Normative reductionism

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Here’s a con­cept that seems use­ful, but that I don’t re­mem­ber ever hear­ing ex­plic­itly referred to (with my own ten­ta­tive name for it—if it turns out to not already have one in some ex­ten­sive philo­soph­i­cal liter­a­ture, I might think more about whether it is a good name):

Nor­ma­tive re­duc­tion­ism: The value of a world his­tory is equal to the value of its parts (for some defi­ni­tion of rele­vant parts).

For in­stance, if two world his­to­ries only differ be­tween time t and time t’, ac­cord­ing to NR you do not need to know what hap­pened at other times to eval­u­ate them in full. Similarly, the value of Alice’s life, or the value of Alice en­joy­ing a nap, de­pend on the na­ture of her life or the nap, and not for in­stance on other peo­ple’s lives or events that took place be­fore she was born with no effect on her (un­less per­haps she has prefer­ences about those events or they in­volve peo­ple hav­ing prefer­ences about her, but still the to­tal value can be de­com­posed into the value of differ­ent prefer­ences be­ing fulfilled or not). Straight­for­ward he­do­nis­tic util­i­tar­i­anism prob­a­bly im­plies nor­ma­tive re­duc­tion­ism.

My im­pres­sion is that peo­ple have differ­ent in­tu­itions about this and vary in how much they as­sume it, and that it mostly isn’t en­tirely al­igned with other axes of eth­i­cal view, ei­ther log­i­cally or so­ciolog­i­cally, though is re­lated to them. So it seems maybe worth not­ing ex­plic­itly.