Bikes aren’t appearances , so there is no analogy.
The analogy is that they both need instantiation. That’s the thing about appearances that is used in the argument.
Know-how, such as riding kills, is not an appearance, or physical.knowledge.
So physicalism is false, because physical knowledge is incomplete without know-how.
Nonetheless , there is a difference.
Sure, they are different physical processes. But what’s the relevant epistemological difference? If you agree that Mary is useless we can discuss whether there are ontological differences.
Riding bikes? How they work? How they appear?
Yes.
in the case of experience, and only in the case of experience
The problem is that there in no other case does it seem necessary to instantiate a brain state in order to undertstand something.
Again, this is false—it is as much as necessary in case of riding. And differences between knowing about qualia and knowing about fusion are explained by preferences: humans just don’t care about or need instantiating fusion, but care about instantiating red. In both cases you are physically affected and so you (can define knowledge in such a way that you) gain new representation of knowledge by instantiation.
So physicalism is false, because physical knowledge is incomplete without know-how.
That’s kind of munchkinning. Even if it’s incomplete in that way, it doesn’t have metaphysical implications.
Sure, they are different physical processes. But what’s the relevant epistemological difference
Mary doesn’t know what colour qualms look.like, and therefore has an incomplete understanding of consciousness. As stayed in all versions of the story.
Riding bikes? How they work? How they appear?
Yes.
Unhelpful.
Again, this is false—it is as much as necessary in case of riding
Even if it’s incomplete in that way, it doesn’t have metaphysical implications.
Therefore Mary’s incomplete knowledge about consciousness doesn’t have metaphysical implications, because it is incomplete in fundamentally same way.
Mary doesn’t know what colour qualms look.like, and therefore has an incomplete understanding of consciousness.
Mary doesn’t know how to ride, and therefore has incomplete understanding of riding. What’s the difference?
Both need instantiation for what?
For gaining potential utility from specific knowledge representations, for knowledge that feels intuitively complete. I guess “you can’t learn to ride in your room” requirement is not exactly and only instantiation? Anyway, the intended general category is “useful knowledge representations”.
Unhelpful
I mean all of them: if physicalism explains riding a bike (physical equations give knowledge in some form and also predict you gaining new knowledge representation when you actually learn to ride), then it explains it’s appearance in analogous way (physical equations give knowledge about bike’s appearance in some form and also predict you gaining new knowledge representation when you actually see it).
The analogy is that they both need instantiation. That’s the thing about appearances that is used in the argument.
So physicalism is false, because physical knowledge is incomplete without know-how.
Sure, they are different physical processes. But what’s the relevant epistemological difference? If you agree that Mary is useless we can discuss whether there are ontological differences.
Yes.
Again, this is false—it is as much as necessary in case of riding. And differences between knowing about qualia and knowing about fusion are explained by preferences: humans just don’t care about or need instantiating fusion, but care about instantiating red. In both cases you are physically affected and so you (can define knowledge in such a way that you) gain new representation of knowledge by instantiation.
Both need instantiation for what?
That’s kind of munchkinning. Even if it’s incomplete in that way, it doesn’t have metaphysical implications.
Mary doesn’t know what colour qualms look.like, and therefore has an incomplete understanding of consciousness. As stayed in all versions of the story.
Unhelpful.
Riding is doing, not understanding.
Therefore Mary’s incomplete knowledge about consciousness doesn’t have metaphysical implications, because it is incomplete in fundamentally same way.
Mary doesn’t know how to ride, and therefore has incomplete understanding of riding. What’s the difference?
For gaining potential utility from specific knowledge representations, for knowledge that feels intuitively complete. I guess “you can’t learn to ride in your room” requirement is not exactly and only instantiation? Anyway, the intended general category is “useful knowledge representations”.
I mean all of them: if physicalism explains riding a bike (physical equations give knowledge in some form and also predict you gaining new knowledge representation when you actually learn to ride), then it explains it’s appearance in analogous way (physical equations give knowledge about bike’s appearance in some form and also predict you gaining new knowledge representation when you actually see it).
No it isn’t. Mary doesn’t know what Red looks like. That’s not know-how
Things can be incomplete in different ways
Theoretical knowledge isn’t about utility.
It doesn’t , in the sense that the theoretical knowledge gives you the know-how. That’s one of your own assumptions.