Rejecting David Lewis’ Counterfactual Realism as absurd and therefore concluding that counterfactuals must be at least partially a human construction: either a) in the sense of them being an inevitable and essential part of how we make sense of the world by our very nature or b) in the sense of being a semi-arbitrary and contingent system that we’ve adopted in order to navigate the world
There are at least three possibilities. David Lewis level realism, where counterfactual worlds seem fully real to their inhabitants, is an extreme. Moderate realism about counterfactuals is equivalent to indeterminism: only one thing happens, but it didn’t have to happen.
And, absent any kind of realism, theres still logical counterfactuals.
Insofar as counterfactuals are inherently a part of how we interpret the world, the only way that we can understand them is to “look out through them”, notice what we see, and attempt to characterise this as precisely as possible
Even if you accept the Kantian framework, it involves N>1 basic categories , so it doesn’t follow that any particular category has to apply to itself . (And if you accept the full Kantian framework, the problems don’t stop with counterfactuals).
Insofar as counterfactuals are a somewhat arbitrary and contingent system constructed in order to navigate the world, the way that the system is justified is by imagining adopting various mental frameworks and noticing that a particular framework seems like it would be useful over a wide variety of circumstances. However, we’ve just invoked counterfactuals twice: a) by imagining adopting different mental frameworks b) by imagining different circumstances over which to evaluate these frameworks.
Well, that’s two examples of circular dependency .
Regarding moderate realism, if what happened didn’t have to happen, then that implies that other things could have happened (these are counterfactuals). But this raises the question, what are these counterfactuals? You’ve already rejected Counterfactual Realism which seems to lead towards the two possibilities I suggested:
a) Counterfactuals are an inevitable and essential part of how we make sense of the world by our very nature b) Counterfactuals are a semi-arbitrary and contingent system that we’ve adopted in order to navigate the world
(Some combination of the two is another possibility.)
Presumably, you don’t think moderate realism leads you down this path. Where do you think it leads instead?
“Even if you accept the Kantian framework, it involves N>1 basic categories”
Interesting point. I’m somewhat skeptical of this, but I wouldn’t completely rule it out either. (One thing I think plausible is that there could be a category A reducible to a category B which is then reducible back to A; but this wouldn’t avoid the circularity)
“Well, that’s two examples of circular dependency”—Yes, that’s what I said. I guess I’m confused why you’re repeating it
I haven’t rejected counterfactual realism. I’ve pointed out that Lewis’s modal realism doesn’t deal with counterfactuals as such, because it is a matter of perspective whether a world is factual (ie. contains me) or counterfactual (doesn’t).
What I have called moderate realism is the only position that holds counterfactuals to be both intrinsically counterfactual and real.
Presumably, you don’t think moderate realism leads you down this path. Where do you think it leads instead?
Kantianism about counterfactuals might be true, but if it is, you are also going to have problems with causality etc. There’s no special problem of counterfactuals.
I’m somewhat skeptical of this,
That’s an odd thing to say. Kant lays out his categories, and there are more than one .
It is a matter of perspective whether a world is factual (contains me) or counterfactual.
How so? I would have said the opposite.
Kantianism about counterfactuals might be true, but if it is, you are also going to have problems with causality etc. There’s no special problem of counterfactuals.
Yeah, if Kantianism about counterfactuals were true, it would be strange to limit it. My expectation would be that it would apply to a bunch of other things as well.
That’s an odd thing to say. Kant layout his categories, and there are more Han one .
Sorry, I should have been clearer. I wasn’t disagreeing with there being more than one category, but your conclusion from this.
There are at least three possibilities. David Lewis level realism, where counterfactual worlds seem fully real to their inhabitants, is an extreme. Moderate realism about counterfactuals is equivalent to indeterminism: only one thing happens, but it didn’t have to happen. And, absent any kind of realism, theres still logical counterfactuals.
Even if you accept the Kantian framework, it involves N>1 basic categories , so it doesn’t follow that any particular category has to apply to itself . (And if you accept the full Kantian framework, the problems don’t stop with counterfactuals).
Well, that’s two examples of circular dependency .
Regarding moderate realism, if what happened didn’t have to happen, then that implies that other things could have happened (these are counterfactuals). But this raises the question, what are these counterfactuals? You’ve already rejected Counterfactual Realism which seems to lead towards the two possibilities I suggested:
a) Counterfactuals are an inevitable and essential part of how we make sense of the world by our very nature
b) Counterfactuals are a semi-arbitrary and contingent system that we’ve adopted in order to navigate the world
(Some combination of the two is another possibility.)
Presumably, you don’t think moderate realism leads you down this path. Where do you think it leads instead?
“Even if you accept the Kantian framework, it involves N>1 basic categories”
Interesting point. I’m somewhat skeptical of this, but I wouldn’t completely rule it out either. (One thing I think plausible is that there could be a category A reducible to a category B which is then reducible back to A; but this wouldn’t avoid the circularity)
“Well, that’s two examples of circular dependency”—Yes, that’s what I said. I guess I’m confused why you’re repeating it
I haven’t rejected counterfactual realism. I’ve pointed out that Lewis’s modal realism doesn’t deal with counterfactuals as such, because it is a matter of perspective whether a world is factual (ie. contains me) or counterfactual (doesn’t).
What I have called moderate realism is the only position that holds counterfactuals to be both intrinsically counterfactual and real.
Kantianism about counterfactuals might be true, but if it is, you are also going to have problems with causality etc. There’s no special problem of counterfactuals.
That’s an odd thing to say. Kant lays out his categories, and there are more than one .
How so? I would have said the opposite.
Yeah, if Kantianism about counterfactuals were true, it would be strange to limit it. My expectation would be that it would apply to a bunch of other things as well.
Sorry, I should have been clearer. I wasn’t disagreeing with there being more than one category, but your conclusion from this.
I wasn’t saying that that is true per se, I was saying it’s Lewis’s view .
Well,if you think there is a special problem with counterfactuals , then needs a basis other than general Kantian issues.
Ah, okay. I get it now.