Many people (including me) have opinions on current US president Donald Trump, none of which are relevant here because, as is well-known to LessWrong, politics is the mind-killer. But in the middle of an interview yesterday with someone from ABC News, I was fascinated to hear him say the most Bayesian thing I’ve ever heard from a US president: --
TERRY MORAN: You have a hundred percent confidence in Pete Hegseth?
PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: I don’t have—a hundred percent confidence in anything, okay? Anything. Do I have a hundred percent? It’s a stupid question. Look --
TERRY MORAN: It’s a pretty important position.
PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: -- I have—no, no, no. You don’t have a hundred percent. Only a liar would say, “I have a hundred percent confidence.” I don’t have a hundred percent confidence that we’re gonna finish this interview. ---
[EDIT—no object-level comments about Trump, please; as per my comment here, I think it would be unproductive and poorly suited to this context. There are many many other places to talk about object-level politics.]
Many people (including me) have opinions on current US president Donald Trump, none of which are relevant here because, as is well-known to LessWrong, politics is the mind-killer.
I think that “none of which are relevant” is too strong a statement and is somewhat of a misconception. From the linked post:
If you want to make a point about science, or rationality, then my advice is to not choose a domain from contemporary politics if you can possibly avoid it. If your point is inherently about politics, then talk about Louis XVI during the French Revolution. Politics is an important domain to which we should individually apply our rationality—but it’s a terrible domain in which to learn rationality, or discuss rationality, unless all the discussants are already rational.
So one question is about how ok it is to use examples from the domain of contemporary politics. I think it’s pretty widely agreed upon on LessWrong that you should aim to avoid doing so.
But another question is whether it is ok to discuss contemporary politics. I think opinions differ here. Some think it is more ok than others. Most opinions probably hover around something like “it is ok sometimes but there are downsides to doing so, so approach with caution”. I took a glance at the FAQ and didn’t see any discussion of or guidance on how to approach the topic.
‘None of which are relevant here’ was intended as a strong suggestion that this shortform post not turn into an object-level discussion of politics in the comments, which I think would be likely to be unproductive since Trump is a polarizing figure. Possibly too oblique of a suggestion, if that didn’t come across.
Most opinions probably hover around something like “it is ok sometimes but there are downsides to doing so, so approach with caution”.
I share that view and maybe lean even further toward not discussing contemporary politics here. I nearly didn’t even post this, but I was so struck by the exchange that it seemed worth it.
Reminiscent of Nixon’s third derivative, when he announced that the rate of increase of inflation was decreasing, many politicians are more sophisticated than they present themselves to be.
Fair. By Bayesian, I mostly just meant that in terms of current conceptions of probability theory, that point is much more associated with Bayesian approaches than frequentist ones.
Hi Alex! I can’t delete your comment (maybe authors can only manage comments on their full posts?) but I request that you delete it—I’m really trying to steer clear of this becoming an object-level discussion of Trump (to avoid aforementioned mind-killing, at least here on LW).
Oh, sure, I’m happy to delete it since you requested. Although, I don’t really understand how my comment is any more politically object-level than your post? I read your post as saying “Hey guys I found a 7-leaf clover in Ireland, isn’t that crazy? I’ve never been somewhere where clovers had that many leaves before.” and I’m just trying to say “FYI I think you just got lucky, I think Ireland has normal clovers.”
Fair question! My goal was to say, ‘Hey, look what an interesting thing for a US president to say!’ without any particular comment on the fact that it was Trump in particular, and my first sentence (‘Many people (including me) have opinions on current US president Donald Trump, none of which are relevant here because, as is well-known to LessWrong, politics is the mind-killer’) was intended to try to emphasize that this wasn’t intended as a comment on Trump. I read your comment (maybe wrongly?) as a comment on Trump in particular and whether he’s someone we should expect to say statistically literate things.
Frankly I’m just worried, possibly overly so, that the comments to the post will descend into the usual sorts of angry political discussion that controversial figures tend to generate. Not that I thought your comment was inflammatory; just that it seems better to try to steer clear of object-level political discussion entirely.
The response in the interview mistakes the nature of the original question. Not every meaningful statement exists on a binary truth spectrum. Not every meaningful statement corresponds to a claim of empirical fact with quantifiable uncertainty. Saying “I have complete confidence in someone” is not a probabilistic assertion akin to saying “I am 100% certain it will rain tomorrow.” Rather, it’s an expression of trust, commitment, or endorsement—often used in a social or political context to convey support, leadership assurance, or accountability.
Confidence in a person, especially in the context of hiring or appointment, isn’t a measurable probability about future events; it’s a communicative act that signals intent and judgment. It doesn’t imply literal omniscience or absolute predictive accuracy. By dodging the question with a pseudo-Bayesian appeal to uncertainty, the speaker appears evasive rather than thoughtful. In fact, framing it this way undermines the communicative clarity and purpose of leadership rhetoric, not to serve as epistemological disclaimers.
This exchange is a clear example of someone co-opting the language of the rationalist community removed from its intended meaning and purpose. The interviewer’s question wasn’t about epistemic certainty or making a falsifiable prediction; it was a straightforward request for a statement of support or trust in an appointed individual
it was a straightforward request for a statement of support or trust in an appointed individual
The Bayesian validity still seems pretty straightforward to me. I have more trust in some people than others, which I would suggest cashes out as my credence that they won’t do something that violates the commitments they’ve made (or violates their stated values, etc). And certainly I should never have 0% or 100% trust in that sense, or the standard objection applies: no evidence could shift my trust.
(that said, on one reading of your comment it’s veering close to object-level discussion of the wisdom or foolishness of Trump in particular, which I’d very much like to avoid here. Hopefully that’s just a misread)
Many people (including me) have opinions on current US president Donald Trump, none of which are relevant here because, as is well-known to LessWrong, politics is the mind-killer. But in the middle of an interview yesterday with someone from ABC News, I was fascinated to hear him say the most Bayesian thing I’ve ever heard from a US president:
--
TERRY MORAN: You have a hundred percent confidence in Pete Hegseth?
PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: I don’t have—a hundred percent confidence in anything, okay? Anything. Do I have a hundred percent? It’s a stupid question. Look --
TERRY MORAN: It’s a pretty important position.
PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: -- I have—no, no, no. You don’t have a hundred percent. Only a liar would say, “I have a hundred percent confidence.” I don’t have a hundred percent confidence that we’re gonna finish this interview.
---
[EDIT—no object-level comments about Trump, please; as per my comment here, I think it would be unproductive and poorly suited to this context. There are many many other places to talk about object-level politics.]
My favorite example of a president being a good Bayesian is Abraham Lincoln (h/t Julia Galef):
This guy clearly read Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation
I think that “none of which are relevant” is too strong a statement and is somewhat of a misconception. From the linked post:
So one question is about how ok it is to use examples from the domain of contemporary politics. I think it’s pretty widely agreed upon on LessWrong that you should aim to avoid doing so.
But another question is whether it is ok to discuss contemporary politics. I think opinions differ here. Some think it is more ok than others. Most opinions probably hover around something like “it is ok sometimes but there are downsides to doing so, so approach with caution”. I took a glance at the FAQ and didn’t see any discussion of or guidance on how to approach the topic.
‘None of which are relevant here’ was intended as a strong suggestion that this shortform post not turn into an object-level discussion of politics in the comments, which I think would be likely to be unproductive since Trump is a polarizing figure. Possibly too oblique of a suggestion, if that didn’t come across.
I share that view and maybe lean even further toward not discussing contemporary politics here. I nearly didn’t even post this, but I was so struck by the exchange that it seemed worth it.
Rumsfeld’s “unknown unknowns” is also good epistemology.
Reminiscent of Nixon’s third derivative, when he announced that the rate of increase of inflation was decreasing, many politicians are more sophisticated than they present themselves to be.
Though pedantically I wouldn’t exactly call this Bayesian, as already Descartes said similar things.
Fair. By Bayesian, I mostly just meant that in terms of current conceptions of probability theory, that point is much more associated with Bayesian approaches than frequentist ones.
[Deleted on request]
Hi Alex! I can’t delete your comment (maybe authors can only manage comments on their full posts?) but I request that you delete it—I’m really trying to steer clear of this becoming an object-level discussion of Trump (to avoid aforementioned mind-killing, at least here on LW).
Oh, sure, I’m happy to delete it since you requested. Although, I don’t really understand how my comment is any more politically object-level than your post? I read your post as saying “Hey guys I found a 7-leaf clover in Ireland, isn’t that crazy? I’ve never been somewhere where clovers had that many leaves before.” and I’m just trying to say “FYI I think you just got lucky, I think Ireland has normal clovers.”
Thanks very much, I appreciate it!
Fair question! My goal was to say, ‘Hey, look what an interesting thing for a US president to say!’ without any particular comment on the fact that it was Trump in particular, and my first sentence (‘Many people (including me) have opinions on current US president Donald Trump, none of which are relevant here because, as is well-known to LessWrong, politics is the mind-killer’) was intended to try to emphasize that this wasn’t intended as a comment on Trump. I read your comment (maybe wrongly?) as a comment on Trump in particular and whether he’s someone we should expect to say statistically literate things.
Frankly I’m just worried, possibly overly so, that the comments to the post will descend into the usual sorts of angry political discussion that controversial figures tend to generate. Not that I thought your comment was inflammatory; just that it seems better to try to steer clear of object-level political discussion entirely.
Related: 0 and 1 Are Not Probabilities
The response in the interview mistakes the nature of the original question. Not every meaningful statement exists on a binary truth spectrum. Not every meaningful statement corresponds to a claim of empirical fact with quantifiable uncertainty. Saying “I have complete confidence in someone” is not a probabilistic assertion akin to saying “I am 100% certain it will rain tomorrow.” Rather, it’s an expression of trust, commitment, or endorsement—often used in a social or political context to convey support, leadership assurance, or accountability.
Confidence in a person, especially in the context of hiring or appointment, isn’t a measurable probability about future events; it’s a communicative act that signals intent and judgment. It doesn’t imply literal omniscience or absolute predictive accuracy. By dodging the question with a pseudo-Bayesian appeal to uncertainty, the speaker appears evasive rather than thoughtful. In fact, framing it this way undermines the communicative clarity and purpose of leadership rhetoric, not to serve as epistemological disclaimers.
This exchange is a clear example of someone co-opting the language of the rationalist community removed from its intended meaning and purpose. The interviewer’s question wasn’t about epistemic certainty or making a falsifiable prediction; it was a straightforward request for a statement of support or trust in an appointed individual
The Bayesian validity still seems pretty straightforward to me. I have more trust in some people than others, which I would suggest cashes out as my credence that they won’t do something that violates the commitments they’ve made (or violates their stated values, etc). And certainly I should never have 0% or 100% trust in that sense, or the standard objection applies: no evidence could shift my trust.
(that said, on one reading of your comment it’s veering close to object-level discussion of the wisdom or foolishness of Trump in particular, which I’d very much like to avoid here. Hopefully that’s just a misread)