This comment made a bunch of your other writing click for me. I think I see what you’re aiming for now; it’s a beautiful vision.
In general, conditions of rationality are first-personal, in the sense that they tell a given perspective what they must believe in order to be consistent.
In retrospect, this is largely what I’ve been trying to get rid of, in particular by looking for a third-person interpretation of probability. Obviously frequentism satisfies that criterion, but the strict form is too narrow for most applications and the less-strict form (i.e. “imagine we repeated this one-shot experiment many times...”) isn’t actually third-person.
I’ve also started thinking about a third-person grounding of utility maximization and the like via selection processes; that’s likely to be a whole months-long project in itself in the not-too-distant future.
This comment made a bunch of your other writing click for me. I think I see what you’re aiming for now; it’s a beautiful vision.
In retrospect, this is largely what I’ve been trying to get rid of, in particular by looking for a third-person interpretation of probability. Obviously frequentism satisfies that criterion, but the strict form is too narrow for most applications and the less-strict form (i.e. “imagine we repeated this one-shot experiment many times...”) isn’t actually third-person.
I’ve also started thinking about a third-person grounding of utility maximization and the like via selection processes; that’s likely to be a whole months-long project in itself in the not-too-distant future.