Dojan

Karma: 598

Dojan 23 May 2026 21:24 UTC
1 point
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on: Omelas Is Perfectly Misread
The Ones Who Walk Into Omelas With Kevlar Vests And Samurai Swords And Desert Eagles And Stare Down All Those Wicked Unrighteous Sinners In Their Droves And Proceed To Totally Fucking Waste Them All In A High Octane Action Sequence That Kicks Insane Amounts Of Ass Think The Raid If It Was Directed By John Woo But When They Finally Get To The Door Of The Basement Where They Keep The Kid Oh Shit It’s The Fucking King Of Omelas And He’s Wielding The Cursed Obsidian Blade Of The Underworld And They Gotta Waste Him Too But He’s Incredibly Fast And Strong Thanks To All The Power He’s Getting From The Kid And He Kills Almost All Of Them Until The Leader Draws Him Out With A Double Feint That Leaves Him Wide Open And Cuts His Fucking Head Clean Off With A Single Perfect Stroke And Then They Finally Open The Door To The Basement And Free The Kid

—By lesbianbloodritual on tumblr: https://www.tumblr.com/login_required/lesbianbloodritual

Dojan 7 May 2026 14:54 UTC
2 points
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in reply to: StartAtTheEnd’s comment on: Intelligence Dissolves Privacy
My impression was that the FBI and CIA etc has always been trying to ban encryption an similar, but has so far mostly failed. Strong encryption was illegal (from the Wikipedia page on PGP):

”in February 1993 Zimmermann [inventor of PGP encryption] became the formal target of a criminal investigation by the US Government for “munitions export without a license”. At the time, cryptosystems using keys larger than 40 bits were considered munitions within the definition of the US export regulations; PGP has never used keys smaller than 128 bits, so it qualified at that time.”
But this was later changed to allow strong encryption for the public. So while I share your worry, I take hope that the slippery slope is not inevitable.

Dojan 7 May 2026 14:42 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: Kaj_Sotala’s comment on: Intelligence Dissolves Privacy
I agree. I’ve had the same number in Sweden for over twenty years, and only get a handful of spam calls per year. And I’m not particularly careful about giving out my number either.

Dojan 29 Aug 2022 19:17 UTC
2 points
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in reply to: KatWoods’s comment on: You have a place to stay in Sweden, should you need it.
Hmm, I didn’t know about that, thanks for the tip. Very busy right now, and moving shortly anyway, but I’ll look into it in a while :)

Dojan 7 Apr 2022 18:56 UTC
3 points
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in reply to: frontier64’s comment on: Ukraine Post #9: Again
No, I think Zvi meant that Ukraine isn’t paying Russian soldiers enough money for defecting.

Dojan 7 Apr 2022 7:35 UTC
6 points
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on: Ukraine Post #9: Again
On the prize of fertilizer, Peter Zeihan explained on Feb 15 that “Russia and Belarus are the worlds second and fourth largest suppliers of potash. Nitrogen fertilizer is disappearing because of what is going on in energy markets. Phosphate fertilizer is disappearing because of what is going on in China. And if this war happens [this was on Feb 15], potash fertilizer globally has a shortages as well.”
Peter Zeihan is prone to hyperbole and overstatement in pursuit of clarity. I have no problem with this, but it should be labeled as such.

Dojan 23 Mar 2022 12:17 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: nim’s comment on: Ukraine Post #5: Bits of Information
More typos:
Cumulation --> Culmination x2

Dojan 19 Mar 2022 11:57 UTC
9 points
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on: Only needs a flying saucer
I don’t have anything to say just.… Know that the world is with you.
Don’t blame yourself for what you can’t do. Rarely is the question of who to blame so simple.

Dojan 19 Mar 2022 11:29 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: Dirichlet-to-Neumann’s comment on: Nuclear Deterrence 101 (and why the US can’t even hint at intervening in Ukraine)
I shall! Thank you :)

Dojan 19 Mar 2022 9:38 UTC
4 points
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in reply to: ChosunOne’s comment on: Nuclear Deterrence 101 (and why the US can’t even hint at intervening in Ukraine)
You interpret that as being specifically a warning against overt deployment of troops to Ukraine?
I think it was deliberately vague. This allows Putin room to choose his response due to exact later consequences, without being bound to his own word. The way NATO is interpreting it sure seems to be that weapons are ok but troops are not, and Putin has accepted that, with only some non-committal grumbling. I think the fact that NATO was already providing that before the invasion makes a strong “status quo” argument. Also it has historically counted as “not participating”, however ridiculous and arbitrary this may seem. Scott Alexander wrote more on this.
While at the outset I can see that being a strong reason at the beginning of the war, i.e. “Don’t take my attempt at a quick victory away from me or else I’ll nuke you”, I don’t know how feasible that remains over time. Putin can’t think that if the war goes on for months without victory that everyone would just sit on the sidelines forever.
In my understanding this is very feasible indeed. Within hours of the invasion, the new status quo had emerged: NATO was sending weapons/money/intelligence and doing sanctions/UN hearings/etc, and Russia was advancing conventionally. The status quo hasn’t really changed since then, except that a; Ukrainian resistance is is much stronger than expected, and b; western sanctions are much stronger than expected. If China came down on one side or the other, that would shift the status quo; or if Russia goes through with it’s chemical weapons gambit, or if NATO escalates support. Or if the ground war starts leaning one way or the other. Breaking the status quo is always counted as a “Move”, however contrived the status quo.
if say a THAAD battery near the Polish border with Ukraine engaged a Russian fighter jet
I think this would be a major major crisis, going down in history alongside the Cuban missile crisis. I think Putin would basically interpret this as a totally unprovoked attack, at least publicly, likening it to Russian forces shooting down NATO planes inside NATO airspace. It would be a massive escalation, and Putin would have to do something in response, or loose all credibility. Whether that thing would then escalate further is hard to know. I don’t want to find out.
I’m not read up on the “MiG Valley” history, but my understanding is that a; everyone pretended that the pilots were not Russian, and b; this was before the doctrine of MAD was fully established. But again, I don’t know the history around it. If there was direct fire exchanged between Russian and NATO troops today, however circumstantial, It would make the history books for sure.
the situation is a lot more nuanced than “If NATO fires a single bullet at a Russian it’s the end of civilization”.
Agreed.

Dojan 19 Mar 2022 7:34 UTC
5 points
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in reply to: ChosunOne’s comment on: Nuclear Deterrence 101 (and why the US can’t even hint at intervening in Ukraine)
I’d rather see counterpoints to my arguments than blanket assertions
My apologies. I found myself convinced of these very points after reading the article, but I can see now how my words could come across as standoffish. No insult intended :)
Failure to perform the fait accompli means that options other than nuclear retaliation are possible.
My reading of both the text quoted and reality as presented, is that this line of thinking only applies when operating inside or very close to the opponents red lines. The next paragraph starts:
Avoiding this problem is why NATO is structured the way it is: promising a maximum response for any violation, however slight, of the territory of any member. The idea is to render the entire bloc immune to piecemeal maneuvers by putting all of it behind the red line (or at least letting the USSR think it is all behind the red line).
And Ukraine is not a member. NATO’s red line is crystal clear. Ukraine is outside of it. Everyone made it very clear to Putin that they didn’t want him to invade, and that they would impose “costs” on him if he did. But no one threatened to nuke him over it.
NATO can clearly signal via way of action that it has no intention of threatening the existence of the Russian state.
Putin made it very clear on the day of the attack that he was threatening nukes to anyone who “interfered” in Ukraine, with his infamous “the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history” -speech. NATO has been helping Ukraine by training their forces and supplying materiell for years before the invasion, and vowed to keep doing so. This can be considered “calling his bluff” to an extent, or as a piecemeal maneuver in it’s own right. Yet they withdrew their personell from the country in the days and weeks leading up to the attack. Some have called Biden weak for doing that, essentially “clearing the way” for Putin by removing the tripwire force, and maybe he is. What is clear is that he didn’t want for that bluff to be called.
Sending NATO troops into Ukraine to engage Russian forces is a very clear escalation, that Putin has specifically warned against. If this were to happen, Putin would have every incentive to nuke them inside Ukraine, or worse. He might be bluffing. I wouldn’t bet on it.
“Red lines” aren’t always geographical. Currently (it looks to me like) NATO’s unambiguous red line is it’s geographical border, while it is trying to establish some strategic ambiguity over use of chemical/biological weapons. This is going so-so, especially after the US’s bluff was called in Syria with no consequences. Meanwhile (it looks to me like) Putin’s unambiguous red line is Russia’s geographical border, and he is trying very successfully and believably to assert a red line over any direct military intervention inside Ukraine, and less successfully over less direct help. Since he was deliberately unspecific in his threats, he can gracefully back down from the supply of weapons without loosing face. That does not mean he would back down from other more direct help, with the infamous Polish fighter jets toeing the line too close for comfort, so the US backed down on that one.
When Putin called that obvious bluff, it would have damaged the credibility and thus the deterrence
The start of the very same paragraph reads:
The logic of deterrence – in particular the fact that it is both very high stakes and also based entirely on perception – explains why NATO and especially the United States took any direct military action off of the table quite loudly well before the conflict began. Saying that ‘all options are on the table’ – as the United States routinely does with Taiwan – would have been a fairly obvious bluff. When Putin called that obvious bluff, it would have damaged the credibility and thus the deterrence
Now, as for fait accompli:
Beaufre notes that for piecemeal maneuvers to be effective, they have to be presented as fait accompli – accomplished so quickly that anything but nuclear retaliation would arrive too late to do any good and of course nuclear retaliation would be pointless
I think the phrase “have to be” above is not to be taken as absolute. The same paragraph continues:
Thus Beaufre suggests that the piecemeal maneuver is best accomplished as a series of coups de main accomplished with fast moving armored, mechanized and airborne forces seizing control of the target country or region before anyone really knows what is happening. The attacking power can then present the maneuver as fait accompli and thus the new status quo that everyone has to accommodate; if successful, they have not only made gains but also moved everyone’s red lines, creating more freedom of action for further piecemeal maneuvers.
Everyone agrees that the maneuver “is best accomplished” if it can be performed quickly. Obviously Putin would be in a much stronger position if he would have been able to conquer Ukraine within a few days. Almost tautologically so. But considering how US Intelligence were consistently calling his shots days in advance during the weeks leading up to the invasion, Putin never managed to establish very much of a smokescreen for this operation, and thus I don’t see this ever being presented as fait accompli to anyone, no matter how it would have turned out on the ground. Unlike his annexation of Crimea, where that tactic was much more successful.

Dojan 19 Mar 2022 3:25 UTC
5 points
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in reply to: Yitz’s comment on: Why a No-Fly-Zone would be the biggest gift to Putin, and why Zelenskyy keeps asking for it [Linkpost and commentary]
Thank you :)
See also this much more in-depth and well researched analysis of nuclear deterrence in general, and how it applies to the situation in Ukraine in particular. And this other post by the same author posted on the day of the invasion, already then presenting a picture clearer than I hold now.

Dojan 19 Mar 2022 1:06 UTC
4 points
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in reply to: ChosunOne’s comment on: Nuclear Deterrence 101 (and why the US can’t even hint at intervening in Ukraine)
Did you read the linked article? It argues extensively and precisely why what you suggest is not something that NATO can risk.
It is a total war for Ukraine, not for Russia. And even less for NATO.
No one doubts that NATO could obliterate Russia’s conventional forces, if it were guaranteed not to escalate beyond conventional warfare. Putin knows that too. Which is precisely why he couldn’t and wouldn’t leave any such guarantee.

Dojan 19 Mar 2022 0:56 UTC
4 points
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on: Nuclear Deterrence 101 (and why the US can’t even hint at intervening in Ukraine)
Thank you for posting this! AAA++, 11 out of 10, would recommend, will read again!
See also another post on the same blog about chemical weapons: acoup.blog/2020/03/20/collections-why-dont-we-use-chemical-weapons-anymore/
I have already started searching through the archives over there. Any more such gems?

Dojan 18 Mar 2022 21:34 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: superads91’s comment on: What’s, in your opinion, the real reason for this war?
“But I don’t even think this discussion has been really adversarial”
I’m relived to hear it!
re:Ulterior motives
I believe we are mostly in agreement over the underlying forces behind this conflict then.

Dojan 18 Mar 2022 21:29 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: superads91’s comment on: What’s, in your opinion, the real reason for this war?
“That’s exactly one of my suspected ulterior motives”
Then we are in agrement here.
“If we believe that it is not a solvable problem”
I didn’t say that it definitely isn’t solvable, I conceded that it might not be. It certainly won’t be if we aren’t even trying, and I’m claiming that we aren’t really trying. This would naturally include perpetually ongoing work on the world stage to prevent such developments as you describe. To be clear: I am not calling for unilateral disarmament. I understand that this would not be helpful. I am calling for gradual, universal disarmament, to the furthest extent possible. A de-escalation to mere nuclear deterrence without MAD, would be an unimaginable win for the probability of the survival of human civilization long term, sanity in general, and literally all known life. I understand that it won’t be easy, and that MAD is an attractor in policy-space etc, etc, etc, but I can not agree with your seemingly defeatist acceptance of MAD as the only solution. To be clear: I understand the logic behind it. I can see your point. It has merit. I don’t accept the conclusion.

Dojan 17 Mar 2022 23:36 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: benjamincosman’s comment on: Why a No-Fly-Zone would be the biggest gift to Putin, and why Zelenskyy keeps asking for it [Linkpost and commentary]
Thanks for your feedback :)

Dojan 17 Mar 2022 21:34 UTC
4 points
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in reply to: maximkazhenkov’s comment on: Why a No-Fly-Zone would be the biggest gift to Putin, and why Zelenskyy keeps asking for it [Linkpost and commentary]
This is a good point, I have been using that term very loosely. I guess what I mean is a massive loss of support and legitimacy, as we have indeed seen already. I agree that for a dictator this probably means a shift to a more authoritarian style before it means being ousted, and that the likelihood of a coup depends in large part on things like palace security.
North Korea is indeed a chilling example, and Russia’s new economic reality has already been widely compared to North Korea in mainstream media. I think Russia has enough widespread internet access, and not enough Putin-worship for the comparison to hold very far, but it can indeed get very ugly in the meantime.
As for that prediction market, that looks low to me, considering how it’s worded. I’d expect at least that much chance of Putin dying a natural death before 2024, and that might well be described as a “regime change” by popular media, so that leaves no room for a coup. Also the fine print stating that it doesn’t count if Putin “voluntarily resigns”, is very vague, and indeed a way he might try to make it look if he sees that he is loosing power. Still I’m updating some.

Dojan 17 Mar 2022 20:51 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: superads91’s comment on: What’s, in your opinion, the real reason for this war?
Meta-discussion sidenote: I didn’t intend for this discussion to escalate and become adversarial. Please see the first part of this comment. No ill will garnered, and no offence taken :) If you think this is discussion is less than constructive, I’m perfectly willing to drop things here.
That said:
“A quick google search can easily disprove that”
I only claimed that they are trying. And that this is a significant escalation since pulling out of the treaty. If they think they’ll succeed to some significant extent in 15 years, that sets a hard time limit on Putins plans.
“And it will much more likely be either in the US or China, since these countries actually invest in R&D instead of the oligarchs stealing everything.”
Case in point. He is falling behind, and he knows it. If he counts loosing SuperPower status as a complete loss condition, he has to do something drastic, and the sooner the better.
“It doesn’t because full nuclear de-escalation is realistically impossible”
For me, Good-guy status is a scale. Holding the world hostage lowers your place on the scale significantly. The fact that others are even worse does not change this. If I had seen a strong, deliberate and sincere effort for mutual nuclear disarmament after the fall of the USSR I would be less harsh, but I haven’t. I’m not saying this is a solvable problem, it might not be. I’m saying we aren’t really trying.

Dojan 17 Mar 2022 20:48 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: superads91’s comment on: What’s, in your opinion, the real reason for this war?
“why aren’t I allowed to have doubts, and mistrust the official justifications?
Sorry but this comment of yours just doesn’t make any sense. What it seems to me is that you, and others, are maybe trying a little too hard to play devil’s advocate with Putin. Or, I don’t know, oppose me just for intellectual fun?”
Of course you are! I think this conversation has been constructive, if a bit adversarial. Sorry about that! It has helped me shake down my picture, and I guess playing devils advocate is the best I can do to understand what is going on. This (obviously) does not imply that I agree with any of Putins actions (goes without saying). I also don’t necessarily expect us to be able to converge our understanding, since we have different priors and different information. Sorry if you felt pressured, that is not my intent :) I am happy to leave this debate here if it doesn’t feel productive to you. I don’t think I’m likely to change my stance much at this point without new information or arguments, and I’m not necessarily saying that you should either. If some confusion remains as to what my stance is, I am happy to elaborate.
That said:
“Words can justify actions and yet not coincide with the real motivations behind said actions.”
Sure. There might be an endless series of masks behind masks. But when we see that his actions consistently line up with a certain layer of mask, then that is evidence that that mask contains some real information. Basically; which of his words has predicted his actions, so far? Those might continue to do so. Obviously many of his words are blatant lies, like “we won’t invade”, “The Ukrainians are bombing their own people”, “Zelenskyy is a Nazi/Nato puppet” etc, but if we can consistently differentiate between this surface level of lies (this outermost mask), from the lower levels that may or may not have predictive power, then we might learn something about his real motives. As it happens, it seems to me that some of what he has been saying has predictive power. I’m trying to extract that. This is not a reliable process, what with all the deliberate misinformation going around, but I hope to be able to do better than chance.
“the ulterior motives of Nanda Ale’s comment”
Could you summarize what they are? I’m not sure what you are referring to specifically. “Consolidate power” is super vague at best, and I think the opposite is happening right now. If you have a different take, I’d be interested in that too.