because they have different ontological implications.
Why think they are the same?
I would guess that the standard rationalist answer is “they are indistinguishable empirically”. But rationalism lacks a proof that unempirical questions are unaswerable or meaningless (unlike logical positivism..but LP is explicitly rejected).
Note that compatibilism and naturalistic libertarian free will are both viable given our present state of knowledge...so there is no necessity to adopt anti realism.
Note also that we still need a motion of moral responsibility for practical puposes.
causal counterfactuals
Causal counterfactuals have theoretical problems, such as implying violations of physical law, hence being un-determined by empirical science (as we can’t observe what happens when physical laws are violated).
So much for MWI then ..according to it, every world is counterfactual to every other.
How do you know counterfactuals require violations of physics itself? The possibility of something happening, that wasn’t what happened, only requires (genuine) indeterminism, as above.
Basically, there’s three levels:
*Counterfactuals are fully real but not “here”. (MWI).
*Alternative outcomes were possible at the time, but didn’t happen , and don’t exist anywhere (single universe
indeterminism, Copenhagen Interpretation).
*Only hypothetical counterfactuals. Single universe determinism (Superdeterministic QM, Newton)
You need to know how the universe works to settle these questions, you can’t do it all with armchair reasoning.
And our ability to think about hypothetical and counterfactual situations doesnt require the violations of actual laws...we only need to use imaginary starting conditions as an input to our physical theories. And that’s useful! You can hypothetically plan out a moon landing before you perform it for the first time. Sweeping rejection of counterfactuals is anti science!
ETA
Laws of physics: universal satisfaction
I mostly find this unclear.
Do the laws have “additional reality” beyond universal satisfaction?
What is universal satisfaction? Do you mean the law was followed in the past , or that it will be in the future as well?
I can see how a US in the second sense would imply the truth of a law , epistemically, but you said it implied the reality...
I don’t see that anything about the ontological nature of a physical law has been asserted.
Decision theory: non-realism
We reject causal decision theory (CDT), because it relies on causal counterfactuals
In what sense of causal counterfactual? Real ones? Why would a DT require you to do anything more than consider hypotheses?
We reject any theory of “logical counterfactuals”, because the counterfactual must be illogical, contradicting modal logics such as S4
That seems to go back to your previous argument, that , if you recast indeterministic arguments in quasi-deterministic form, then everything is determined. According to the new model … but not the original.
It’s typical for rationalists to argue one (hopefully)universal decision theory against another. Fifteen or twenty years on, the problem remains unresolved. There’s a problem behind that problem: whether you can arrive at a one-size-fits-all DT without knowing what kind of universe you are in.
Time: eternalism
Eternalism says the future exists, as the past and present do. This is fairly natural from the DAG factorization notion of causality. As there are multiple topological sorts of a given DAG, and multiple DAGs consistent with the same joint distribution, there isn’t an obvious way to separate the present from the past and future;
There’s an obvious empirical difference: the future, for you , is what is what you haven’t seen yet.
There’s a possible complication, in that our DAG factorization can be stochastic
Block universes can embrace unpredictability very easily. Too easily, since it’s difficult to predict the existence of any kind of lawfulness/predictability/ compressibility from the block universe premise alone. The reason for that is that BUT says that time works just like space. However , since there is no reason to expect a slice of an object along the X axis to predict a further slice, there is no reason to think that a slice along the T axis will be able to predict anything, on the premises that time is just like space
Block universes are, of course, deterministic in a sense, since, the future is “already there”, and waiting to happen. The thing is that they are also not causally deterministic, since everything is “already there” and therefore doesn’t need to be made to happen..
And you can’t infer BUT from predictability, because it doesn’t imply it.
Moral Realism
Moral realism implies that moral facts exist, but where would they exist?
Realism and anti realism are both a range of claims, and instead ignoring starkly opposed, they are capable of meeting in the middle.
Moral realism is, minimally, the theory that moral propositions have truth values. It doesn’t necessarily require the existence of a special domain of objects to serve as truth makers, since correspondence to a state of affairs isn’t the only theory of truth.
The apparent requirement for supernatural entities is a common reason to reject MR, but many naturalist theories of realism are available. Eg evolutionary ethics, contractarianism, Kantian ethics and game theoretical ethics. Maybe utilitarianism as well.
Where do truths about how to do things;well—build bridges, or play chess—reside? They are not in some inaccessible realm. But they don’t stand in one to one correspondence to with basic physical facts either. They are derived from multitudes of physical facts, plus some abstract rules. They stand in a one-to-many relationship with basic physical facts.
What’s that got to do with morality? For one thing it shows that the is-ought divide is bridgeable. For another , it shows that there is a middle way between anti realism and Platonism.
Anti realism is not a theory, but a collection of theories. It includes error theory and non cognitivism, both of which imply ethical questions don’t have answers. Anti realism also realism also includes subjective and emotivism, which supply far too many answers , potentially one per person. We need morality to justify practices, objective actions that either happen or not, like sending people to jail, and starting wars—and A Babel of conflicting opinion can’t provide the justification. Nihilism and subjectivism are profoundly un-useful.
So, if Moral Realism does not exist, it would be necessary to invent it, to construct a system of ethics that is as close to realism as possible… and perhaps we have.
Naturalistic ethics can still be objected to on grounds of the is-ought gap. --.but I will argue that there is no such thing. How a thing should done is well. It is possible to gather bodies of theoretical and practical information on how to do something—build a bridge, or play chess—well. Such methodological knowledge is conditional: if you want to achieve X, you should do Y. So if we want to apply it to ethics, we need to figure out what ethics is for, what it’s purpose is.
This we can do. Ethics is social. If you are all alone in a desert island , there is nobody to steal from or kill. Ethics fulfils a role in society, and originated as a mutually beneficial way of regulating individual actions to minimise conflict, conserve resources, and solve coordination problems.
There are many possible minds (consider the space of AGI programs), and they could find different things compelling
Why does that matter? There might be minds that think 2+2=5, but they are wrong.
If you are trying to make a point about truth, you need to specify rational minds. (In fact everyone who makes this kind of point, except Yudkowsky, does).
If you are making a point about compulsion , the problem has been solved: those who are not internally compelled are externally compelled by threats and rewards.
In addition, the discussion of free will and decision theory shows that there are problems with formulating possibility and intentional action. If, as Kant says, “ought implies can”, then contrapositively “not can implies not ought”; if modal analysis shows that alternative actions for a given agent are not possible, then no alternative actions can be “ought”. (Alternatively, if modal possibility is unreal, then “ought implies can” is confused to begin with).
Compatibilism has its own, internally consistent, senses of “can” and “free”. “Free” is “not under compulsion” and can is “generally possible for the type of which the subject is a token”: pigeons can fly, penguins cant.
Theory of mind: epistemic reductive physicalism
Chalmers claims that mental properties are “further facts” on top of physical properties, based on the zombie argument: it is conceivable that a universe physically identical to ours could exist, but with no consciousness in it.
No, just phenomenal consciousness. It’s possible to combine identity theory about Easy Problem consciousness, with eliminativism or dualism about Hard Problem consciousness (phenomenal consciousness, qualia).
Ontological minimality suggests not believing in these “further facts”,
Explanations need to be as simple as possible, but no simpler. As simple as possible means the minimum to explain the facts. We don’t have an explanation of phenomenal consciousness in physical terms, so adding further facts to explain it is justifiable.
especially given how dubious theories of consciousness tend to be. This seems a lot like eliminativism.
If it’s eliminativism, why call it reductionism? They are not the same.
People believe in phenomenal consciousness because there is evidence for it, and believe in “further facts”—dualism—because there is no reductive explanation of it. (The zombie argument isn’t the only argument against physicalism) So you are not in a position to believe in the reductive theory of phenomenal consciousness, here and now ,because there isn’t one. You could take the view that a reductive theory will be found one day through normal science …and that would be promissory materialism. Or you could selectively eliminate phenomenal consciousness .. which leaves you needing to explain where the apparent evidence comes from … ie. solve the meta problem.
We don’t need to discard all mental concepts, though.
Reductionism doesn’t require you to discard any.
Personal identity: empty individualism, similarity as successor
If a machine scans you and makes a nearly-exact physical copy elsewhere, is that copy also you? Paradoxes of personal identity abound. Whether that copy is “really you” seems like a non-question; if it had an answer, where would that answer be located?
What’s fairly simple and predictive to say above X=X is that a near-exact copy of you is similar to you
That just isn’t the same question.
Suppose you found out you had an identical twin. You would not consider them to be you yourself. Maximal similarity is not numerical identity.
The major problem is that you and your duplicate exist simultaneously in different places, which goes against the intuition that you are a unique individual. Mere similarity explains how you could be the same individual as your non identical past self, but if it undermines your uniqueness, it is not a nett gain.
Basing identity on material continuity is possible given materialism/reductionism avoids the problem of “my clone is me, I’m in two place at once”, but makes it harder to understand how you could be the same individual as your non identical past self. However, Similarity and Continuity are not entirely exclusive, so a hybrid answer is possible.
Anthropic probability: non-realism, graph structure as successor
In the Sleeping Beauty problem, is the correct probability ½ or ⅓?
Is there a single correct probability?
Formalism
Consists of several claims..that mathematical objects have no real existence, that truth is proof, and that there is no single set of mathematical truths.
Formalism is suggestive of finitism and intuitionism
How?
None of the claims above imply that , and these are usually classed as different philosophies. Indeed, finitism is often motivated by the idea that maths is about the physical world.
(I am generally favourable to formalism, but I find some of the subsidiary claims confusing).
Your Conclusion
Treat models as mathematical tools for describing the world’s structure, not as windows onto modal or metaphysical realms.
You are not consistently avoiding metaphysical claims ,because you at siding with determinism and against reductionism. (And against the most innocent forms of modality!)
My Conclusion
Whether it’s a good thing or bad, we are not in a position to do ontological minimalism with any precision, because we don’t know enough about the territory. Also, filling in knowledge gaps with intuitions and guesswork amounts to confirmation bias.
The precalculated “stochastic”variables thing, and the on-the-fly calls to the universe’s rand() aren’t the same thing, because they have different ontological implications.
Yeah they can be distinguished ontologically. Although there are going to be multiple Bayes nets expressing the same joint distribution. So it’s not like there’s going to be a canonical ordering.
I would guess that the standard rationalist answer is “they are indistinguishable empirically”. But rationalism lacks a proof that unempirical questions are unaswerable or meaningless (unlike logical positivism..but LP is explicitly rejected).
I get that active dis-belief in further facts (such as counterfactuals) can be dogmatic. Rather, it’s more of a case of, we can get an adequate empirical account without them, and adding them has problems (like causal counterfactuals implying violations of physical law).
Part of where I’m coming with this is a Chalmers like framework. Suppose there are 2 possible universes, they have the same joint distribution, but different causal ordering. Like maybe in one the stochasticity is on the fly, in the other it’s pre-computed. They imply the same joint distribution and the same set of “straightforward” physical facts (particle trajectories and so on). Yet there is a distinction, a further fact.
In which case… The agents in these universes can’t have epistemic access to these further facts, it’s similar to with the zombie argument. A simple approach is “no further facts”, although assuming this is literally the case might be dogmatic. It’s more like, don’t believe in further facts prior to a good/convincing account of them, where the ontological complexity is actually worth it.
Note that compaibilism and naturalistic libertarian are both viable given our present state of knowledge...so there is no necessity to adopt anti realism.
Well it’s more like, most specific theories of these have problems. Like, the counterfactuals being really weird, corresponding to bad decision theories, etc. And it seems simpler to say, the counterfactuals don’t exist? Even if assigning high probability to it is dogmatic.
So much for MWI then ..according to it, every world is counterfactual to every other.
If instead of QM our best physics said something like “there are true random coin flips” then it would be a bit of a stretch to posit a MWI-like theory there, that there exist other universes where the coin flips go differently. The case for MWI is somewhat more complex, it has to do with the Copenhagen interpretation being a lot more complicated than “here, have some stochastic coin flips”.
How do you know counterfactuals require violations of physics itself? The possibility of something happening that wasn’t what happened, only requires (genuine) indeterminism, as above.
Well we can disjunct on high or low universal K complexity. Assuming low universal K complexity, counterfactuals really do have problems, there are a lot of implications. Assuming high universal K complexity, I guess they’re more well defined. Though you can’t counterfact on just anything, you have to counterfact on a valid quantum event. So like, how many counterfactuals there are depends on the density of relevant quantum events to, say, a computer.
I guess you could make the case from QM that the classical trajectory has high K complexity, therefore counterfactual alternatives to the classical trajectory don’t require physical law violations.
If not for QM though, our knowledge would be compatible with determinism / low K complexity of the classical trajectory, and it seems like a philosophy should be able to deal with that case (even if it empirically seems not to be the case)
You can hypothetically plan out a moon landing before you perform it for the first time.
Right so, counterfactual reasoning is practically useful, this is more about skepticism of the implied metaphysics. There might be translations like, observing that a deterministic system can be factored (multiple ways) as interacting systems with inputs/outputs, each factoring implying additional facts about the deterministic system. Without having to say that any of these factorings is correct in the sense of correctness about further facts.
I get that active dis-belief in further facts (such as counterfactuals) can be dogmatic. Rather, it’s more of a case of, we can get an adequate empirical account without them, and adding them has problems (like causal counterfactuals implying violations of physical law).
As I have explained, that depends on how you conceive of both counterfactuals and physical laws. Physical laws can be deterministic or indeterministic.
Counterfactuals come in three strengths:-
i) Counterfactuals are fully real but not “here”.
ii) Alternative outcomes were possible at the time, but didn’t happen , and don’t exist anywhere.
iii) Only hypothetical counterfactuals are possible.
There are certainly some impossible combinations , such a deterministic laws and type ii counterfactuals .. but there are plenty of allowed combinations as well. Notably, type iii Counterfactuals have no metaphysical implications So.there is no sweeping argument against counterfactuals.
Part of where I’m coming with this is a Chalmers like framework. Suppose there are 2 possible universes, they have the same joint distribution, but different causal ordering. Like maybe in one the stochasticity is on the fly, in the other it’s pre-computed. They imply the same joint distribution and the same set of “straightforward” physical facts (particle trajectories and so on). Yet there is a distinction, a further fact.
In which case… The agents in these universes can’t have epistemic access to these further facts,
Perhaps not via direct empiricism, but it’s possible to argue for one ontology over another on grounds of , eg, simplicity, as you actually do.
it’s similar to with the zombie argument.
Additional facts don’t have to be causally idle. For instance, physical law is an additional fact over observed events. So maybe not entirely like zombies.
A simple approach is “no further facts”, although assuming this is litery the case might be dogmatic.
It is also difficult to see how it would apply to in/determinism. Indeterminism means there at addition possibilities. Determinism means there is more lawfullness.
It’s more like, don’t believe in further facts prior to a good/convincing account of them, where the ontological complexity is actually worth it.
That creates a presupposition against MWI.
Note that compaibilism and naturalistic libertarian are both viable given our present state of knowledge...so there is no necessity to adopt anti realism.
Well it’s more like, most specific theories of these have problems.
All theories of FW have problems, including hard determinism
Like, the counterfactuals being really weird, corresponding to bad decision theories, etc
Huh? Libertarian free will requires indeterminism, and therefore type ii) counterfactuals, but that isn’t “weird” , it just isn’t determinism.I
And of course , compatibilism doesn’t require any kind of real counterfactuals, so why far with the same brush?
. And it seems simpler to say, the counterfactuals don’t exist? Even if assigning high probability to it is dogmatic.
Saying all types of counterfactual are non existent means ditching the useful , and ontologically unimpactive , type iii’s.
So much for MWI then ..according to it, every world is counterfactual to every other.
If instead of QM our best physics said something like “there are true random coin flips” then it would be a bit of a stretch to posit a MWI-like theory there, that there exist other universes where the coin flips go differently. The case for MWI is somewhat more complex, it has to do with the Copenhagen interpretation being a lot more complicated than “here, have some stochastic coin flips”.
How do you know counterfactuals require violations of physics itself? The possibility of something happening that wasn’t what happened, only requires (genuine) indeterminism, as above.
Well we can disjunct on high or low universal K complexity. Assuming low universal K complexity, counterfactuals really do have problems,
Why? You seem to have missed several steps. Low and high complexity might imply something about (in)determinism, and (in)determinism does imply type ii counterfactuals....but merely thinking in terms of counterfactuals doesn’t have to be realistic at all, it can be performed in terms of type iii counterfactuals. (But increasing versus flat complexity would be more relevant to (in)determinism. On-the-fly indeterminism means we information is constantly being added).
there are a lot of implications. Assuming high universal K complexity, I guess they’re more well defined.
Why?
Though you can’t counterfact on just anything, you have to counterfact on a valid quantum event.
You can consider hypothetical counterfactuals about anything.
Rationalists
So like, how many counterfactuals there are depends on the density of relevant quantum events to, say, a computer.
Only type ii.
I guess you could make the case from QM that the classical trajectory has high K complexity, therefore counterfactual alternatives to the classical trajectory don’t require physical law violations.
Huh?
If not for QM though, our knowledge would be compatible with determinism / low K complexity of the classical trajectory, and it seems like a philosophy should be able to deal with that case (even if it empirically seems not to be the case)
You can hypothetically plan out a moon landing before you perform it for the first time.
Right so, counterfactual reasoning is practically useful, this is more about skepticism of the implied metaphysics. There might be translations like, observing that a deterministic system can be factored (multiple ways) as interacting systems with inputs/outputs, each factoring implying additional facts about the deterministic system.
You don’t need that. You only need to apply an imaginary starting condition to your deterministic laws. That’s how you hypothetically plan a moon landing...the starting conditions represent the launch of a rocket design that hasn’t been built yet. And that doesn’t require breaking laws even in imagination.
PS I added a long section to my previous response.
free will
There is more than one definition of free will. According to compatibilitism, the agent only needs to be generally capable, and uncoerced.
If you think of stochastic bits as pre calculated, but hidden until they are needed, that may be the case. Under the more conventional view, where indeterministic value occur, as needed, “on the fly”, rather than being retrieved, it’s clearly the case that alternative possibilities can exist: the outcome of quantum counts toss, is unknowable, even to Laplace’s demon.
But that’s not an accurate, lossless alternative model of indeterminism, because , according to it”everything is deterministic”!
The precalculated “stochastic” variables thing, and the on-the-fly calls to the universe’s rand() aren’t the same thing, because they have different ontological implications.
Why think they are the same?
I would guess that the standard rationalist answer is “they are indistinguishable empirically”. But rationalism lacks a proof that unempirical questions are unaswerable or meaningless (unlike logical positivism..but LP is explicitly rejected).
Note that compatibilism and naturalistic libertarian free will are both viable given our present state of knowledge...so there is no necessity to adopt anti realism.
Note also that we still need a motion of moral responsibility for practical puposes.
causal counterfactuals
So much for MWI then ..according to it, every world is counterfactual to every other.
How do you know counterfactuals require violations of physics itself? The possibility of something happening, that wasn’t what happened, only requires (genuine) indeterminism, as above.
Basically, there’s three levels:
*Counterfactuals are fully real but not “here”. (MWI).
*Alternative outcomes were possible at the time, but didn’t happen , and don’t exist anywhere (single universe indeterminism, Copenhagen Interpretation).
*Only hypothetical counterfactuals. Single universe determinism (Superdeterministic QM, Newton)
You need to know how the universe works to settle these questions, you can’t do it all with armchair reasoning.
And our ability to think about hypothetical and counterfactual situations doesnt require the violations of actual laws...we only need to use imaginary starting conditions as an input to our physical theories. And that’s useful! You can hypothetically plan out a moon landing before you perform it for the first time. Sweeping rejection of counterfactuals is anti science!
ETA
Laws of physics: universal satisfaction
I mostly find this unclear.
What is universal satisfaction? Do you mean the law was followed in the past , or that it will be in the future as well?
I can see how a US in the second sense would imply the truth of a law , epistemically, but you said it implied the reality...
I don’t see that anything about the ontological nature of a physical law has been asserted.
Decision theory: non-realism
In what sense of causal counterfactual? Real ones? Why would a DT require you to do anything more than consider hypotheses?
That seems to go back to your previous argument, that , if you recast indeterministic arguments in quasi-deterministic form, then everything is determined. According to the new model … but not the original.
It’s typical for rationalists to argue one (hopefully)universal decision theory against another. Fifteen or twenty years on, the problem remains unresolved. There’s a problem behind that problem: whether you can arrive at a one-size-fits-all DT without knowing what kind of universe you are in.
Time: eternalism
There’s an obvious empirical difference: the future, for you , is what is what you haven’t seen yet.
Block universes can embrace unpredictability very easily. Too easily, since it’s difficult to predict the existence of any kind of lawfulness/predictability/ compressibility from the block universe premise alone. The reason for that is that BUT says that time works just like space. However , since there is no reason to expect a slice of an object along the X axis to predict a further slice, there is no reason to think that a slice along the T axis will be able to predict anything, on the premises that time is just like space
Block universes are, of course, deterministic in a sense, since, the future is “already there”, and waiting to happen. The thing is that they are also not causally deterministic, since everything is “already there” and therefore doesn’t need to be made to happen..
And you can’t infer BUT from predictability, because it doesn’t imply it.
Moral Realism
Realism and anti realism are both a range of claims, and instead ignoring starkly opposed, they are capable of meeting in the middle.
Moral realism is, minimally, the theory that moral propositions have truth values. It doesn’t necessarily require the existence of a special domain of objects to serve as truth makers, since correspondence to a state of affairs isn’t the only theory of truth.
The apparent requirement for supernatural entities is a common reason to reject MR, but many naturalist theories of realism are available. Eg evolutionary ethics, contractarianism, Kantian ethics and game theoretical ethics. Maybe utilitarianism as well.
Where do truths about how to do things;well—build bridges, or play chess—reside? They are not in some inaccessible realm. But they don’t stand in one to one correspondence to with basic physical facts either. They are derived from multitudes of physical facts, plus some abstract rules. They stand in a one-to-many relationship with basic physical facts.
What’s that got to do with morality? For one thing it shows that the is-ought divide is bridgeable. For another , it shows that there is a middle way between anti realism and Platonism.
Anti realism is not a theory, but a collection of theories. It includes error theory and non cognitivism, both of which imply ethical questions don’t have answers. Anti realism also realism also includes subjective and emotivism, which supply far too many answers , potentially one per person. We need morality to justify practices, objective actions that either happen or not, like sending people to jail, and starting wars—and A Babel of conflicting opinion can’t provide the justification. Nihilism and subjectivism are profoundly un-useful.
So, if Moral Realism does not exist, it would be necessary to invent it, to construct a system of ethics that is as close to realism as possible… and perhaps we have.
Naturalistic ethics can still be objected to on grounds of the is-ought gap. --.but I will argue that there is no such thing. How a thing should done is well. It is possible to gather bodies of theoretical and practical information on how to do something—build a bridge, or play chess—well. Such methodological knowledge is conditional: if you want to achieve X, you should do Y. So if we want to apply it to ethics, we need to figure out what ethics is for, what it’s purpose is.
This we can do. Ethics is social. If you are all alone in a desert island , there is nobody to steal from or kill. Ethics fulfils a role in society, and originated as a mutually beneficial way of regulating individual actions to minimise conflict, conserve resources, and solve coordination problems.
Why does that matter? There might be minds that think 2+2=5, but they are wrong.
If you are trying to make a point about truth, you need to specify rational minds. (In fact everyone who makes this kind of point, except Yudkowsky, does).
If you are making a point about compulsion , the problem has been solved: those who are not internally compelled are externally compelled by threats and rewards.
Compatibilism has its own, internally consistent, senses of “can” and “free”. “Free” is “not under compulsion” and can is “generally possible for the type of which the subject is a token”: pigeons can fly, penguins cant.
Theory of mind: epistemic reductive physicalism
No, just phenomenal consciousness. It’s possible to combine identity theory about Easy Problem consciousness, with eliminativism or dualism about Hard Problem consciousness (phenomenal consciousness, qualia).
Explanations need to be as simple as possible, but no simpler. As simple as possible means the minimum to explain the facts. We don’t have an explanation of phenomenal consciousness in physical terms, so adding further facts to explain it is justifiable.
If it’s eliminativism, why call it reductionism? They are not the same.
People believe in phenomenal consciousness because there is evidence for it, and believe in “further facts”—dualism—because there is no reductive explanation of it. (The zombie argument isn’t the only argument against physicalism) So you are not in a position to believe in the reductive theory of phenomenal consciousness, here and now ,because there isn’t one. You could take the view that a reductive theory will be found one day through normal science …and that would be promissory materialism. Or you could selectively eliminate phenomenal consciousness .. which leaves you needing to explain where the apparent evidence comes from … ie. solve the meta problem.
Reductionism doesn’t require you to discard any.
Personal identity: empty individualism, similarity as successor
In physics, metaphysics, social construction, etc. If physics can undermine identity claims , it can also support them.
That just isn’t the same question.
Suppose you found out you had an identical twin. You would not consider them to be you yourself. Maximal similarity is not numerical identity.
The major problem is that you and your duplicate exist simultaneously in different places, which goes against the intuition that you are a unique individual. Mere similarity explains how you could be the same individual as your non identical past self, but if it undermines your uniqueness, it is not a nett gain.
Basing identity on material continuity is possible given materialism/reductionism avoids the problem of “my clone is me, I’m in two place at once”, but makes it harder to understand how you could be the same individual as your non identical past self. However, Similarity and Continuity are not entirely exclusive, so a hybrid answer is possible.
Anthropic probability: non-realism, graph structure as successor
Is there a single correct probability?
Formalism
Consists of several claims..that mathematical objects have no real existence, that truth is proof, and that there is no single set of mathematical truths.
How?
None of the claims above imply that , and these are usually classed as different philosophies. Indeed, finitism is often motivated by the idea that maths is about the physical world.
(I am generally favourable to formalism, but I find some of the subsidiary claims confusing).
Your Conclusion
You are not consistently avoiding metaphysical claims ,because you at siding with determinism and against reductionism. (And against the most innocent forms of modality!)
My Conclusion
Whether it’s a good thing or bad, we are not in a position to do ontological minimalism with any precision, because we don’t know enough about the territory. Also, filling in knowledge gaps with intuitions and guesswork amounts to confirmation bias.
Yeah they can be distinguished ontologically. Although there are going to be multiple Bayes nets expressing the same joint distribution. So it’s not like there’s going to be a canonical ordering.
I get that active dis-belief in further facts (such as counterfactuals) can be dogmatic. Rather, it’s more of a case of, we can get an adequate empirical account without them, and adding them has problems (like causal counterfactuals implying violations of physical law).
Part of where I’m coming with this is a Chalmers like framework. Suppose there are 2 possible universes, they have the same joint distribution, but different causal ordering. Like maybe in one the stochasticity is on the fly, in the other it’s pre-computed. They imply the same joint distribution and the same set of “straightforward” physical facts (particle trajectories and so on). Yet there is a distinction, a further fact.
In which case… The agents in these universes can’t have epistemic access to these further facts, it’s similar to with the zombie argument. A simple approach is “no further facts”, although assuming this is literally the case might be dogmatic. It’s more like, don’t believe in further facts prior to a good/convincing account of them, where the ontological complexity is actually worth it.
Well it’s more like, most specific theories of these have problems. Like, the counterfactuals being really weird, corresponding to bad decision theories, etc. And it seems simpler to say, the counterfactuals don’t exist? Even if assigning high probability to it is dogmatic.
If instead of QM our best physics said something like “there are true random coin flips” then it would be a bit of a stretch to posit a MWI-like theory there, that there exist other universes where the coin flips go differently. The case for MWI is somewhat more complex, it has to do with the Copenhagen interpretation being a lot more complicated than “here, have some stochastic coin flips”.
Well we can disjunct on high or low universal K complexity. Assuming low universal K complexity, counterfactuals really do have problems, there are a lot of implications. Assuming high universal K complexity, I guess they’re more well defined. Though you can’t counterfact on just anything, you have to counterfact on a valid quantum event. So like, how many counterfactuals there are depends on the density of relevant quantum events to, say, a computer.
I guess you could make the case from QM that the classical trajectory has high K complexity, therefore counterfactual alternatives to the classical trajectory don’t require physical law violations.
If not for QM though, our knowledge would be compatible with determinism / low K complexity of the classical trajectory, and it seems like a philosophy should be able to deal with that case (even if it empirically seems not to be the case)
Right so, counterfactual reasoning is practically useful, this is more about skepticism of the implied metaphysics. There might be translations like, observing that a deterministic system can be factored (multiple ways) as interacting systems with inputs/outputs, each factoring implying additional facts about the deterministic system. Without having to say that any of these factorings is correct in the sense of correctness about further facts.
As I have explained, that depends on how you conceive of both counterfactuals and physical laws. Physical laws can be deterministic or indeterministic.
Counterfactuals come in three strengths:-
i) Counterfactuals are fully real but not “here”.
ii) Alternative outcomes were possible at the time, but didn’t happen , and don’t exist anywhere.
iii) Only hypothetical counterfactuals are possible.
There are certainly some impossible combinations , such a deterministic laws and type ii counterfactuals .. but there are plenty of allowed combinations as well. Notably, type iii Counterfactuals have no metaphysical implications So.there is no sweeping argument against counterfactuals.
Perhaps not via direct empiricism, but it’s possible to argue for one ontology over another on grounds of , eg, simplicity, as you actually do.
Additional facts don’t have to be causally idle. For instance, physical law is an additional fact over observed events. So maybe not entirely like zombies.
It is also difficult to see how it would apply to in/determinism. Indeterminism means there at addition possibilities. Determinism means there is more lawfullness.
That creates a presupposition against MWI.
All theories of FW have problems, including hard determinism
Huh? Libertarian free will requires indeterminism, and therefore type ii) counterfactuals, but that isn’t “weird” , it just isn’t determinism.I
And of course , compatibilism doesn’t require any kind of real counterfactuals, so why far with the same brush?
Saying all types of counterfactual are non existent means ditching the useful , and ontologically unimpactive , type iii’s.
I know what Yudkowkys case for MWI is, and why it is wrong
Why? You seem to have missed several steps. Low and high complexity might imply something about (in)determinism, and (in)determinism does imply type ii counterfactuals....but merely thinking in terms of counterfactuals doesn’t have to be realistic at all, it can be performed in terms of type iii counterfactuals. (But increasing versus flat complexity would be more relevant to (in)determinism. On-the-fly indeterminism means we information is constantly being added).
Why?
You can consider hypothetical counterfactuals about anything.
Rationalists
Only type ii.
Huh?
You can hypothetically plan out a moon landing before you perform it for the first time.
You don’t need that. You only need to apply an imaginary starting condition to your deterministic laws. That’s how you hypothetically plan a moon landing...the starting conditions represent the launch of a rocket design that hasn’t been built yet. And that doesn’t require breaking laws even in imagination.
PS I added a long section to my previous response.