If..it was pointed out a long time ago that (a form of) probability being in the mind doesn’t imply (a firm of) it isn’t in the territory as well.
That not true because fundamental determinism is true , or because effective determinism at the macroscopic level is true.
This is beside the point that I’m making. Which is: even if we grant that the universe is utterly deterministic and therefore probability is fully in the map, this map still has to correspond to the territory for which you have to go an look. And we still have to be able to construct a meaningful framework for it.
Armchair arguments can’t prove anything about the territory...you have to look.
Exactly.
You may be beating a dead horse there. Talk of possible worlds doesn’t have to imply realism about possible worlds, just as mathematical anti-realists can talk about numbers without committing to their mind independent existence.
I’m not saying that it does. For instance here I specifically outline alternative option:
“Well, you don’t necessary have to believe that there are parallel worlds as real as ours in which the coin comes differently, though it’s a respectable position about the nature of counterfactuals. Probability is in the mind, remember? You can simply imagine alternative worlds that are logically consistent with your observations.”
What I’m saying is that even the talk itself about “possible worlds”—without assumption of their realism—is harmful as this framework leaves us unable to reason about logical uncertainty and doesn’t provide proper guardrails against absurdities, most noticeably in indexical uncertainty.
A better way is to talk about iterations of probability experiment which solves all these issues.
even if we grant that the universe is utterly deterministic and therefore probability is fully in the map, this map *still *has to correspond to the territory for which you have to go an look
The map that corresponds to a deterministically branching multiversal has possible worlds. The map that corresponds to a Copenhagen universe has inherent indeterminism
What I’m saying is that even the talk itself about “possible worlds”—without assumption of their realism—is harmful as this framework leaves us unable to reason about logical uncertainty
Refusing to.ever talk about possible worlds is dangerous, because they might exist (they do in MWI ) and they might be useful otherwise. What you really have is an argument that they are a poor match for logical uncertainty, which they are, but you are allowed to use different tools for different jobs.
Having dogmatic , non-updatable assumptions is bad (see rationality, passsim) and it’s still bad when they are in the direction of determinism, reductionism, etc.
You keep missing the point. It’s as if you haven’t even read the post and simply noticed a couple of key words.
The map that corresponds to a deterministically branching multiversal has possible worlds.
Some do.
I’m proposing a better map, capable to talk about knowledge states and uncertainty, in any circumstances, having all the advantages of maps using the concept of possible worlds, without their weak point.
If you think that the framework of probability experiment that I’m outlining in the post fails to account for something that the frameworks of possible worlds manage to account for—please specify it. Bring up a setting in which you think my framework fails to describe the territory.
Refusing to.ever talk about possible worlds is dangerous, because they might exist (they do in MWI ) and they might be useful otherwise.
Possible world is a term from a map. There may be a referent for it in a territory, true. But it doesn’t mean that we have to use this particular term to talk about this referent. We may have a better term, instead.
The point is that a map has to represent the territory.
“And sure, every map is, in a sense, a map of the world”, as you out it.,
So if a the territory is branching , the map.should, too. (A map may include aspects of human knowledge as well).
I’m proposing a better map, capable to talk about knowledge states and uncertainty, in any circumstances
That’s a disadvantage, because the same map can’t represent any territory.
Threre may be an ontologically neutral way of doing probability calculations, but it’s not a map, for that reason....more of a tool.
If you think that the framework of probability experiment that I’m outlining in the post fails to account for something that the frameworks of possible worlds manage to account for
The problem is the implied ontology. You haven’t actually proven that probability is only in the mind and you can’t prove it using methodology, because its a statement about the territory , not just about probability calculations.
Possible world is a term from a map. There may be a referent for it in a territory
If there is a referent for it in the territory, it is entirely reasonable to say “possible worlds exist”.
But it doesn’t mean that we have to use this particular term to talk about this referent. We may have a better term, instead.
Is it really a win to admit the substance of existing possible worlds, but under a different name?
So if a the territory is branching , the map.should, too.
Of course not. The territory can be made of rocks and dirt, but it doesn’t mean that the map also has to be.
That’s a disadvantage, because the same map can’t represent any territory.
I’m not saying that it represents every territory. I’m saying that it represents a more general class of territories without loosing any advantages of the framework of possible worlds.
In the post I’ve even specifically outlined what are the territories that my framework can represent:
“So the territory that probability is in the map of is...”
All the processes in the real world, such that my knowledge state about them works like a weighted sample of n elements.
( there may be an ontological neutral way of doing probability calculations, but it’s not a map, for that reason....more of a tool)
Now it seems that you are finally starting to get it. It is a map, of course, but that’s really beside the point. If you want to put it in a separate category of “tools” (as if a map is not a tool?) then whatever suits your needs. Yes, what I’m doing is providing an ontologically neutral framework for probability theory that works better than a framework of possible worlds.
The problem is the implied ontology.
Once again, no ontology is actually implied. It’s absolutely trivial to describe behavior of indetermenistic processes in terms of probability experiment. I’m concentrating on deterministic cases simply because they are trickier.
If there is a referent for it in the territory, it is entirely reasonable to say “possible worlds exist”.
I’m not saying that it’s unreasonable to say, conditionally on using this term. I’m saying that usage of the term, to begin with, is a bad idea as it keeps leading people doing probability theory astray.
Is it really a win to admit the substance of existing possible worlds, but under a different name?
When your goal is to separate the substance from the harmful rubbish, it absolutely is a win.
Once again, no ontology is actually implied. It’s absolutely trivial to describe behavior of indetermenistic processes in terms of probability experiment. I’m concentrating on deterministic cases simply because they are trickier
If that’s what you actually think, the first line should read something like “under circumstances where probability is in the mind”.
This is beside the point that I’m making. Which is: even if we grant that the universe is utterly deterministic and therefore probability is fully in the map, this map still has to correspond to the territory for which you have to go an look. And we still have to be able to construct a meaningful framework for it.
Exactly.
I’m not saying that it does. For instance here I specifically outline alternative option:
What I’m saying is that even the talk itself about “possible worlds”—without assumption of their realism—is harmful as this framework leaves us unable to reason about logical uncertainty and doesn’t provide proper guardrails against absurdities, most noticeably in indexical uncertainty.
A better way is to talk about iterations of probability experiment which solves all these issues.
The map that corresponds to a deterministically branching multiversal has possible worlds. The map that corresponds to a Copenhagen universe has inherent indeterminism
Refusing to.ever talk about possible worlds is dangerous, because they might exist (they do in MWI ) and they might be useful otherwise. What you really have is an argument that they are a poor match for logical uncertainty, which they are, but you are allowed to use different tools for different jobs.
Having dogmatic , non-updatable assumptions is bad (see rationality, passsim) and it’s still bad when they are in the direction of determinism, reductionism, etc.
You keep missing the point. It’s as if you haven’t even read the post and simply noticed a couple of key words.
Some do.
I’m proposing a better map, capable to talk about knowledge states and uncertainty, in any circumstances, having all the advantages of maps using the concept of possible worlds, without their weak point.
If you think that the framework of probability experiment that I’m outlining in the post fails to account for something that the frameworks of possible worlds manage to account for—please specify it. Bring up a setting in which you think my framework fails to describe the territory.
Possible world is a term from a map. There may be a referent for it in a territory, true. But it doesn’t mean that we have to use this particular term to talk about this referent. We may have a better term, instead.
The point is that a map has to represent the territory.
“And sure, every map is, in a sense, a map of the world”, as you out it.,
So if a the territory is branching , the map.should, too. (A map may include aspects of human knowledge as well).
That’s a disadvantage, because the same map can’t represent any territory.
Threre may be an ontologically neutral way of doing probability calculations, but it’s not a map, for that reason....more of a tool.
The problem is the implied ontology. You haven’t actually proven that probability is only in the mind and you can’t prove it using methodology, because its a statement about the territory , not just about probability calculations.
If there is a referent for it in the territory, it is entirely reasonable to say “possible worlds exist”.
Is it really a win to admit the substance of existing possible worlds, but under a different name?
Of course not. The territory can be made of rocks and dirt, but it doesn’t mean that the map also has to be.
I’m not saying that it represents every territory. I’m saying that it represents a more general class of territories without loosing any advantages of the framework of possible worlds.
In the post I’ve even specifically outlined what are the territories that my framework can represent:
Now it seems that you are finally starting to get it. It is a map, of course, but that’s really beside the point. If you want to put it in a separate category of “tools” (as if a map is not a tool?) then whatever suits your needs. Yes, what I’m doing is providing an ontologically neutral framework for probability theory that works better than a framework of possible worlds.
Once again, no ontology is actually implied. It’s absolutely trivial to describe behavior of indetermenistic processes in terms of probability experiment. I’m concentrating on deterministic cases simply because they are trickier.
I’m not saying that it’s unreasonable to say, conditionally on using this term. I’m saying that usage of the term, to begin with, is a bad idea as it keeps leading people doing probability theory astray.
When your goal is to separate the substance from the harmful rubbish, it absolutely is a win.
If that’s what you actually think, the first line should read something like “under circumstances where probability is in the mind”.