I get that active dis-belief in further facts (such as counterfactuals) can be dogmatic. Rather, it’s more of a case of, we can get an adequate empirical account without them, and adding them has problems (like causal counterfactuals implying violations of physical law).
As I have explained, that depends on how you conceive of both counterfactuals and physical laws. Physical laws can be deterministic or indeterministic.
Counterfactuals come in three strengths:-
i) Counterfactuals are fully real but not “here”.
ii) Alternative outcomes were possible at the time, but didn’t happen , and don’t exist anywhere.
iii) Only hypothetical counterfactuals are possible.
There are certainly some impossible combinations , such a deterministic laws and type ii counterfactuals .. but there are plenty of allowed combinations as well. Notably, type iii Counterfactuals have no metaphysical implications So.there is no sweeping argument against counterfactuals.
Part of where I’m coming with this is a Chalmers like framework. Suppose there are 2 possible universes, they have the same joint distribution, but different causal ordering. Like maybe in one the stochasticity is on the fly, in the other it’s pre-computed. They imply the same joint distribution and the same set of “straightforward” physical facts (particle trajectories and so on). Yet there is a distinction, a further fact.
In which case… The agents in these universes can’t have epistemic access to these further facts,
Perhaps not via direct empiricism, but it’s possible to argue for one ontology over another on grounds of , eg, simplicity, as you actually do.
it’s similar to with the zombie argument.
Additional facts don’t have to be causally idle. For instance, physical law is an additional fact over observed events. So maybe not entirely like zombies.
A simple approach is “no further facts”, although assuming this is litery the case might be dogmatic.
It is also difficult to see how it would apply to in/determinism. Indeterminism means there at addition possibilities. Determinism means there is more lawfullness.
It’s more like, don’t believe in further facts prior to a good/convincing account of them, where the ontological complexity is actually worth it.
That creates a presupposition against MWI.
Note that compaibilism and naturalistic libertarian are both viable given our present state of knowledge...so there is no necessity to adopt anti realism.
Well it’s more like, most specific theories of these have problems.
All theories of FW have problems, including hard determinism
Like, the counterfactuals being really weird, corresponding to bad decision theories, etc
Huh? Libertarian free will requires indeterminism, and therefore type ii) counterfactuals, but that isn’t “weird” , it just isn’t determinism.I
And of course , compatibilism doesn’t require any kind of real counterfactuals, so why far with the same brush?
. And it seems simpler to say, the counterfactuals don’t exist? Even if assigning high probability to it is dogmatic.
Saying all types of counterfactual are non existent means ditching the useful , and ontologically unimpactive , type iii’s.
So much for MWI then ..according to it, every world is counterfactual to every other.
If instead of QM our best physics said something like “there are true random coin flips” then it would be a bit of a stretch to posit a MWI-like theory there, that there exist other universes where the coin flips go differently. The case for MWI is somewhat more complex, it has to do with the Copenhagen interpretation being a lot more complicated than “here, have some stochastic coin flips”.
How do you know counterfactuals require violations of physics itself? The possibility of something happening that wasn’t what happened, only requires (genuine) indeterminism, as above.
Well we can disjunct on high or low universal K complexity. Assuming low universal K complexity, counterfactuals really do have problems,
Why? You seem to have missed several steps. Low and high complexity might imply something about (in)determinism, and (in)determinism does imply type ii counterfactuals....but merely thinking in terms of counterfactuals doesn’t have to be realistic at all, it can be performed in terms of type iii counterfactuals. (But increasing versus flat complexity would be more relevant to (in)determinism. On-the-fly indeterminism means we information is constantly being added).
there are a lot of implications. Assuming high universal K complexity, I guess they’re more well defined.
Why?
Though you can’t counterfact on just anything, you have to counterfact on a valid quantum event.
You can consider hypothetical counterfactuals about anything.
Rationalists
So like, how many counterfactuals there are depends on the density of relevant quantum events to, say, a computer.
Only type ii.
I guess you could make the case from QM that the classical trajectory has high K complexity, therefore counterfactual alternatives to the classical trajectory don’t require physical law violations.
Huh?
If not for QM though, our knowledge would be compatible with determinism / low K complexity of the classical trajectory, and it seems like a philosophy should be able to deal with that case (even if it empirically seems not to be the case)
You can hypothetically plan out a moon landing before you perform it for the first time.
Right so, counterfactual reasoning is practically useful, this is more about skepticism of the implied metaphysics. There might be translations like, observing that a deterministic system can be factored (multiple ways) as interacting systems with inputs/outputs, each factoring implying additional facts about the deterministic system.
You don’t need that. You only need to apply an imaginary starting condition to your deterministic laws. That’s how you hypothetically plan a moon landing...the starting conditions represent the launch of a rocket design that hasn’t been built yet. And that doesn’t require breaking laws even in imagination.
PS I added a long section to my previous response.
As I have explained, that depends on how you conceive of both counterfactuals and physical laws. Physical laws can be deterministic or indeterministic.
Counterfactuals come in three strengths:-
i) Counterfactuals are fully real but not “here”.
ii) Alternative outcomes were possible at the time, but didn’t happen , and don’t exist anywhere.
iii) Only hypothetical counterfactuals are possible.
There are certainly some impossible combinations , such a deterministic laws and type ii counterfactuals .. but there are plenty of allowed combinations as well. Notably, type iii Counterfactuals have no metaphysical implications So.there is no sweeping argument against counterfactuals.
Perhaps not via direct empiricism, but it’s possible to argue for one ontology over another on grounds of , eg, simplicity, as you actually do.
Additional facts don’t have to be causally idle. For instance, physical law is an additional fact over observed events. So maybe not entirely like zombies.
It is also difficult to see how it would apply to in/determinism. Indeterminism means there at addition possibilities. Determinism means there is more lawfullness.
That creates a presupposition against MWI.
All theories of FW have problems, including hard determinism
Huh? Libertarian free will requires indeterminism, and therefore type ii) counterfactuals, but that isn’t “weird” , it just isn’t determinism.I
And of course , compatibilism doesn’t require any kind of real counterfactuals, so why far with the same brush?
Saying all types of counterfactual are non existent means ditching the useful , and ontologically unimpactive , type iii’s.
I know what Yudkowkys case for MWI is, and why it is wrong
Why? You seem to have missed several steps. Low and high complexity might imply something about (in)determinism, and (in)determinism does imply type ii counterfactuals....but merely thinking in terms of counterfactuals doesn’t have to be realistic at all, it can be performed in terms of type iii counterfactuals. (But increasing versus flat complexity would be more relevant to (in)determinism. On-the-fly indeterminism means we information is constantly being added).
Why?
You can consider hypothetical counterfactuals about anything.
Rationalists
Only type ii.
Huh?
You can hypothetically plan out a moon landing before you perform it for the first time.
You don’t need that. You only need to apply an imaginary starting condition to your deterministic laws. That’s how you hypothetically plan a moon landing...the starting conditions represent the launch of a rocket design that hasn’t been built yet. And that doesn’t require breaking laws even in imagination.
PS I added a long section to my previous response.