(We are probably responding to you supplying the community password rather than only the excellence of the thinking, but even so.)
I do think online rationalists and academic, rational choice or adjacent social scientists exist at the level of intellectual distance form one another that is delightful. Enough shared vocabulary to talk productively along with enough distance in perspective to be surprised by what comes from the other side and bridging figures like Tyler Cowen exist. It’s a shame there isn’t more back and forth.
Academic social science is making an aggressive move into studying AI. It’s a hotter topic than terrorism was in October 2001 at the moment. I am curious what comes of that.
Point A was a basically moral point not a factual one (i.e., we should not let OpenAI get away with claiming that ChatGPT’s actions are not its responsibility). So, it’s not necessarily in tension with B. It’s just talking about something else.
Could a paperclip maximizer occur as a defective product? The basic attitude here implies “no”—the thinking is that something smart enough to design a system to harvest your hemoglobin can’t be dumb enough to think that’s what you were asking when you said “maximize paperclips.”
A question I didn’t raise at any point was “if you set out to build a malicious AI designed to go out and harvest hemoglobin for paperclips, could you do it?” I think at least some of them would say “no” without venturing a guess on the proportion. A lot of my students (and a lot of people generally) apply a kind of intuitive moral realism under which there are objective standards or right and wrong that would be known, and followed, by a sufficiently intelligent AI.