...except that the Dutch book itself assumes consistency. If I believe that there is a 66% chance of it landing on heads, but refuse to take a bet at 2:1 odds—or even at 1.5:1 odds even though I should think it’s easy money! - then I can’t be Dutch booked. I am literally too stupid to be tricked effectively. You would think this wouldn’t happen too often, since people would need to construct an accurate mental model to know when they should refuse such a bet, and such an accurate model would tell them they should revise their probabilities—but time after time people have demonstrated the ability to do exactly that.
What? This paragraph just seems broken. If they refuse to take a bet at 1.5:1 odds, they either have an injunction against gambling or don’t actually believe there’s a 66% chance, which is the entire point of the belief in belief article.
Overall, I find this article pretty weak. Is the point that reflective equilibrium is what seeking consistency looks like in humans? Then why try and knock down consistency, since if you don’t seek consistency you have no reason to seek reflective equilibrium?
What? This paragraph just seems broken. If they refuse to take a bet at 1.5:1 odds, they either have an injunction against gambling or don’t actually believe there’s a 66% chance, which is the entire point of the belief in belief article.
People may simultaneously have contradicting beliefs. The mind is not one unified entity: one part of it can believe in X, while another believes in not-X. Refusing the bet may simply mean that the part of them which is in control of behavior at that particular moment doesn’t believe there’s a 66% chance. It doesn’t mean that some other part of them might not genuinely believe there’s a 66% chance, and that part may be in control in other situations.
They have an injunction against explicit gambling, which is not a bad idea when you’re inconsistent. And their injunction isn’t always explicit, either.
I wonder if that’s true. Next time I’m in that situation, I’m going to offer up a few dollars on a bet that is genuinely and obviously good for the other person just to see if they’re smart enough to take it.
I finally had this come up naturally. I offered a coin flip, my $15 against his $10. He declined. Then I offered two coinflips—if both were heads, I got his $10, otherwise he got my $15. He declined. He has an explicit injunction against gambling. In the second case, he said “Well that I would accept” and I asked “Okay, do you accept it? Because I’m offering” and he said ”...no, I’d feel bad if I took your $15, or if I lost my $10″. (paraphrased)
I found a person that claimed an injunction against it as well, but I decided to put it off to see if I could get him to make the bet when he wasn’t self primed with his injunction against gambling.
He said “I don’t like gambling”, and then claimed nonlinear utility at bets risking $10, but he accepted $1.5 risking $1.
They don’t have a single consistent belief it’s 0.66. From each decision they make you can infer a belief, but you’ll soon notice it’s not consistent, though it may be stable within some conditions. Maybe they always act like it’s 0.66 when it’s the first bet, but like it’s 0.33 when they’re offered a second one.
What? This paragraph just seems broken. If they refuse to take a bet at 1.5:1 odds, they either have an injunction against gambling or don’t actually believe there’s a 66% chance, which is the entire point of the belief in belief article.
Overall, I find this article pretty weak. Is the point that reflective equilibrium is what seeking consistency looks like in humans? Then why try and knock down consistency, since if you don’t seek consistency you have no reason to seek reflective equilibrium?
People may simultaneously have contradicting beliefs. The mind is not one unified entity: one part of it can believe in X, while another believes in not-X. Refusing the bet may simply mean that the part of them which is in control of behavior at that particular moment doesn’t believe there’s a 66% chance. It doesn’t mean that some other part of them might not genuinely believe there’s a 66% chance, and that part may be in control in other situations.
They have an injunction against explicit gambling, which is not a bad idea when you’re inconsistent. And their injunction isn’t always explicit, either.
I wonder if that’s true. Next time I’m in that situation, I’m going to offer up a few dollars on a bet that is genuinely and obviously good for the other person just to see if they’re smart enough to take it.
I finally had this come up naturally. I offered a coin flip, my $15 against his $10. He declined. Then I offered two coinflips—if both were heads, I got his $10, otherwise he got my $15. He declined. He has an explicit injunction against gambling. In the second case, he said “Well that I would accept” and I asked “Okay, do you accept it? Because I’m offering” and he said ”...no, I’d feel bad if I took your $15, or if I lost my $10″. (paraphrased)
Thanks for reminding me!
I found a person that claimed an injunction against it as well, but I decided to put it off to see if I could get him to make the bet when he wasn’t self primed with his injunction against gambling.
He said “I don’t like gambling”, and then claimed nonlinear utility at bets risking $10, but he accepted $1.5 risking $1.
I won :)
Good point, I should downvote my post for claiming too much generality. I’ll do the same and report. :D
They don’t have a single consistent belief it’s 0.66. From each decision they make you can infer a belief, but you’ll soon notice it’s not consistent, though it may be stable within some conditions. Maybe they always act like it’s 0.66 when it’s the first bet, but like it’s 0.33 when they’re offered a second one.