So physicalism is false, because physical knowledge is incomplete without know-how.
That’s kind of munchkinning. Even if it’s incomplete in that way, it doesn’t have metaphysical implications.
Sure, they are different physical processes. But what’s the relevant epistemological difference
Mary doesn’t know what colour qualms look.like, and therefore has an incomplete understanding of consciousness. As stayed in all versions of the story.
Riding bikes? How they work? How they appear?
Yes.
Unhelpful.
Again, this is false—it is as much as necessary in case of riding
Even if it’s incomplete in that way, it doesn’t have metaphysical implications.
Therefore Mary’s incomplete knowledge about consciousness doesn’t have metaphysical implications, because it is incomplete in fundamentally same way.
Mary doesn’t know what colour qualms look.like, and therefore has an incomplete understanding of consciousness.
Mary doesn’t know how to ride, and therefore has incomplete understanding of riding. What’s the difference?
Both need instantiation for what?
For gaining potential utility from specific knowledge representations, for knowledge that feels intuitively complete. I guess “you can’t learn to ride in your room” requirement is not exactly and only instantiation? Anyway, the intended general category is “useful knowledge representations”.
Unhelpful
I mean all of them: if physicalism explains riding a bike (physical equations give knowledge in some form and also predict you gaining new knowledge representation when you actually learn to ride), then it explains it’s appearance in analogous way (physical equations give knowledge about bike’s appearance in some form and also predict you gaining new knowledge representation when you actually see it).
Both need instantiation for what?
That’s kind of munchkinning. Even if it’s incomplete in that way, it doesn’t have metaphysical implications.
Mary doesn’t know what colour qualms look.like, and therefore has an incomplete understanding of consciousness. As stayed in all versions of the story.
Unhelpful.
Riding is doing, not understanding.
Therefore Mary’s incomplete knowledge about consciousness doesn’t have metaphysical implications, because it is incomplete in fundamentally same way.
Mary doesn’t know how to ride, and therefore has incomplete understanding of riding. What’s the difference?
For gaining potential utility from specific knowledge representations, for knowledge that feels intuitively complete. I guess “you can’t learn to ride in your room” requirement is not exactly and only instantiation? Anyway, the intended general category is “useful knowledge representations”.
I mean all of them: if physicalism explains riding a bike (physical equations give knowledge in some form and also predict you gaining new knowledge representation when you actually learn to ride), then it explains it’s appearance in analogous way (physical equations give knowledge about bike’s appearance in some form and also predict you gaining new knowledge representation when you actually see it).
No it isn’t. Mary doesn’t know what Red looks like. That’s not know-how
Things can be incomplete in different ways
Theoretical knowledge isn’t about utility.
It doesn’t , in the sense that the theoretical knowledge gives you the know-how. That’s one of your own assumptions.