On Collusion—Vitalik Buterin

Link post

...if there is a situ­a­tion with some fixed pool of re­sources and some cur­rently es­tab­lished mechanism for dis­tribut­ing those re­sources, and it’s un­avoid­ably pos­si­ble for 51% of the par­ti­ci­pants can con­spire to seize con­trol of the re­sources, no mat­ter what the cur­rent con­figu­ra­tion is there is always some con­spir­acy that can emerge that would be prof­itable for the par­ti­ci­pants.
...This fact, the in­sta­bil­ity of ma­jor­ity games un­der co­op­er­a­tive game the­ory, is ar­guably highly un­der­rated as a sim­plified gen­eral math­e­mat­i­cal model of why there may well be no “end of his­tory” in poli­tics and no sys­tem that proves fully satis­fac­tory; I per­son­ally be­lieve it’s much more use­ful than the more fa­mous Ar­row’s the­o­rem, for ex­am­ple.

I’ve found this post quite use­ful in think­ing about mechanism de­sign and prob­lems of de­sign­ing sta­ble sys­tems.