Regarding moderate realism, if what happened didn’t have to happen, then that implies that other things could have happened (these are counterfactuals). But this raises the question, what are these counterfactuals? You’ve already rejected Counterfactual Realism which seems to lead towards the two possibilities I suggested:
a) Counterfactuals are an inevitable and essential part of how we make sense of the world by our very nature b) Counterfactuals are a semi-arbitrary and contingent system that we’ve adopted in order to navigate the world
(Some combination of the two is another possibility.)
Presumably, you don’t think moderate realism leads you down this path. Where do you think it leads instead?
“Even if you accept the Kantian framework, it involves N>1 basic categories”
Interesting point. I’m somewhat skeptical of this, but I wouldn’t completely rule it out either. (One thing I think plausible is that there could be a category A reducible to a category B which is then reducible back to A; but this wouldn’t avoid the circularity)
“Well, that’s two examples of circular dependency”—Yes, that’s what I said. I guess I’m confused why you’re repeating it
I haven’t rejected counterfactual realism. I’ve pointed out that Lewis’s modal realism doesn’t deal with counterfactuals as such, because it is a matter of perspective whether a world is factual (ie. contains me) or counterfactual (doesn’t).
What I have called moderate realism is the only position that holds counterfactuals to be both intrinsically counterfactual and real.
Presumably, you don’t think moderate realism leads you down this path. Where do you think it leads instead?
Kantianism about counterfactuals might be true, but if it is, you are also going to have problems with causality etc. There’s no special problem of counterfactuals.
I’m somewhat skeptical of this,
That’s an odd thing to say. Kant lays out his categories, and there are more than one .
It is a matter of perspective whether a world is factual (contains me) or counterfactual.
How so? I would have said the opposite.
Kantianism about counterfactuals might be true, but if it is, you are also going to have problems with causality etc. There’s no special problem of counterfactuals.
Yeah, if Kantianism about counterfactuals were true, it would be strange to limit it. My expectation would be that it would apply to a bunch of other things as well.
That’s an odd thing to say. Kant layout his categories, and there are more Han one .
Sorry, I should have been clearer. I wasn’t disagreeing with there being more than one category, but your conclusion from this.
Regarding moderate realism, if what happened didn’t have to happen, then that implies that other things could have happened (these are counterfactuals). But this raises the question, what are these counterfactuals? You’ve already rejected Counterfactual Realism which seems to lead towards the two possibilities I suggested:
a) Counterfactuals are an inevitable and essential part of how we make sense of the world by our very nature
b) Counterfactuals are a semi-arbitrary and contingent system that we’ve adopted in order to navigate the world
(Some combination of the two is another possibility.)
Presumably, you don’t think moderate realism leads you down this path. Where do you think it leads instead?
“Even if you accept the Kantian framework, it involves N>1 basic categories”
Interesting point. I’m somewhat skeptical of this, but I wouldn’t completely rule it out either. (One thing I think plausible is that there could be a category A reducible to a category B which is then reducible back to A; but this wouldn’t avoid the circularity)
“Well, that’s two examples of circular dependency”—Yes, that’s what I said. I guess I’m confused why you’re repeating it
I haven’t rejected counterfactual realism. I’ve pointed out that Lewis’s modal realism doesn’t deal with counterfactuals as such, because it is a matter of perspective whether a world is factual (ie. contains me) or counterfactual (doesn’t).
What I have called moderate realism is the only position that holds counterfactuals to be both intrinsically counterfactual and real.
Kantianism about counterfactuals might be true, but if it is, you are also going to have problems with causality etc. There’s no special problem of counterfactuals.
That’s an odd thing to say. Kant lays out his categories, and there are more than one .
How so? I would have said the opposite.
Yeah, if Kantianism about counterfactuals were true, it would be strange to limit it. My expectation would be that it would apply to a bunch of other things as well.
Sorry, I should have been clearer. I wasn’t disagreeing with there being more than one category, but your conclusion from this.
I wasn’t saying that that is true per se, I was saying it’s Lewis’s view .
Well,if you think there is a special problem with counterfactuals , then needs a basis other than general Kantian issues.
Ah, okay. I get it now.