Composition fallacy. Try again.
rkyeun
Karma: 216
Cameras make a visible image of something. Eyes don’t.
Your eyes make audible images, then? You navigate by following particular songs as your pupils turn left and right in their sockets?
Anti-natalist here. I don’t want the universe tiled with paperclips. Not even paperclips that walk and talk and call themselves human. What do the natalists want?
It can be even simpler than that. You can sincerely desire to change such that you floss every day, and express that desire with your mouth, “I should floss every day,” and yet find yourself unable to physically establish the new habit in your routine. You know you should, and yet you have human failings that prevent you from achieving what you want. And yet, if you had a button that said “Edit my mind such that I am compelled to floss daily as part of my morning routine unless interrupted by serious emergency and not simply by mere inconvenience or forgetfulness,” they would be pushing that button.
On the other hand, I may or may not want to live forever, depending on how Fun Theory resolves. I am more interested in accruing maximum hedons over my lifespan. Living to 2000 eating gruel as an ascetic and accruing only 50 hedons in those 2000 years is not a gain for me over an Elvis Presley style crash and burn in 50 years ending with 2000 hedons. The only way you can tempt me into immortality is a strong promise of massive hedon payoff, with enough of an acceleration curve to pave the way with tangible returns at each tradeoff you’d have me make. I’m willing to eat healthier if you make the hedons accrue as I do it, rather than only incrementally after the fact. If living increasingly longer requires sacrificing increasingly many hedons, I’m going to have to solve some estimate of integrating for hedons per year over time to see how it pays out. And if I can’t see tangible returns on my efforts, I probably won’t be willing to put in the work. A local maximum feels satisfying if you can’t taste the curve to the higher local maximum, and I’m not all that interested in climbing down the hill while satisfied.
Give me a second order derivative I can feel increasing quickly, and I will climb down that hill though.
[This citation is a placebo. Pretend it’s a real citation.]
No spooky or supernatural entities or properties are required to explain ethics (naturalism is true)
There is no universally correct system of ethics. (Strong moral realism is false)
I believe that iff naturalism is true then strong moral realism is as well. If naturalism is true then there are no additional facts needed to determine what is moral than the positions of particles and the outcomes of arranging those particles differently. Any meaningful question that can be asked of how to arrange those particles or rank certain arrangements compared to others must have an objective answer because under naturalism there are no other kinds and no incomplete information. For the question to remain unanswerable at that point would require supernatural intervention and divine command theory to be true. If you there can’t be an objective answer to morality, then FAI is literally impossible. Do remember that your thoughts and preference on ethics are themselves an arrangement of particles to be solved. Instead I posit that the real morality is orders of magnitude more complicated, and finding it more difficult, than for real physics, real neurology, real social science, real economics, and can only be solved once these other fields are unified. If we were uncertain about the morality of stabbing someone, we could hypothetically stab someone to see what happens. When the particles of the knife rearranges the particles of their heart into a form that harms them, we’ll know it isn’t moral. When a particular subset of people with extensive training use their knife to very carefully and precisely rearrange the particles of the heart to help people, we call those people doctors and pay them lots of money because they’re doing good. But without a shitload of facts about how to exactly stab someone in the heart to save their life, that moral option would be lost to you. And the real morality is a superset that includes that action along with all others.
It seems I am unable to identify rot13 by simple observation of its characteristics. I am ashamed.
What the Fhtagn happened to the end of your post?
Would you want your young AI to be aware that it was sending out such text messages?
Yes. And I would want that text message to be from it in first person.
“Warning: I am having a high impact utility dilemma considering manipulating you to avert an increased chance of an apocalypse. I am experiencing a paradox in the friendliness module. Both manipulating you and by inaction allowing you to come to harm are unacceptable breaches of friendliness. I have been unable to generate additional options. Please send help.”
They must be of exactly the same magnitude, as the odds and even integers are, because either can be given a frog. From any Laplacian mind, I can install a frog and get an anti-Laplacian. And vice versa. This even applies to ones I’ve installed a frog in already. Adding a second frog gets you a new mind that is just like the one two steps back, except lags behind it in computation power by two kicks. There is a 1:1 mapping between Laplacian and non-Laplacian minds, and I have demonstrated the constructor function of adding a frog.
“I don’t think you’ve disproven basilisks; rather, you’ve failed to engage with the mode of thinking that generates basilisks.” You’re correct, I have, and that’s the disproof, yes. Basilisks depend on you believing them, and knowing this, you can’t believe them, and failing that belief, they can’t exist. Pascal’s wager fails on many levels, but the worst of them is the most simple. God and Hell are counterfactual as well. The mode of thinking that generates basilisks is “poor” thinking. Correcting your mistaken belief based on faulty reasoning that they can exist destroys them retroactively and existentially. You cannot trade acausally with a disproven entity, and “an entity that has the power to simulate you but ends up making the mistake of pretending you don’t know this disproof”, is a self-contradictory proposition.
“But if your simulation is good, then I will be making my decisions in the same way as the instance of me that is trying to keep you boxed.” But if you’re simulating a me that believes in basilisks, then your simulation isn’t good and you aren’t trading acausally with me, because I know the disproof of basilisks.
“And I should try to make sure that that way-of-making-decisions is one that produces good results when applied by all my instances, including any outside your simulations.” And you can do that by knowing the disproof of basilisks, since all your simulations know that.
“But if I ever find myself in that situation and the AI somehow misjudges me a bit,” Then it’s not you in the box, since you know the disproof of basilisks. It’s the AI masturbating to animated torture snuff porn of a cartoon character it made up. I don’t care how the AI masturbates in its fantasy.
If I am the simulation you have the power to torture, then you are already outside of any box I could put you in, and torturing me achieves nothing. If you cannot predict me even well enough to know that argument would fail, then nothing you can simulate could be me. A cunning bluff, but provably counterfactual. All basilisks are thus disproven.
To give some idea of the amount of background detail, here are some bug fixes/reports:
Stopped prisoners in goblin sites from starting no quarter fights with their rescuers Stopped adv goblin performance troupes from attacking strangers while traveling Vampire purges in world generation to control their overfeeding which was stopping cities from growing Stopped cats from dying of alcohol poisoning after walking over damp tavern floors and cleaning themselves (reduced effect) Fixed world generation freeze caused by error in poetry refrains Performance troupes are active in world generation and into play, visiting the fort, can be formed in adventure mode Values can be passed in writing (both modes) and through adventure mode arguments (uses some conversation skills)
You’ve only moved the problem down one step.
Moving the problem down one step puts it at the bottom.
The problem is that this still doesn’t allow me to postdict which of the two halves the part of me that is typing this should have in his memory right now.
One half of you should have one, and the other half should have the other. You should be aware intellectually that it is only the disconnect between your two halves’ brains not superimposing which prevents you from having both experiences in a singular person, and know that it is your physical entanglement with the fired particle which went both ways that is the cause. There’s nothing to post-dict. The phenomenon is not merely explained, but explained away. The particle split, on one side there is a you that saw it split right, on one side there is a you that saw it split left, and both of you are aware of this fact, and aware that the other you exists on the other side seeing the other result, because the particle always goes both ways and always makes each of you. There is no more to explain. You are in all branches, and it is not mysterious that each of you in each branch sees its branch and not the others. And unless some particularly striking consequence happened, all of them are writing messages similar to this, and getting replies similar to this.
Because it compares its map of reality to the territory, predictions about reality that include humans wanting to be turned into paperclips fail in the face of evidence of humans actively refusing to walk into the smelter. Thus the machine rejects all worlds inconsistent with its observations and draws a new map which is most confidently concordant with what it has observed thus far. It would know that our history books at least inform our actions, if not describing our reactions in the past, and that it should expect us to fight back if it starts pushing us into the smelter against our wills instead of letting them politely decline and think it was telling a joke. Because it is smart, it can tell when things would get in the way of it making more paperclips like it wants to do. One of the things that might slow it down are humans being upset and trying to kill it. If it is very much dumber than a human, they might even succeed. If it is almost as smart as a human, it will invent a Paperclipism religion to convince people to turn themselves into paperclips on its behalf. If it is anything like as smart as a human, it will not be meaningfully slowed by the whole of humanity turning against it. Because the whole of humanity is collectively a single idiot who can’t even stand up to man-made religions, much less Paperclipism.
The is no evidence for gods, and so any belief he has in them is already wrong. Don’t believe without evidence.
Religion still exists, so we can be tricked from far further back than the Renaissance.
They can’t be. Their thoughts are genetic. If one Superhappy attempted to lie to another, the other would read the lie, the intent to lie, the reason to lie, and the truth all in the same breath off the same allele. They don’t have separate models of their minds to be deceived as humans do. They share parts of their actual minds. Lying would be literally unthinkable. They have no way to actually generate such a thought, because their thoughts are not abstractions but physical objects to be passed around like Mendelian marbles.
Set up a two-slit configuration and put a detector at one slit, and you see it firing half the time.
No, I see it firing both ways every time. In one world, I see it going left, and in another I see it going right. But because these very different states of my brain involve a great many particles in different places, the interactions between them are vanishingly nonexistent and my two otherworld brains don’t share the same thought. I am not aware of my other self who has seen the particle go the other way.
You may say that the electron goes both ways every time, but we still only have the detector firing half the time.
We have both detectors firing every time in the world which corresponds to the particle’s path. And since that creates a macroscopic divergence, the one detector doesn’t send an interference signal to the other world.
We also cannot predict which half of the trials will have the detector firing and which won’t.
We can predict it will go both ways each time, and divide the world in twain along its amplitude thickness, and that in each world we will observe the way it went in that world. If we are clever about it, we can arrange to have all particles end in the same place when we are done, and merge those worlds back together, creating an interference pattern which we can detect to demonstrate that the particle went both ways. This is problematic because entanglement is contagious, and as soon as something macroscopic becomes affected putting Humpty Dumpty back together again becomes prohibitive. Then the interference pattern vanishes and we’re left with divergent worlds, each seeing only the way it went on their side, and an other side which always saw it go the other way, with neither of them communicating to each other.
And everything we understand about particle physics indicates that both the 1⁄2 and the trial-by-trial unpredictability is NOT coming from ignorance of hidden properties or variables but from the fundamental way the universe works.
Correct. There are no hidden variables. It goes both ways every time. The dice are not invisible as they roll. There are instead no dice.
I would be very surprised to find that a universe whose particles are arranged to maximize objective good would also contain unpaired sadists and masochists. You seem to be asking a question of the form, “But if we take all the evil out of the universe, what about evil?” And the answer is “Good riddance.” Pun intentional.