Quantum mechanics only shifts us from the state of the world being deterministic, to the probability distribution being deterministic. It doesn’t provide scope for free will
But counterfactuals aren’t defined in terms of free will, only probability. Which is to say, that as far as everyone who is not a Yudowskian rationalist is concerned,counterfactuals aren’t defined in terms of free will, only probability. Rationalists have their own problem of counterfactuals because they have their own definition of counterfactuals.
A probabilistic world, a world in which it is an objective fact that things could have happened differently, cannot be a deterministic world...even if it lacks free will. There are more than two quadrants.
It is Many Worlds that portrays a deterministic evolution of probability distributions...not quantum mechanics.
Counterfactuals are defined in terms of probability, but not of objective probability. Subjective probability is always available because subjects have limited knowledge..so subjective counterfactuals are always available.
If the model is based on probabilities, then its counterfactuals are defined in terms of probabilities. If the model is not based on probabilities, then its counterfactuals are not defined in terms of probabilities. If the model has something in it called “free will”, then its counterfactuals will be defined in terms of “free will”.
Even if it’s true that counterfactuals are only defined within models, it doesn’t follow that you can always define counterfactuals within any given model. A model that contains (libertarian) free will embeds possibilities/probabilities anyway … the are doing the lifting.
So if I’m not a Yudkowskian rationalist and I want to say that if, in Game of Life, the configuration of cells had been different (so instead of configuration1, it had been configuration2), the outcome would’ve also been different (outcome2 instead of outcome1), that’s not a counterfactual? (Since it’s not defined in terms of subjective or objective probability.)
One of the problems Rationalists have with counterfactuals is motivational: why would you think of an alternate history of a game of life, when there is zero probability that it started in a different state?
So you’re saying that it is a counterfactual (despite not involving subjective or objective probability), but you’re saying there is a problem in nobody being motivated to think about said counterfactual?
So you’re neither saying it’s not a counterfactual (despite it not involving either subjective or objective probability), nor you’re saying there is a problem with nobody being motivated to think about them.
In a deterministic universe (the jury is still out as to whether the indeterminism of our universe impacts our decisions), free will is hidden in the other if-branches of the computation-which-is-you. It could’ve made another decision, but it didn’t. You can imagine that as another possible world with that computation being slightly different (such that it makes another decision).
Counterfactuals don’t have ontological existence. We talk about them to talk about other possible worlds which are similar to ours in some aspects and different in others.
Off course zero not being a probability means that you don’t know with infinite strength which one is the real history of game of life. There is a perspective that probablities fundamentally are thinkresource allocations, giving a low probablity means you don’t/shouldn’t think with/about it.
But counterfactuals aren’t defined in terms of free will, only probability. Which is to say, that as far as everyone who is not a Yudowskian rationalist is concerned,counterfactuals aren’t defined in terms of free will, only probability. Rationalists have their own problem of counterfactuals because they have their own definition of counterfactuals.
A probabilistic world, a world in which it is an objective fact that things could have happened differently, cannot be a deterministic world...even if it lacks free will. There are more than two quadrants.
It is Many Worlds that portrays a deterministic evolution of probability distributions...not quantum mechanics.
Counterfactuals are defined in terms of probability, but not of objective probability. Subjective probability is always available because subjects have limited knowledge..so subjective counterfactuals are always available.
Counterfactuals are defined relative to models.
If the model is based on probabilities, then its counterfactuals are defined in terms of probabilities. If the model is not based on probabilities, then its counterfactuals are not defined in terms of probabilities. If the model has something in it called “free will”, then its counterfactuals will be defined in terms of “free will”.
Even if it’s true that counterfactuals are only defined within models, it doesn’t follow that you can always define counterfactuals within any given model. A model that contains (libertarian) free will embeds possibilities/probabilities anyway … the are doing the lifting.
So if I’m not a Yudkowskian rationalist and I want to say that if, in Game of Life, the configuration of cells had been different (so instead of configuration1, it had been configuration2), the outcome would’ve also been different (outcome2 instead of outcome1), that’s not a counterfactual? (Since it’s not defined in terms of subjective or objective probability.)
One of the problems Rationalists have with counterfactuals is motivational: why would you think of an alternate history of a game of life, when there is zero probability that it started in a different state?
So you’re saying that it is a counterfactual (despite not involving subjective or objective probability), but you’re saying there is a problem in nobody being motivated to think about said counterfactual?
I’m saying the Rationalists are saying that …I don’t have a problem with counterfactuals myself.
So you’re neither saying it’s not a counterfactual (despite it not involving either subjective or objective probability), nor you’re saying there is a problem with nobody being motivated to think about them.
So what are you saying?
If you want to think about the outcomes of a a counterfactual its just a conditional whose antecedent didn’t happen.
But thats not the problem Rationalists have.
Indeed.
So what is the problem?
The motivational problem is “why think about alternative decisions when you could only have made one decision?”.
The ontological problem is “where do counterfactuals exist?”
In a deterministic universe (the jury is still out as to whether the indeterminism of our universe impacts our decisions), free will is hidden in the other if-branches of the computation-which-is-you. It could’ve made another decision, but it didn’t. You can imagine that as another possible world with that computation being slightly different (such that it makes another decision).
Counterfactuals don’t have ontological existence. We talk about them to talk about other possible worlds which are similar to ours in some aspects and different in others.
Off course zero not being a probability means that you don’t know with infinite strength which one is the real history of game of life. There is a perspective that probablities fundamentally are thinkresource allocations, giving a low probablity means you don’t/shouldn’t think with/about it.