Because there are so many more possible viviaria than simulations. Like, a simulation is simulating something, which involves a kind of match between what’s in the simulation and what it’s supposed to represent/simulate. If it contains life and life is the object of study, it’s a vivarium, and I think most simulations are vivaria, but most vivaria are probably not simulations.
In our case, if we are ultimately running on a computer, then wouldn’t that mean that we are a simulation? It seems obvious that we are trying; the intention would be to simulate a pre-AGI civilization.
Could we be running on a computer and also be a vivarium?
I get that a lot of people use “simulation” and “computer program” as basically synonyms, but that’s a bit linguistically impoverished for the hard work of analyzing distinct metaphysical hypotheses and their consequences. Consider that ideal behavior is different in
a) computer worlds that are built to mimic an existing world, in which case our “job” is be similar to whatever is “out there” that we’re a simulation of, versus
b) computer worlds that are built to be a de novo home for a new kind of life or being, such as for entertainment or exploratory science.
(a) is a “simulation”, and if I discover I’m in a simulation, I might just go ahead an act like I’m not, to help the simulator with their intended purpose to mimic something that’s not in a simulation.
(b) is not a “simulation”, and if we ever discover we’re in one of those, I might look for other instructions for what I’m supposed or expected to do, from the creator(s). I call this a ‘digital vivarium’ but I’m open to other terms, just not ‘simulation’ which fails to correctly draw the distinction of, well, not being a simulation of anything.
if we are ultimately running on a computer, then wouldn’t that mean that we are a simulation?
Not really, if the computer program we’re inside is not designed to simulate anything.
Could we be running on a computer and also be a vivarium
Ok but if we’re on a computer then isn’t it clear we’re a simulation, not a vivarium, bc clearly it was designed to simulate the behavior of a pre-agi civ?
bc clearly it was designed to simulate the behavior of a pre-agi civ?
No? This makes no sense to me, unless you define “computer” to mean “computer built by a future human civilization”, which is a weirdly human-centric definition of computer.
Here’s a weirdly specific scenario to help illustrate why:
Suppose I use a 2040 MacBook to build an alien-like digital world with novel 13-tentacled lifeforms in it, that are not a simulation of anything that I believe exists. The aliens in that digital world have their own computers that look nothing like MacBooks, but I’m still quite interested in what they’ll do with their alien computers, and if they’ll make AGI. The computers run on “greenstone” circuits that are more like Minecraft redstone circuits than electrical transistors, but are actually different from both (not a simulation of either). The creatures then discuss, in their own way of communicating, as follows:
Creature 1: “If we’re in a computer, it’s sure to be a simulation.”
Creature 2: “Not necessarily. Even if we’re in a computer, it could be in some kind of digital vivarium that’s not a simulation of anything, just a computational world with artificial lifeforms created to live within it (us).”
Creature 1: “But if we’re in a computer, clearly it was designed to simulate the behavior of a pre-agi civ?”
Creature 2: “No? If we’re in a vivarium, its creators may be a wholly different civilization, for whom we are not a simulation of anything. Like, who knows, maybe they only have 4 limbs! Unless by ‘computer’ you specifically mean one of these 13-tentacle-operated devices that we-specifically built from greenstone circuits… then sure, yeah, our future civilization would probably be running the simulation in that case. But that’s a weirdly us-specific definition of ‘computer’ don’t you think?”
What seems clear to me is that our world is the result of fairly simple laws of physics, and our creators wanted to know how those simple laws would play out. They’re saying “if there was a universe with these laws, what would happen”. (This is what I’d meant by “simulation”)
I agree it’s less clear that they’re doing this bc they think those laws also describe a real-world process (somewhere in the multiverse) and they want to predict the outcome of that process. (This is what you meant by “simulation” and I think your def is better.)
So I understand where you’re coming from better now. Thanks!
But I still think we’re in a simulation, in your stronger sense of the word! Why? Bc:
other civs will reasonably believe our laws of physics describe part of the multiverse,
this gives them a strong instrumental reason to simulate this,
absent 1 and 2 there aren’t comparably strong reasons to run vivariums like our world.
absent 1 and 2 there aren’t comparably strong reasons to run vivariums like our world.
Why the focus on “reasons”?
Many things exist from causes that are not “reasons” in the sense of a decision-maker choosing something with an objective. All reasons are causes, but not all causes are reasons. For example, reproduction is a process that creates a lot of things without “reasons” in the central case of the word referring to something “reasoning”.
And, if you wonder what caused you (or us) to exist, a good contender is “a causing-things-to-exist maximizer”.
Some universal distributions are full of agents that make choices that make that distribution not a valid model of reality after the decisions are made (self-defeating). Other distributions are full of agents making decisions that ratify the distribution (self-fulfilling).
Distributions that aren’t fixed points under reflection about what they decide about themselves are not coherent models of reality.
Because there are so many more possible viviaria than simulations. Like, a simulation is simulating something, which involves a kind of match between what’s in the simulation and what it’s supposed to represent/simulate. If it contains life and life is the object of study, it’s a vivarium, and I think most simulations are vivaria, but most vivaria are probably not simulations.
In our case, if we are ultimately running on a computer, then wouldn’t that mean that we are a simulation? It seems obvious that we are trying; the intention would be to simulate a pre-AGI civilization.
Could we be running on a computer and also be a vivarium?
I get that a lot of people use “simulation” and “computer program” as basically synonyms, but that’s a bit linguistically impoverished for the hard work of analyzing distinct metaphysical hypotheses and their consequences. Consider that ideal behavior is different in
a) computer worlds that are built to mimic an existing world, in which case our “job” is be similar to whatever is “out there” that we’re a simulation of, versus
b) computer worlds that are built to be a de novo home for a new kind of life or being, such as for entertainment or exploratory science.
(a) is a “simulation”, and if I discover I’m in a simulation, I might just go ahead an act like I’m not, to help the simulator with their intended purpose to mimic something that’s not in a simulation.
(b) is not a “simulation”, and if we ever discover we’re in one of those, I might look for other instructions for what I’m supposed or expected to do, from the creator(s). I call this a ‘digital vivarium’ but I’m open to other terms, just not ‘simulation’ which fails to correctly draw the distinction of, well, not being a simulation of anything.
Not really, if the computer program we’re inside is not designed to simulate anything.
Yes, because artificial life is still life.
Ok but if we’re on a computer then isn’t it clear we’re a simulation, not a vivarium, bc clearly it was designed to simulate the behavior of a pre-agi civ?
No? This makes no sense to me, unless you define “computer” to mean “computer built by a future human civilization”, which is a weirdly human-centric definition of computer.
Here’s a weirdly specific scenario to help illustrate why:
Suppose I use a 2040 MacBook to build an alien-like digital world with novel 13-tentacled lifeforms in it, that are not a simulation of anything that I believe exists. The aliens in that digital world have their own computers that look nothing like MacBooks, but I’m still quite interested in what they’ll do with their alien computers, and if they’ll make AGI. The computers run on “greenstone” circuits that are more like Minecraft redstone circuits than electrical transistors, but are actually different from both (not a simulation of either). The creatures then discuss, in their own way of communicating, as follows:
Creature 1: “If we’re in a computer, it’s sure to be a simulation.”
Creature 2: “Not necessarily. Even if we’re in a computer, it could be in some kind of digital vivarium that’s not a simulation of anything, just a computational world with artificial lifeforms created to live within it (us).”
Creature 1: “But if we’re in a computer, clearly it was designed to simulate the behavior of a pre-agi civ?”
Creature 2: “No? If we’re in a vivarium, its creators may be a wholly different civilization, for whom we are not a simulation of anything. Like, who knows, maybe they only have 4 limbs! Unless by ‘computer’ you specifically mean one of these 13-tentacle-operated devices that we-specifically built from greenstone circuits… then sure, yeah, our future civilization would probably be running the simulation in that case. But that’s a weirdly us-specific definition of ‘computer’ don’t you think?”
Thanks, that’s helpful.
What seems clear to me is that our world is the result of fairly simple laws of physics, and our creators wanted to know how those simple laws would play out. They’re saying “if there was a universe with these laws, what would happen”. (This is what I’d meant by “simulation”)
I agree it’s less clear that they’re doing this bc they think those laws also describe a real-world process (somewhere in the multiverse) and they want to predict the outcome of that process. (This is what you meant by “simulation” and I think your def is better.)
So I understand where you’re coming from better now. Thanks!
But I still think we’re in a simulation, in your stronger sense of the word! Why? Bc:
other civs will reasonably believe our laws of physics describe part of the multiverse,
this gives them a strong instrumental reason to simulate this,
absent 1 and 2 there aren’t comparably strong reasons to run vivariums like our world.
Why the focus on “reasons”?
Many things exist from causes that are not “reasons” in the sense of a decision-maker choosing something with an objective. All reasons are causes, but not all causes are reasons. For example, reproduction is a process that creates a lot of things without “reasons” in the central case of the word referring to something “reasoning”.
And, if you wonder what caused you (or us) to exist, a good contender is “a causing-things-to-exist maximizer”.
Is there a strong enough prior on causing-things-to-exist-maximizers in, eg, the universal distribution, though?
Which universal distribution?
Some universal distributions are full of agents that make choices that make that distribution not a valid model of reality after the decisions are made (self-defeating). Other distributions are full of agents making decisions that ratify the distribution (self-fulfilling).
Distributions that aren’t fixed points under reflection about what they decide about themselves are not coherent models of reality.