I’ve also been thinking about the application of agency abstractions to decision theory, from a somewhat different angle.
It seems like what you’re doing is considering relations between high-level third-person abstractions and low-level third-person abstractions. In contrast, I’m primarily considering relations between high-level first-person abstractions and low-level first-person abstractions.
The VNM abstraction itself assumes that “you” are deciding between different options, each of which has different (stochastic) consequences; thus, it is inherently first-personal. (Applying it to some other agent requires conjecturing things about that agent’s first-person perspective: the consequences it expects from different actions)
In general, conditions of rationality are first-personal, in the sense that they tell a given perspective what they must believe in order to be consistent.
The determinism vs. free will paradox comes about when trying to determine when a VNM-like choice abstraction is valid of a third-personal physical world.
If physical entities are considered perceptible, then there is an assumed relation between them and first-personal observations.
If physical entities are causal in a Pearlian sense, then there is an assumed relation between them and metaphysically-real interventions, which are produced through first-personal actions.
Decision theory problems, considered linguistically, are also first-personal. In the five and ten problem, things are said about “you” being in a given room, choosing between two items on “the” table, presumably the one in front of “you”. If the ability to choose different dollar bills is, linguistically, considered a part of the decision problem, then the decision problem already contains in it a first-personal VNM-like choice abstraction.
The naturalization problem is to show how such high-level, first-personal decision theory problems could be compatible with physics. Such naturalization is hard, perhaps impossible, if physics is assumed to be third-personal, but may be possible if physics is assumed to be first-personal.
This comment made a bunch of your other writing click for me. I think I see what you’re aiming for now; it’s a beautiful vision.
In general, conditions of rationality are first-personal, in the sense that they tell a given perspective what they must believe in order to be consistent.
In retrospect, this is largely what I’ve been trying to get rid of, in particular by looking for a third-person interpretation of probability. Obviously frequentism satisfies that criterion, but the strict form is too narrow for most applications and the less-strict form (i.e. “imagine we repeated this one-shot experiment many times...”) isn’t actually third-person.
I’ve also started thinking about a third-person grounding of utility maximization and the like via selection processes; that’s likely to be a whole months-long project in itself in the not-too-distant future.
I’ve also been thinking about the application of agency abstractions to decision theory, from a somewhat different angle.
It seems like what you’re doing is considering relations between high-level third-person abstractions and low-level third-person abstractions. In contrast, I’m primarily considering relations between high-level first-person abstractions and low-level first-person abstractions.
The VNM abstraction itself assumes that “you” are deciding between different options, each of which has different (stochastic) consequences; thus, it is inherently first-personal. (Applying it to some other agent requires conjecturing things about that agent’s first-person perspective: the consequences it expects from different actions)
In general, conditions of rationality are first-personal, in the sense that they tell a given perspective what they must believe in order to be consistent.
The determinism vs. free will paradox comes about when trying to determine when a VNM-like choice abstraction is valid of a third-personal physical world.
My present view of physics is that it is also first-personal, in the sense that:
If physical entities are considered perceptible, then there is an assumed relation between them and first-personal observations.
If physical entities are causal in a Pearlian sense, then there is an assumed relation between them and metaphysically-real interventions, which are produced through first-personal actions.
Decision theory problems, considered linguistically, are also first-personal. In the five and ten problem, things are said about “you” being in a given room, choosing between two items on “the” table, presumably the one in front of “you”. If the ability to choose different dollar bills is, linguistically, considered a part of the decision problem, then the decision problem already contains in it a first-personal VNM-like choice abstraction.
The naturalization problem is to show how such high-level, first-personal decision theory problems could be compatible with physics. Such naturalization is hard, perhaps impossible, if physics is assumed to be third-personal, but may be possible if physics is assumed to be first-personal.
This comment made a bunch of your other writing click for me. I think I see what you’re aiming for now; it’s a beautiful vision.
In retrospect, this is largely what I’ve been trying to get rid of, in particular by looking for a third-person interpretation of probability. Obviously frequentism satisfies that criterion, but the strict form is too narrow for most applications and the less-strict form (i.e. “imagine we repeated this one-shot experiment many times...”) isn’t actually third-person.
I’ve also started thinking about a third-person grounding of utility maximization and the like via selection processes; that’s likely to be a whole months-long project in itself in the not-too-distant future.