My thinking about this has changed in the past few weeks, again. I no longer think automating labor is the central issue. The central issue is automating violence.
Consider this. For most of history, the labor of the masses was very much needed by the powerful, but the powerful still treated the masses very badly. That’s the normal state of humanity. Right now we’re living in a brief anomalous period, where the masses are treated relatively well by the powerful. The anomaly didn’t begin because the labor of the masses became valuable; it was always valuable! No, the anomaly began because firearms made mass armies worthwhile. The root cause of the anomaly is the violence-value of the masses, not their labor-value. (Recall the hushed, horrified conversations between samurai in Clavell’s Shogun, saying European guns should be banned because any peasant can shoot a gun.) And the anomaly will end when AI weapons make mass armies useless. Past that point, no matter if the masses keep labor-value or not, no matter if the top levels are occupied by AIs or by a minority of humans, the masses will be treated very badly again.
This is the determinism that I wish people like @Matthew Barnett understood and took seriously, instead of focusing on the unimportant determinism of labor automation. If the coming change was only about labor automation, and violence-value remained spread out among the masses, then we could indeed have a nice future filled with a large leisure class. But since there seems no way to prevent the concentration of violence-value, the future looks very grim.
We discuss this in Misaligned States part of the Gradual Disempowerment (the thesis you mention is explored in much detail in Tilly (1990). Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990).
I don’t think the violence is particularly unique source of power—in my view forms of power are somewhat convertible (ie if a rentier state does not derive income from taxation, it can hire mercenaries to pacify the population).
Also, empirically: military power is already quite concentrated—modern militaries are not that large but would be able to pacify much larger popular unrest, if they had the will to do so. But this is kept in check in part by econ power and in part by culture.
I mostly agree with your writings, my comment was mostly a reply to Barnett :-)
Also, empirically: military power is already quite concentrated—modern militaries are not that large but would be able to pacify much larger popular unrest, if they had the will to do so.
This seems like missing the point a bit. For example, Russia right now is trying to stimulate population growth to get more soldiers. It needs people to shoot the guns. That’s the deciding factor of modernity to me, and kicking it out will lead to bad things. The fact that Russia can pacify internal unrest (which is also true) doesn’t affect the thesis much.
My thinking about this has changed in the past few weeks, again. I no longer think automating labor is the central issue. The central issue is automating violence.
Consider this. For most of history, the labor of the masses was very much needed by the powerful, but the powerful still treated the masses very badly. That’s the normal state of humanity. Right now we’re living in a brief anomalous period, where the masses are treated relatively well by the powerful. The anomaly didn’t begin because the labor of the masses became valuable; it was always valuable! No, the anomaly began because firearms made mass armies worthwhile. The root cause of the anomaly is the violence-value of the masses, not their labor-value. (Recall the hushed, horrified conversations between samurai in Clavell’s Shogun, saying European guns should be banned because any peasant can shoot a gun.) And the anomaly will end when AI weapons make mass armies useless. Past that point, no matter if the masses keep labor-value or not, no matter if the top levels are occupied by AIs or by a minority of humans, the masses will be treated very badly again.
This is the determinism that I wish people like @Matthew Barnett understood and took seriously, instead of focusing on the unimportant determinism of labor automation. If the coming change was only about labor automation, and violence-value remained spread out among the masses, then we could indeed have a nice future filled with a large leisure class. But since there seems no way to prevent the concentration of violence-value, the future looks very grim.
We discuss this in Misaligned States part of the Gradual Disempowerment (the thesis you mention is explored in much detail in Tilly (1990). Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990).
I don’t think the violence is particularly unique source of power—in my view forms of power are somewhat convertible (ie if a rentier state does not derive income from taxation, it can hire mercenaries to pacify the population).
Also, empirically: military power is already quite concentrated—modern militaries are not that large but would be able to pacify much larger popular unrest, if they had the will to do so. But this is kept in check in part by econ power and in part by culture.
I mostly agree with your writings, my comment was mostly a reply to Barnett :-)
This seems like missing the point a bit. For example, Russia right now is trying to stimulate population growth to get more soldiers. It needs people to shoot the guns. That’s the deciding factor of modernity to me, and kicking it out will lead to bad things. The fact that Russia can pacify internal unrest (which is also true) doesn’t affect the thesis much.