I agree with most of the points presented in the post to various extents, but I don’t think these arguments actually support the post’s conclusion.
If you take only one thing from this post, take this: any theory of change that falls to one of these competitive pressures is completely useless. The only way to avoid these pressures is if we could build common knowledge, at any given time, that no one is trying to develop ASI.
Doesn’t this plan (effectively an outright ASI ban) fall to competitive pressures between labs and nations just as easily as the others?
In fact, I’d say it’s a lot more brittle. On a long enough timeline this plan would fail if any secret ASI project exists somewhere in the world, which due to the very competitive pressures outlined in the post, is almost certain to exist, with the bonus that the winners in this scenario would be guaranteed to be a group willing to start a secret ASI project presumably against international law.
In the meantime, the three filters that this post mention all involve a smaller number of actors. In the first filter, only a few countries can start a global nuclear war, and in the other two filters (in the case where they occur) only one AI or group of people will decide the fate of humanity.
Also, a tangential observation: some of the arguments presented in the post seem to suggest that on the margin, it would be better to race faster in order to create aligned ASI before either your own government or their nuke-happy adversaries realize what’s going on. I don’t know what to make of this observation.
I think these mitigations only apply for external use outside of trusted customers, not for the internal AI lab and government uses that are relevant to takeover risk. So the main consequence is reducing the chance of some catastrophe caused by human use of the models, not AI takeover risk