As @William_Mayner says, what we are discussing isn’t p zombies , but computational zombues, it c-zombies. P zombies are not incoherent, as @derelict5432 ssays, but inconsistent with physicalism.
You don’t have to be a substance dualist to believe a sim (something computationally or functionally isomorphic to a person) could be a zombie. It’s a common error , that because dualism is a reason to reject something as being genuinely conscious, it is the only reason—there is also an argument based on physicalism.
There are three things that can defeat the multiple realisability of consciousness:-
Computationalism is true, and the physical basis makes a difference to the kinds of computations that are possible.
Physicalism is true, but computationalism isn’t. Having the right computation without the right physics—without running on the metal—only gives a semblance of consciousness.
Dualism is true. Consciousness depends on something that is neither physics nor computation.
So there are two issues: what explains claims of consciousness? What explains absence of consciousness?
Computationalism is a theory of multiple realisability: the hardware on which the computation runs doesn’t matter, so long as it is adequate to run the computation, so grey matter and silicon can run the same computations...and a lot of physical details are therefore irrelevant to conscious.
Computationalism, even very fine grained computationalism, isn’t a direct consequence of physicalism.
Physicalism has it that an exact atom-by-atom duplicate of a person will be a person and not a zombie, because there is no nonphysical element to go missing. That’s the argument against p-zombies. But if actually takes an atom-by-atom duplication to achieve human functioning, then the computational theory of mind will be false, because CTM implies that the same algorithm running on different hardware will be sufficient. Physicalism doesn’t imply computationalism, and arguments against p-zombies don’t imply the non existence of c-zombies—unconscious duplicates that are identical computationally, but not physically.
So it is possible,given physicalism , for qualia to depend on the real physics , the physical level of granularity, not on the higher level of granularity that is computation.
Effects can have multiple causes. One possible cause of a claim to be conscious is actually being conscious. Another is being a functional duplicate of an entity that claims to be conscious. Another is some kind of delusion. Under normal circumstances, reports of consciousness are strong evidence of consciousness , but robotic duplicates and neuronal replacement scenarios aren’t normal circumstances
A computational duplicate of a believer in consciousness and qualia—a c-zombie—will continue to state that it has them , whether it does or not, because its a computational duplicate , so it produces the same output in response to the same input. Likewise, a duplicate of a non believer will deny them. (This point is clearer if you think in terms of duplicates of specific individuals with consistent views, like Dennett and Chalmers, rather than a generic human ).
Do C Zombies imply Epiphenomenalism?
No, not necessarily. Functions and algorithms don’t cause anything, substrates do. If a conscious state in a normal physical brain is identical to some physical state, then it shares in its causal powers. Robo Chalmers has a different substrate based on silicon , or whatever .Robo Chalmers’ substrate is causally effective, but that doesn’ necessarily mean Robo Chalmers has a causally effective consciousness, because it might not have (hard problem, phenomenal) consciousness at all. Or an entirely different phenomenology.
If an entirely zombie like computational duplicate is possbile, that undermine the
Absent,Dancing and Fading argument If the end point, complete absence of Qualia is possible, the mid point of faded Qualia is not impossible
Is there a post or wiki page laying out the differences between P- and C-zombies in an operational sense? Not how they internally work or feel, but what would an outside observer be able to detect to distinguish a person from a C-Zombie (already established that P-Zombies are indistinguishable).
As @William_Mayner says, what we are discussing isn’t p zombies , but computational zombues, it c-zombies. P zombies are not incoherent, as @derelict5432 ssays, but inconsistent with physicalism.
You don’t have to be a substance dualist to believe a sim (something computationally or functionally isomorphic to a person) could be a zombie. It’s a common error , that because dualism is a reason to reject something as being genuinely conscious, it is the only reason—there is also an argument based on physicalism.
There are three things that can defeat the multiple realisability of consciousness:-
Computationalism is true, and the physical basis makes a difference to the kinds of computations that are possible.
Physicalism is true, but computationalism isn’t. Having the right computation without the right physics—without running on the metal—only gives a semblance of consciousness.
Dualism is true. Consciousness depends on something that is neither physics nor computation.
So there are two issues: what explains claims of consciousness? What explains absence of consciousness?
Computationalism is a theory of multiple realisability: the hardware on which the computation runs doesn’t matter, so long as it is adequate to run the computation, so grey matter and silicon can run the same computations...and a lot of physical details are therefore irrelevant to conscious.
Computationalism, even very fine grained computationalism, isn’t a direct consequence of physicalism.
Physicalism has it that an exact atom-by-atom duplicate of a person will be a person and not a zombie, because there is no nonphysical element to go missing. That’s the argument against p-zombies. But if actually takes an atom-by-atom duplication to achieve human functioning, then the computational theory of mind will be false, because CTM implies that the same algorithm running on different hardware will be sufficient. Physicalism doesn’t imply computationalism, and arguments against p-zombies don’t imply the non existence of c-zombies—unconscious duplicates that are identical computationally, but not physically.
So it is possible,given physicalism , for qualia to depend on the real physics , the physical level of granularity, not on the higher level of granularity that is computation.
Effects can have multiple causes. One possible cause of a claim to be conscious is actually being conscious. Another is being a functional duplicate of an entity that claims to be conscious. Another is some kind of delusion. Under normal circumstances, reports of consciousness are strong evidence of consciousness , but robotic duplicates and neuronal replacement scenarios aren’t normal circumstances
A computational duplicate of a believer in consciousness and qualia—a c-zombie—will continue to state that it has them , whether it does or not, because its a computational duplicate , so it produces the same output in response to the same input. Likewise, a duplicate of a non believer will deny them. (This point is clearer if you think in terms of duplicates of specific individuals with consistent views, like Dennett and Chalmers, rather than a generic human ).
Do C Zombies imply Epiphenomenalism?
No, not necessarily. Functions and algorithms don’t cause anything, substrates do. If a conscious state in a normal physical brain is identical to some physical state, then it shares in its causal powers. Robo Chalmers has a different substrate based on silicon , or whatever .Robo Chalmers’ substrate is causally effective, but that doesn’ necessarily mean Robo Chalmers has a causally effective consciousness, because it might not have (hard problem, phenomenal) consciousness at all. Or an entirely different phenomenology.
If an entirely zombie like computational duplicate is possbile, that undermine the Absent,Dancing and Fading argument If the end point, complete absence of Qualia is possible, the mid point of faded Qualia is not impossible
Is there a post or wiki page laying out the differences between P- and C-zombies in an operational sense? Not how they internally work or feel, but what would an outside observer be able to detect to distinguish a person from a C-Zombie (already established that P-Zombies are indistinguishable).
Ah! Shoot. Yeah, I didn’t use the correct terminology, P-zombies =/= C-zombies! Thanks for pointing that out and for the explanation.
Do C Zombies imply Epiphenomenalism? --> I’m not sure I follow the argument for why it doesn’t.