These numbers seem reasonable. My median for “full automation of AI R&D” is ~early 2031 and my 25th percentile is ~mid 2028.
I’m between Daniel’s views (more aggressive) and Eli’s views. (My superintelligence median is closer to Eli’s, my superhuman coder median is closer to Daniel’s. My TEDAI median is probably closer to Eli’s.)
Ok, on closer examination of my numbers and views, what I said here isn’t that accurate about my current views. (This is mostly driven by me thinking more carefully about what my views should be and updating towards slightly longer timelines.)
I’m actually pretty close to Eli on both AC and TEDAI, with shorter timeline to AC and longer timelines to TEDAI. See here for more details.
(My views aren’t that stable on reflection as is apparent here...)
Comparing to your post GPT-5 update, it reads like you have shorter timelines than you did at the start of 2025? (This contrasts to the AI Futures model authors whose timelines are now in between their initial and q4 numbers).
What doubling rate and deployment time to AI automation after 1 month 80% reliability are you now assuming? Naively, if I use a 80% reliability 125 day doubling time (which is the current trendline to opus 4.6 using logistic fixed slope), that would get us to 1-month 80% in Feb 2029. That’s only about 6 months sooner than your GPT-5 update post. And yet, you’ve moved back your median for full AI automation by 2 years. Are you assuming a faster jump from 1 month to full AI automation now or an even faster doubling time regime from 2025?
These numbers seem reasonable. My median for “full automation of AI R&D” is ~early 2031 and my 25th percentile is ~mid 2028.
I’m between Daniel’s views (more aggressive) and Eli’s views. (My superintelligence median is closer to Eli’s, my superhuman coder median is closer to Daniel’s. My TEDAI median is probably closer to Eli’s.)
Ok, on closer examination of my numbers and views, what I said here isn’t that accurate about my current views. (This is mostly driven by me thinking more carefully about what my views should be and updating towards slightly longer timelines.)
I’m actually pretty close to Eli on both AC and TEDAI, with shorter timeline to AC and longer timelines to TEDAI. See here for more details.
(My views aren’t that stable on reflection as is apparent here...)
Can you share your median parameters for all the adjustable parameters in their model?
Comparing to your post GPT-5 update, it reads like you have shorter timelines than you did at the start of 2025? (This contrasts to the AI Futures model authors whose timelines are now in between their initial and q4 numbers).
What doubling rate and deployment time to AI automation after 1 month 80% reliability are you now assuming? Naively, if I use a 80% reliability 125 day doubling time (which is the current trendline to opus 4.6 using logistic fixed slope), that would get us to 1-month 80% in Feb 2029. That’s only about 6 months sooner than your GPT-5 update post. And yet, you’ve moved back your median for full AI automation by 2 years. Are you assuming a faster jump from 1 month to full AI automation now or an even faster doubling time regime from 2025?
I’ve updated towards faster progress, more acceleration from AIs, and superexponential time horizon progress earlier.
I plan on saying more in a new post.I say more in this post. (And see this other comment.)