PeterL(PeterL)

Karma: 16

PeterL 16 Mar 2024 5:10 UTC
1 point
0
on: Acting Wholesomely
Am I understanding correctly that this idea of wholesomeness is purely definitory/axiomatic (like mathematics) containing no (extraordinary) claims at all, so it doesn’t make sense to ask “Is this true?” but rather “Is it useful?”, and whether “to act wholesomely is good” is just hypothesis you are even actually testing?
Because then I see its great advantage over religious moral systems, that do contain such claims that actually might be false, but people are demanded to believe them.

PeterL 15 Mar 2024 0:32 UTC
1 point
0
in reply to: owencb’s comment on: Acting Wholesomely
Wow, thanks for your willingness to test/falsify your statements, and I apologize for my rash judgment. Your idea just sounded to me to be too good to be true, so I wanted to be cautious.
And I would be glad to say I am completely satisfied with your answer. However, that is not the case yet, maybe just because the “mistakes” of the people trying to apply wholesomeness might still need a definition—a criterion according to which something is or is not a mistake.
However, if you provided such a definition, I might be another tester of this style of thinking.

PeterL 14 Mar 2024 19:46 UTC
1 point
0
on: Acting Wholesomely
Could someone, please, confirm or disprove my impression that this idea might be not falsifiable at all? And if it is not, could someone, please, explain to me what reasons to apply this idea are still there (I am skeptical and curious, not completely denying)?
However, I appreciate this attempt to offer such an interesting moral idea/hypothesis/theory like this.

PeterL 1 Mar 2024 22:53 UTC
1 point
0
on: Open Thread – Winter 2023/2024
Hello, my name is Peter and recently I read Basics of Rationalist Discourse and iteratively checked/updated the current post based on the points stated in those basics:

I (possibly falsely) feel that moral (i.e. “what should be”) theories should be reducible because I see the analogy with the demand of “what is” theories to be reducible due to Occam’s razor. I admit that my feeling might be false (and I know analogy might not be a sufficient reason), and I am ready to admit that it is. However, despite reading the whole Mere Goodness from RAZ I cannot remember any reasons (maybe they are there, and I don’t blame the author (EY), if not), but many interesting statements (e.g. about becoming the pleasure brain center itself). And I remember there was such a long dialog there that might have explained this to me but I didn’t comprehend its bottom line.

This post is not intended to have any conclusion more general than about my state of mind, and if there is such an impact, I don’t mean it.

PeterL 26 Feb 2024 9:00 UTC
1 point
on: Resist the Happy Death Spiral
I find splitting the Great Idea a very useful tool to quantify its relevance (“For how many parts do I feel they are true?”), and this way, to apply falsification (for which I find “If your idea wasn’t true, how would you find out? Because if you don’t ask, it might be not true, but you didn’t find out.” to be the most logical and intuitive description. And so in case of splitting, you can say “I would admit my idea was incorrect, if not all its 12 parts felt correct separately. Easy.”.).

PeterL 25 Feb 2024 15:13 UTC
1 point
on: Belief in Self-Deception
I agree with both “emotion” and “pretend” hypotheses. It is (according to my world view) extremely difficult to pretend emotions you are not possessing. Thus, the easiest way to pretend your beliefs might be to manipulate your own emotions.

PeterL 4 Dec 2023 13:36 UTC
2 points
0
in reply to: Productimothy’s comment on: Appendix: Building a Bugs List prompts
Wow, thanks very much. Your post boosted my usage of this handbook rapidly from that day, I intensely enjoy doing these exercises, and I find them extremely helpful and effective. Thanks once again.

PeterL 16 May 2023 17:04 UTC
1 point
on: Worst Commonsense Concepts?
“His own stupid”—the idea that if someone is stupid, he deserves all the bad consequences of being stupid.
Disproof:
Let’s assume this is true. Then there would have been at least one voluntary action that turned him from wise to stupid. But why would someone voluntarily choose to be stupid? Only because he wouldn’t have known what being stupid means, so he would be already stupid. Thus there would be no such first action. (Assumtion rejected.)

PeterL 21 Dec 2022 22:04 UTC
1 point
in reply to: null’s comment on: The Tails Coming Apart As Metaphor For Life
Very nicely written. A good example of this might be invention of genetic flaw correction, due to which morally controversial abortion could become less desired option.

PeterL 29 Aug 2022 10:47 UTC
1 point
0
on: Appendix: Building a Bugs List prompts
I am stuck at the prompt no. 1, because I am wondering whether it is possible to name all the wants once forever despite the complexity of human morality.

Thanks in advance for explanation.

PeterL 19 Jan 2022 22:22 UTC
1 point
on: Why truth? And...
What about moral duty to be curious?

PeterL 19 Jan 2022 22:15 UTC
1 point
on: Why truth? And...
For everytime I am curious about “how the things are?”, I would like to be curious also about “what to do?” then. (Curious pragmatism)

PeterL 18 Jan 2022 21:50 UTC
6 points
on: Scope Insensitivity
My suggestion for alternative explanation is that people somehow assume that for saving more birds, more people will be asked to donate, so after dividing, the amounts per person will be very similar.

PeterL 17 Jan 2022 13:46 UTC
1 point
NIL
on: Open Thread—Jan 2022 [Vote Experiment!]
I agree that voting might be little bit annoying.
On the other side, it could potentially make the search for specific qualities of comment much easier if automated (by sorting). (E.g. “Now I am not in the mood for solving difficult concepts so I want something with high clarity evaluation.” or “Now I am too tired to argue/fight so I want something empathic now.”)

PeterL 11 Jan 2022 19:53 UTC
1 point
on: Taboo Your Words
1. entity that regularly makes the acts of changing the owner of object of value from the other entities to self without providing any signal according to that the given other entity could have any reason to hypothesize such change in short term time horizon of its perceptual and cognitive activity.

2. relatively common state of a natural system of currently detecting an internal insufficiency of specific sources interpreting it as the threat to its existence or proper functioning and causing it to perform an attempt to compensate for it and deflect such threat.

3. the natural object which is usually keeping its shape and is making an impression of having a value much greater than other kinds of natural shape-keeping objects probably due to the easily recognizable hue and also due to the relatively low amount of it in reachable universe.

PeterL 6 Jan 2022 22:54 UTC
1 point
in reply to: Pattern’s comment on: Your Preferences
Excuse me. What should be easy to remember? Concept names or whole frameworks?

PeterL 10 Sep 2021 17:30 UTC
1 point
in reply to: gilch’s comment on: Open & Welcome Thread September 2021
Ok, thanks. This is very interesting, and correct in theory (I guess). And I would be very glad to apply it. But before doing my first steps in it on my own by the trial-&-error method, I would like to know some best practices in doing so, if they are available at all. I strongly doubt this is a common practice in a common population and I slightly doubt that it is the common practice also for a “common” attendee of this forum, but I would still like to make this my (usual) habit.
And the greatest issue I see in this is how to talk to common people around me about common uncertain things that are probabilistic if they actually think of the common things as they would be certain. Should I try to gradually and unnoticeably change their paradigm? Or should I use double language: probabilistic inside, but confidential outside?
(I am aware that these questions might be difficult, and I don’t necessarily expect direct answers.)

PeterL 9 Sep 2021 18:58 UTC
1 point
in reply to: CraigMichael’s comment on: Open & Welcome Thread September 2021
OK, thanks, but then one of my additional questions is: what is the reasonable threshold for the probability of my belief A given all available evidence B1, B2, .., Bn? And why?

PeterL 8 Sep 2021 3:54 UTC
1 point
on: Open & Welcome Thread September 2021
Hello, I would like to ask whether there is any summary/discussion of necessary/sufficient criteria according to which a reason for whatever (belief, action, goal, …) is sufficient. If not, I would like to discuss it.

PeterL 18 Mar 2021 19:13 UTC
1 point
on: My attempt to find the meaning of existence
Mr./Mrs. nim, thanks for asking.
By meangfulness of existence, I mean the case related to whole existing reality in whole (eternal) time that would be good to prefer when choosing actions to perform. Or said differently, it would be good to maximize the probability of the meanigfulness by choosing proper actions.
So potentially, the whole existence can be either meaningful or not (indpendently of time variable), and we should make it be the former.
But the meaningfulness of moment is the different term, which I have chosen to be auxiliary in the statements.
I wanted to apply curiosity and this idea was the output of my mind, and it can be burdened by my subjectivity. And I would like to apply the second virtue (relinquishment) but before doing it, I would like to have an alternative to remain. So I am open to reasonable alternatives from people here.
I also admit, that the items in the second statement can be arbitrary, but better arbitrary than none.