I haven’t rejected counterfactual realism. I’ve pointed out that Lewis’s modal realism doesn’t deal with counterfactuals as such, because it is a matter of perspective whether a world is factual (ie. contains me) or counterfactual (doesn’t).
What I have called moderate realism is the only position that holds counterfactuals to be both intrinsically counterfactual and real.
Presumably, you don’t think moderate realism leads you down this path. Where do you think it leads instead?
Kantianism about counterfactuals might be true, but if it is, you are also going to have problems with causality etc. There’s no special problem of counterfactuals.
I’m somewhat skeptical of this,
That’s an odd thing to say. Kant lays out his categories, and there are more than one .
It is a matter of perspective whether a world is factual (contains me) or counterfactual.
How so? I would have said the opposite.
Kantianism about counterfactuals might be true, but if it is, you are also going to have problems with causality etc. There’s no special problem of counterfactuals.
Yeah, if Kantianism about counterfactuals were true, it would be strange to limit it. My expectation would be that it would apply to a bunch of other things as well.
That’s an odd thing to say. Kant layout his categories, and there are more Han one .
Sorry, I should have been clearer. I wasn’t disagreeing with there being more than one category, but your conclusion from this.
I haven’t rejected counterfactual realism. I’ve pointed out that Lewis’s modal realism doesn’t deal with counterfactuals as such, because it is a matter of perspective whether a world is factual (ie. contains me) or counterfactual (doesn’t).
What I have called moderate realism is the only position that holds counterfactuals to be both intrinsically counterfactual and real.
Kantianism about counterfactuals might be true, but if it is, you are also going to have problems with causality etc. There’s no special problem of counterfactuals.
That’s an odd thing to say. Kant lays out his categories, and there are more than one .
How so? I would have said the opposite.
Yeah, if Kantianism about counterfactuals were true, it would be strange to limit it. My expectation would be that it would apply to a bunch of other things as well.
Sorry, I should have been clearer. I wasn’t disagreeing with there being more than one category, but your conclusion from this.
I wasn’t saying that that is true per se, I was saying it’s Lewis’s view .
Well,if you think there is a special problem with counterfactuals , then needs a basis other than general Kantian issues.
Ah, okay. I get it now.