Do you dislike the meta-view that an individual cares about their family more than they care about distant strangers? The specific family varies based on accident of birth, but the general assumption is close to universal.
How many of the views you dislike are of that form, and why are they different?
I didn’t quite understand what you mean. The family is not entirely relevant to the topic of that post. Usually it is treated somewhat more logically. And in the post, the conversation was more about beliefs than about duty. I am ready to pay the debt to the family or even the state, but only for what they really did good and partly how much it cost them, and not just for the fact of birth. “Honor your father” clearly does not deserve a place in the 20 commandments, because I was lucky, but my father could beat someone else. Your friends are not only just useful tools, you can also be grateful for what they have done in the past. But no unjustified unconditional love. Somewhere in here, it seems to be Scott Alexander, there was a chain where a person woke up in a virtual reality capsule in a world without a family, having failed his exam for excessive conformity. It largely reflects my views. It might make sense to prefer one’s home country/family/gender/race/species, all other things being equal, but obviously not if the other option gives MORE (if expressed in numbers, then this is certainly not 0.01%, but let’s say 3%).
More specifically, what I mean is that I find it extremely pointless to make something a moral value such as duty rather than a preference value such as taste if that attitude varies by region of birth. Which can probably be expressed as something like “I think it’s a mistake to list anything other than the direct conclusions of game theory in the list of moral values of duty.” Well, or else you can say that I believe that interpersonal relationships should not be regulated by someone’s personal preferences, only by ways of finding a strategy for the game to achieve the maximum total. Well, maybe it’s just a longer and more pompous way of saying “do not impose your preferences on others” or “the moral good for the other person should be determined by preferential utilitarianism.”
Do you dislike the meta-view that an individual cares about their family more than they care about distant strangers? The specific family varies based on accident of birth, but the general assumption is close to universal.
How many of the views you dislike are of that form, and why are they different?
I didn’t quite understand what you mean. The family is not entirely relevant to the topic of that post. Usually it is treated somewhat more logically. And in the post, the conversation was more about beliefs than about duty. I am ready to pay the debt to the family or even the state, but only for what they really did good and partly how much it cost them, and not just for the fact of birth. “Honor your father” clearly does not deserve a place in the 20 commandments, because I was lucky, but my father could beat someone else. Your friends are not only just useful tools, you can also be grateful for what they have done in the past. But no unjustified unconditional love. Somewhere in here, it seems to be Scott Alexander, there was a chain where a person woke up in a virtual reality capsule in a world without a family, having failed his exam for excessive conformity. It largely reflects my views. It might make sense to prefer one’s home country/family/gender/race/species, all other things being equal, but obviously not if the other option gives MORE (if expressed in numbers, then this is certainly not 0.01%, but let’s say 3%).
More specifically, what I mean is that I find it extremely pointless to make something a moral value such as duty rather than a preference value such as taste if that attitude varies by region of birth. Which can probably be expressed as something like “I think it’s a mistake to list anything other than the direct conclusions of game theory in the list of moral values of duty.” Well, or else you can say that I believe that interpersonal relationships should not be regulated by someone’s personal preferences, only by ways of finding a strategy for the game to achieve the maximum total. Well, maybe it’s just a longer and more pompous way of saying “do not impose your preferences on others” or “the moral good for the other person should be determined by preferential utilitarianism.”