Yeah my impression is that prediction markets incentivize things that are more like “seek out poorly priced things and arbitrage them” rather than “make useful, correct predictions that anyone cared about.” (I have some vague sense that the shape of prediction markets tends towards not solving the problems I care about, although I haven’t thought about it too hard).
There totally could also be prediction markets involved here. But the primary purpose is to establish a record of “who predicted accurate things that anyone cared about” so that can become an easily referenced source-of-authority.
This needs to be incentive-compatible with “being a pundit”, I think. Like the idea is to make it so people who do pundrity on twitter are automatically nudged to make their predictions legible and gradable.
This needs to be incentive-compatible with “being a pundit”, I think. Like the idea is to make it so people who do pundrity on twitter are automatically nudged to make their predictions legible and gradable.
The default is of course that people who do punditry are automatically nudged to make their predictions illegible, because the existence of any such system threatens to embarrass the many pundits who know their predictions are bullshit.
This seems like a huge problem and I don’t know how you get around it, other than hoping the system takes off so well that people can be shamed for conspicuously dodging its accountability.
I agree it’s quite difficult to solve this completely. But, it seems like you could make it so “On twitter, the default thing is if you try to pundit, the system nudges you towards legiblizing your predictions.”
This at least makes more of the world, on the margin, track “being correct” as a good thing to do. This can hopefully have flowthrough effects as the equilibrium shifts from “illegible pundits just look like status quo” to “illegible pundits look weirder.”
Yeah my impression is that prediction markets incentivize things that are more like “seek out poorly priced things and arbitrage them” rather than “make useful, correct predictions that anyone cared about.” (I have some vague sense that the shape of prediction markets tends towards not solving the problems I care about, although I haven’t thought about it too hard).
There totally could also be prediction markets involved here. But the primary purpose is to establish a record of “who predicted accurate things that anyone cared about” so that can become an easily referenced source-of-authority.
This needs to be incentive-compatible with “being a pundit”, I think. Like the idea is to make it so people who do pundrity on twitter are automatically nudged to make their predictions legible and gradable.
The default is of course that people who do punditry are automatically nudged to make their predictions illegible, because the existence of any such system threatens to embarrass the many pundits who know their predictions are bullshit.
This seems like a huge problem and I don’t know how you get around it, other than hoping the system takes off so well that people can be shamed for conspicuously dodging its accountability.
I agree it’s quite difficult to solve this completely. But, it seems like you could make it so “On twitter, the default thing is if you try to pundit, the system nudges you towards legiblizing your predictions.”
This at least makes more of the world, on the margin, track “being correct” as a good thing to do. This can hopefully have flowthrough effects as the equilibrium shifts from “illegible pundits just look like status quo” to “illegible pundits look weirder.”