“The Russian public really likes this invasion” is definitely one of the higher-prior hypotheses, good to know that it lines up with the data.
Assuming that is the main driver, the obvious next line of thought is that a few years down the line Russia will likely be in the same sort of quagmire occupation that the US was in with Iraq and Afghanistan, Russian public opinion will turn strongly against, and Russia will have to back out and Putin will lose a lot of popularity. Presumably this possibility is obvious to Putin (I have no impression that he’s an idiot), so either he’s making very aggressive short-term-over-long-term political tradeoffs, or for some reason he thinks an occupation of Ukraine won’t be an obvious giant mess. Some possibilities:
State-controlled media changes the problem (compared to the Iraq/Afghanistan versions) - maybe Putin does expect the occupation to be a giant mess, but thinks that won’t be obvious to the Russian public.
Putin expects to be able to leverage the short-term political gains for other long-term political wins which will outweigh the long-term political costs-to-Putin of the war.
Putin is getting old, and has abandoned long-term plans.
Putin expects an occupation of Ukraine to be easy??
I’m from Russia. The issue of war splits our society. Young people and intellectuals are mostly against the war, anti-war rallies were held today in most major cities of Russia. But the older generation (conservatives) mostly support the war, some even speak out for the complete annexation of Ukraine (this is hardly possible in reality). Written with the help of an online translator, my English is very bad, there may be mistakes.
In Russia, extremely many are dissatisfied with the collapse of the USSR and the deprivation of Russia’s superpower status, therefore they support the return of the former territories or at least political influence on them. In 2014, I also fervently supported the return of Crimea, where almost the entire population is Russian, although I hated Putin. But this was followed by a protracted economic crisis, a drop in household incomes, so now support for Putin’s actions is less than at that time.
Opinions of few people from Kyrgyzstan, middle age+
Nobody understands why this invasion started (this seem to be true for Russians too), did not want Russia to invade, scared and disheartened by war. Many have relatives in Ukraine. But! Suspect some unknown reasons for this to happen, probably intel on NATO deployment (Invasion seems rushed, but I’d consider it weak evidence—numbers of alternative explanations.)
Also a bit of clarification on 2014 popularity: it was invasion semantically but casualties extremely low, while right now we are looking at rivers of blood. Wonder how Russian population reacting.
In addition to Konstantin words. Many conservators in Russia honestly believe that USA/NATO want to destroy Russia and to seize Russian resources. They don’t think that Ukraine and Ukrainians are the agents. They believe that Ukrainians are the pawns of the West. They think that Russian army are saving Ukrainian people from NATO agents and crazy Ukrainian nationalists.
A decline to accept the agency of opponents is very common for Kremlin propaganda and Kremlin supporters.
Honest question: why is annexation judged to be impossible? I know nothing about Russia’s internal politics, and only a little about Ukraine’s but directly annexing conquered Ukrainian territory seems like a completely natural outcome to me.
… the maximal nature of Russia’s goals – conquest and regime change – impose considerable challenges all on their own. Russian troops will need not only to seize the country but also hold it and support the administration of whatever government Putin puts in place, against what is likely to be intense popular resistance. They will also need to take Ukraine’s major cities, particularly Kyiv. Urban warfare is brutally difficult and has in the past not been a particular strength of the Russian Federation.
That does not mean Ukrainian resistance is pointless here. Instead, both the initial, conventional stage of resistance and the likely secondary insurgency phase push towards the same objectives: making Russian occupation so costly in blood and treasure that it cannot be maintained. Here the Ukrainians have a real chance of eventual success if they remain committed to the effort, while the challenges for Russia are immense. Consider the US experience: Ukraine is about 10% more populous and about a third larger than Iraq. Whereas the funds for Iraqi insurgents often had to come via limited dark money or relatively weak state sponsors (like Iran) Ukrainian resistance, meanwhile, is likely to be bankrolled and supplied by the richest countries in the world able to use the traditional banking and finance system to do it (either covertly or overtly) and move those supplies through transport routes in well-developed NATO countries whose airspace is effectively inviolate. And finally, Russia has less than half of the United States’ population and about a sixth of the US’ economic production (adjusted for purchasing power). The United States in Iraq also had allies, both in the region and also providing troops; Russia has no real allies in this fight, though China may seek to keep Russia from becoming entirely economically isolated.
Russia is thus embarking, with fewer friends and fewer resources, on a war that may prove to be far more difficult than the wars the United States struggled with in Afghanistan and Iraq. And of course the very fact that Ukraine can win this in the long run will serve to stiffen Ukrainian resistance. Meanwhile, it is not entirely clear that Putin’s war has widespread popular support in Russia, though of course getting any clear sense of the popular mood within an authoritarian state is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, flagging public support at home, even in an authoritarian state where there are no political channels for that opposition, can translate into morale problems at the front, as Russians learned in 1917.
In Ukraine, the majority will not vote for joining Russia. It is impossible to preserve even the visible legitimacy of such an annexation. When Crimea was annexed, the majority voted for joining Russia. In Luhansk and Donetsk (two separatist regions of eastern Ukraine), the majority voted for independence from Ukraine. These referendums are not recognized by most countries, but there is no doubt about the reality of such sentiments of the local population. It won’t work that way with the rest of Ukraine.
For what it’s worth, I wrote a Twitter thread which attempted to piece together a partial theory.
“The Russian public really likes this invasion” is definitely one of the higher-prior hypotheses, good to know that it lines up with the data.
Assuming that is the main driver, the obvious next line of thought is that a few years down the line Russia will likely be in the same sort of quagmire occupation that the US was in with Iraq and Afghanistan, Russian public opinion will turn strongly against, and Russia will have to back out and Putin will lose a lot of popularity. Presumably this possibility is obvious to Putin (I have no impression that he’s an idiot), so either he’s making very aggressive short-term-over-long-term political tradeoffs, or for some reason he thinks an occupation of Ukraine won’t be an obvious giant mess. Some possibilities:
State-controlled media changes the problem (compared to the Iraq/Afghanistan versions) - maybe Putin does expect the occupation to be a giant mess, but thinks that won’t be obvious to the Russian public.
Putin expects to be able to leverage the short-term political gains for other long-term political wins which will outweigh the long-term political costs-to-Putin of the war.
Putin is getting old, and has abandoned long-term plans.
Putin expects an occupation of Ukraine to be easy??
I’m from Russia. The issue of war splits our society. Young people and intellectuals are mostly against the war, anti-war rallies were held today in most major cities of Russia. But the older generation (conservatives) mostly support the war, some even speak out for the complete annexation of Ukraine (this is hardly possible in reality).
Written with the help of an online translator, my English is very bad, there may be mistakes.
Thanks, this is very helpful and whatever translator you’re using works great.
Thank you for your input. The readership here skews hard toward Europe/America. I appreciate your addition of a voice from Ukraine/Russia.
By the way, your online translator works great.
The link here was posted in the chat of the translation group of Yudkovsky’s articles about AI. Your post was interesting.
Among those supportive of the war, what do they want from it? Why do they want to invade?
In Russia, extremely many are dissatisfied with the collapse of the USSR and the deprivation of Russia’s superpower status, therefore they support the return of the former territories or at least political influence on them. In 2014, I also fervently supported the return of Crimea, where almost the entire population is Russian, although I hated Putin. But this was followed by a protracted economic crisis, a drop in household incomes, so now support for Putin’s actions is less than at that time.
Opinions of few people from Kyrgyzstan, middle age+
Nobody understands why this invasion started (this seem to be true for Russians too), did not want Russia to invade, scared and disheartened by war. Many have relatives in Ukraine. But! Suspect some unknown reasons for this to happen, probably intel on NATO deployment (Invasion seems rushed, but I’d consider it weak evidence—numbers of alternative explanations.)
Also a bit of clarification on 2014 popularity: it was invasion semantically but casualties extremely low, while right now we are looking at rivers of blood. Wonder how Russian population reacting.
Evidence?
“looking at” as in “anticipate”
In addition to Konstantin words. Many conservators in Russia honestly believe that USA/NATO want to destroy Russia and to seize Russian resources. They don’t think that Ukraine and Ukrainians are the agents. They believe that Ukrainians are the pawns of the West. They think that Russian army are saving Ukrainian people from NATO agents and crazy Ukrainian nationalists.
A decline to accept the agency of opponents is very common for Kremlin propaganda and Kremlin supporters.
Hello there! Will you translate something else?
And yes, even commentators with a different point of view in Runet are called paid.
Honest question: why is annexation judged to be impossible? I know nothing about Russia’s internal politics, and only a little about Ukraine’s but directly annexing conquered Ukrainian territory seems like a completely natural outcome to me.
Maybe not impossible, but very hard:
(source)
In Ukraine, the majority will not vote for joining Russia. It is impossible to preserve even the visible legitimacy of such an annexation. When Crimea was annexed, the majority voted for joining Russia. In Luhansk and Donetsk (two separatist regions of eastern Ukraine), the majority voted for independence from Ukraine. These referendums are not recognized by most countries, but there is no doubt about the reality of such sentiments of the local population. It won’t work that way with the rest of Ukraine.
Nothing impossible, just less politically convenient than installing a puppet regime. A mere change of hats.
I think Putin will not overtake Ukraine and just install a new government that guarantees that it won’t join the NATO.