John Broome calls this view ‘separability of times’ in Weighing Lives, ch. 7.
(Pedantic quibble: the reductionist thesis you define can’t claim that the value of a world history is equal to the value of its parts; it should claim that the value of a world history is equal to the sum of the value of its parts—or, if you don’t want to commit to additivity, that it is a function of the value of its parts.)
Actually, re-reading the post I think that by ‘parts’ you didn’t necessarily mean ‘temporal parts’. In particular, your example of Alice suggests that in that case, the ‘parts’ in question are ‘people’. Broome has a parallel view to ‘separability of times’, called ‘separability of lives’ and discussed in ch. 8 of Weighing Lives, which corresponds to this use of ‘parts’.
John Broome calls this view ‘separability of times’ in Weighing Lives, ch. 7.
(Pedantic quibble: the reductionist thesis you define can’t claim that the value of a world history is equal to the value of its parts; it should claim that the value of a world history is equal to the sum of the value of its parts—or, if you don’t want to commit to additivity, that it is a function of the value of its parts.)
Actually, re-reading the post I think that by ‘parts’ you didn’t necessarily mean ‘temporal parts’. In particular, your example of Alice suggests that in that case, the ‘parts’ in question are ‘people’. Broome has a parallel view to ‘separability of times’, called ‘separability of lives’ and discussed in ch. 8 of Weighing Lives, which corresponds to this use of ‘parts’.