The classic problem with (Pyrrhonian) skepticism is that it’s a fake position. That is, where skepticism claims to say that something can’t be known, the claim that something can’t be known is itself a claim to know, and thus skepticism is just a special case of claiming to know but where the particular knowledge rejects knowing the matter at hand. Thus skepticism isn’t really any different, fundamentally, than claiming to know something, it just tries to hide this fact and shrink it down to a single claim, which doesn’t solve the epistemological problems involved so much as move them around.
There’s a more casual kind of skepticism that’s quite good, though, which is to be suspicious of the supposed validating of claims. To want to check the details of arguments for oneself. That kind of skepticism is quite useful!
It’s with great regret that our language doesn’t make a clean distinction between these two kinds.
That is, where skepticism claims to say that something can’t be known, the claim that something can’t be known is itself a claim to know, and thus skepticism is just a special case of claiming to know but where the particular knowledge rejects knowing the matter at hand
Yes, however a version of skepticism that claims that nothing can be known for sure/justified beyond any doubt doesn’t have this problem.
Figuring out/refining the right kind of philosophical skepticism that would add up to normality is a bit of a challenge, but it’s not that hard, really. But this require to do the first step—to stop dismissing skepticism out of hand.
The point of the exercise is to add skepticism to normality. Skepticism is the starting point. Justified uncertainty is the goal. The journey between the two is the exercise.
The classic problem with (Pyrrhonian) skepticism is that it’s a fake position. That is, where skepticism claims to say that something can’t be known, the claim that something can’t be known is itself a claim to know, and thus skepticism is just a special case of claiming to know but where the particular knowledge rejects knowing the matter at hand. Thus skepticism isn’t really any different, fundamentally, than claiming to know something, it just tries to hide this fact and shrink it down to a single claim, which doesn’t solve the epistemological problems involved so much as move them around.
There’s a more casual kind of skepticism that’s quite good, though, which is to be suspicious of the supposed validating of claims. To want to check the details of arguments for oneself. That kind of skepticism is quite useful!
It’s with great regret that our language doesn’t make a clean distinction between these two kinds.
Yes, however a version of skepticism that claims that nothing can be known for sure/justified beyond any doubt doesn’t have this problem.
Figuring out/refining the right kind of philosophical skepticism that would add up to normality is a bit of a challenge, but it’s not that hard, really. But this require to do the first step—to stop dismissing skepticism out of hand.
But how much is this still properly skepticism, then, instead of justified uncertainty?
The point of the exercise is to add skepticism to normality. Skepticism is the starting point. Justified uncertainty is the goal. The journey between the two is the exercise.