However, here are two counterpoints that I take seriously:
(1) Air power. In a few years there will be fighter-jet-sized drones designed for air to air combat, but for now at least, NATO would probably continue to dominate in the skies. This is especially important e.g. for a war over Taiwan.
(2) Space power. Thanks mostly to SpaceX, it seems like the USA would have a huge advantage in launching stuff to orbit. I don’t have a good sense of how big a deal ‘space supremacy’ will be in e.g. a Taiwan war, but I suspect it will be huge (e.g. maybe it’ll allow you to actually hide some of your major force movements, since the enemy won’t have satellites, whereas not only will you be able to see their stuff, and possibly even deploy bombs/drones/etc. from space to strike deep into enemy territory)
I asked Claude to build this table for me, and spot-checked the links a bit:
2024 Data (from McDowell’s Space Activities 2024 report)
Entity
Payload Mass Launched
SpaceX
~1,500–1,600 tonnes (Wikipedia reports >1,498 tonnes with only 85.5% of launches having reported masses)
USA total
2,178 tonnes
China
174 tonnes
NATO countries
~2,230 tonnes (USA + W. Europe 46t + E. Europe 0.1t + Turkey 4.3t + Canada ~4t)
Not publicly aggregated; ~72+ launches through mid-November, but no total mass figure available
NATO countries
Not aggregated; dominated by USA (~160+ launches, mostly SpaceX)
Key Notes
China’s 2025 payload mass isn’t tracked publicly in aggregate. Based on China’s 70 successful orbital launches through early November 2025 Payloadspace, and assuming similar average payload masses to 2024 (~2.6 tonnes/launch), a rough estimate would be ~180–200 tonnes, but this is my extrapolation.
NATO is dominated by the USA (which is dominated by SpaceX). European NATO members contribute relatively little mass—Western Europe launched only 46 tonnes total in 2024 Planet4589.
SpaceX alone accounts for roughly 85–90% of global payload mass to orbit.
Kessler syndrome isn’t permanent though, and it only affects orbits where there is a high density of satellites. If SpaceX can continue launching they would launch to higher orbits with low debris density, and very low orbits where the high surface area : volume ratio of debris means it reenters fast but the satellite needs to use a bit more fuel.
What they can do is deny LEO due to Kessler syndrome, and deny slightly higher orbits by launching 10^9 tiny ball bearings into retrograde orbit, which will cause several unavoidable collisions per year with any satellite passing through that altitude. I think this forces adversaries to retreat into VLEO which is shielded by drag.
Space power means NATO drones larger than a few kilograms will probably be unjammable, because they connect to Starlink. China just had a study and the upshot is you need air superiority and hundreds of large EW drones to jam Starlink, which is difficult to achieve when your own drones are vulnerable to EW. I’m not sure if NATO would actually have enough of an mass advantage in space to shoot down Chinese satellites, but it seems like satellites can be small enough that hiding “major force movements” would be difficult for any party
Not sure what to make of it, but some concerning claims: only 750 out of 2000 jet fighters in US airforce are combat ready. Average number of flights hour per pilot has dropped to 110 a year, where previously anything below 150 would be considered not combat-ready. Chinese fighter pilots average 200 hours a year.
Unfortunately, I basically agree with this post.
However, here are two counterpoints that I take seriously:
(1) Air power. In a few years there will be fighter-jet-sized drones designed for air to air combat, but for now at least, NATO would probably continue to dominate in the skies. This is especially important e.g. for a war over Taiwan.
(2) Space power. Thanks mostly to SpaceX, it seems like the USA would have a huge advantage in launching stuff to orbit. I don’t have a good sense of how big a deal ‘space supremacy’ will be in e.g. a Taiwan war, but I suspect it will be huge (e.g. maybe it’ll allow you to actually hide some of your major force movements, since the enemy won’t have satellites, whereas not only will you be able to see their stuff, and possibly even deploy bombs/drones/etc. from space to strike deep into enemy territory)
I asked Claude to build this table for me, and spot-checked the links a bit:
2024 Data (from McDowell’s Space Activities 2024 report)
2025 Data (partial year, through Q3/Nov 2025)
Key Notes
China’s 2025 payload mass isn’t tracked publicly in aggregate. Based on China’s 70 successful orbital launches through early November 2025 Payloadspace, and assuming similar average payload masses to 2024 (~2.6 tonnes/launch), a rough estimate would be ~180–200 tonnes, but this is my extrapolation.
NATO is dominated by the USA (which is dominated by SpaceX). European NATO members contribute relatively little mass—Western Europe launched only 46 tonnes total in 2024 Planet4589.
SpaceX alone accounts for roughly 85–90% of global payload mass to orbit.
Best source: Jonathan McDowell’s annual reports at planet4589.org/space/papers/
In a full out war, the side with a disadvantage in space would probably try to introduce Kessler syndrome.
Kessler syndrome isn’t permanent though, and it only affects orbits where there is a high density of satellites. If SpaceX can continue launching they would launch to higher orbits with low debris density, and very low orbits where the high surface area : volume ratio of debris means it reenters fast but the satellite needs to use a bit more fuel.
What they can do is deny LEO due to Kessler syndrome, and deny slightly higher orbits by launching 10^9 tiny ball bearings into retrograde orbit, which will cause several unavoidable collisions per year with any satellite passing through that altitude. I think this forces adversaries to retreat into VLEO which is shielded by drag.
Space power means NATO drones larger than a few kilograms will probably be unjammable, because they connect to Starlink. China just had a study and the upshot is you need air superiority and hundreds of large EW drones to jam Starlink, which is difficult to achieve when your own drones are vulnerable to EW. I’m not sure if NATO would actually have enough of an mass advantage in space to shoot down Chinese satellites, but it seems like satellites can be small enough that hiding “major force movements” would be difficult for any party
Thanks Daniel, you bring up some good points.
On the airforce issue I would be inclined to agree with you but the following video is doing the rounds on twitter right now: https://x.com/teortaxesTex/status/1993637089900900540
Not sure what to make of it, but some concerning claims: only 750 out of 2000 jet fighters in US airforce are combat ready. Average number of flights hour per pilot has dropped to 110 a year, where previously anything below 150 would be considered not combat-ready. Chinese fighter pilots average 200 hours a year.