In point of fact, I don’t kiss most things which are human. I actually do care about the specific instances of those whom I kiss. I suppose I’m not a true stoic, as I do experience and accept both joy and pain for things which I do not devalue by thinking them fungible.
I am disturbed if my favorite cup breaks, and I expect to be quite sad for some time if my wife dies before me. I am semi-stoic in that I don’t think either of those sadnesses will be a fundamental permanent change in my temperament or being. Those feelings, too, shall pass.
“Real” stoicism seems to demand total relinquishment of all attachments, to almost exactly the same degree that “real” Buddhism does. I think this is a pathological thing to want.
Yes, it’s psychologically beneficial to be less upset about being stuck in traffic. When you’re already stuck in traffic and can’t do anything about it, your choice to not be upset about it is simply a choice to avoid needless suffering.
One might argue that it’s even better to let yourself be really annoyed by being stuck in traffic, and then permit your annoyance to motivate you to take actions to avoid being stuck in traffic in the future.
The sort of person who would legitimately not care if their child died would also be different from me in a number of other very important ways in order to be a reasonably consistent agent. For example, if a stoic claims to be emotionally indifferent between “child death” and “child flourishing”, then what actually motivates them? Why do anything, why make any choice? At least Buddhist thought is honest about this, and admits that the only truly consistent solution is a purely monastic life of meditation and aggressive pursuit of non-existence. Stoicism, as far as I can tell, refuses to bite the bullet of the conclusions of its premises.
We must make the best use that we can of the things which are in our power, and use the rest according to their nature. What is their nature then? As God may please.
This seems to require being motivated to bring about good outcomes, when those good outcomes are in one’s control. I think the idea is to reframe motivations as being about how you use the faculties available to you (which you always have control over), rather than about outcomes (which you don’t always have control over).
Where this becomes difficult is when your control on outcomes is uncertain.
More specifically, it’s quite often that it looks like you probably can’t do anything to change the situation, but it’s also plausible that if you considered the problem more you would discover something. In that case knowing what amount of consideration is worth it is a hard to determine thing. Presumably there is some sort of diminishing returns curve you could use, but obviously you don’t have access to that so you have to estimate the effectiveness of your estimation.
Luckily, I think there are huge number of situations where this consideration isn’t relevant, such as being struck in traffic.
In point of fact, I don’t kiss most things which are human. I actually do care about the specific instances of those whom I kiss. I suppose I’m not a true stoic, as I do experience and accept both joy and pain for things which I do not devalue by thinking them fungible.
I am disturbed if my favorite cup breaks, and I expect to be quite sad for some time if my wife dies before me. I am semi-stoic in that I don’t think either of those sadnesses will be a fundamental permanent change in my temperament or being. Those feelings, too, shall pass.
“Real” stoicism seems to demand total relinquishment of all attachments, to almost exactly the same degree that “real” Buddhism does. I think this is a pathological thing to want.
Yes, it’s psychologically beneficial to be less upset about being stuck in traffic. When you’re already stuck in traffic and can’t do anything about it, your choice to not be upset about it is simply a choice to avoid needless suffering.
One might argue that it’s even better to let yourself be really annoyed by being stuck in traffic, and then permit your annoyance to motivate you to take actions to avoid being stuck in traffic in the future.
The sort of person who would legitimately not care if their child died would also be different from me in a number of other very important ways in order to be a reasonably consistent agent. For example, if a stoic claims to be emotionally indifferent between “child death” and “child flourishing”, then what actually motivates them? Why do anything, why make any choice? At least Buddhist thought is honest about this, and admits that the only truly consistent solution is a purely monastic life of meditation and aggressive pursuit of non-existence. Stoicism, as far as I can tell, refuses to bite the bullet of the conclusions of its premises.
Epictetus said:
This seems to require being motivated to bring about good outcomes, when those good outcomes are in one’s control. I think the idea is to reframe motivations as being about how you use the faculties available to you (which you always have control over), rather than about outcomes (which you don’t always have control over).
It seems to me very strange to translate a Greek philosopher who wasn’t a monotheist in a way that capitalizes God.
Where this becomes difficult is when your control on outcomes is uncertain.
More specifically, it’s quite often that it looks like you probably can’t do anything to change the situation, but it’s also plausible that if you considered the problem more you would discover something. In that case knowing what amount of consideration is worth it is a hard to determine thing. Presumably there is some sort of diminishing returns curve you could use, but obviously you don’t have access to that so you have to estimate the effectiveness of your estimation.
Luckily, I think there are huge number of situations where this consideration isn’t relevant, such as being struck in traffic.