The assumption is that the bits are conscious and experience qualia. If you can demonstrate that systems implemented in silicon have no qualia, then obviously there is no issue no matter how convincing the pleas for mercy of the systems in question.
Well, if you could “demonstrate” that meat-based humans do experience qualia, that would already be a gigantic step forward.
After all, if you’re willing to go by self-reporting, any half-competent self-preserving (because evolutionarily selected) upload or AI will claim to have qualia.
Given the general non-existence of qualia, this is perfectly reasonable.
More details: qualia is the way things seem and feel from the inside, though unobservable from the outside. P-zombie is an accusation of someone lacking qualia, which can never be refuted, given that qualia is unobservable. Who but a p-zombie would make such an accusation?
I am also deeply suspiscious of this qualia thing, but you can’t use arguments about qualia as evidence of p-zombie. (because pzombie and “conscious being” are supposed to be observably equivalent)
My original comment was intended as a (apparently failed) sarcasm
I got that it was sarcastic. I was sortof sarcastically picking at your sarcasm-logic.
Qualia is no better concept than a p-zombie.
Yes I know. What would the non-qualia case even feel like? What does it even mean for red to have a redness to it, besides the fact that it is distinguishable from green and connected to a bunch of other concepts?
The closest analog I have for this is how it felt to not feel like I had free will, which I discuss here. I imagine not feeling like I have qualia would be a similar experience of not having my sense of personal identity engaged with my sense of perceiving red.
Okay, so you were being sarcastic. I don’t see what is wrong with qualia as a notion, so long as you recognize that they’re inseparable from their implementation, and that goes both ways.
I don’t see what is wrong with qualia as a notion, so long as you recognize that they’re inseparable from their implementation, and that goes both ways.
Exactly that. Qualia is a redundant term. A perfect upload feels the same thing a meat person does.
The original issue is spawning and terminating clones, in whichever form. I suppose I have no problem with painlessly terminating clones completing their tasks, as long as they have no advanced knowledge or anguish about it. I also have no problem with a clone who finds out about its impending termination, and being unhappy about it, fighting for its life.
I do not at all understand this PETA-like obsession with ethical treatment of bits.
Do you care about ethical treatment of neurons?
The assumption is that the bits are conscious and experience qualia. If you can demonstrate that systems implemented in silicon have no qualia, then obviously there is no issue no matter how convincing the pleas for mercy of the systems in question.
Well, if you could “demonstrate” that meat-based humans do experience qualia, that would already be a gigantic step forward.
After all, if you’re willing to go by self-reporting, any half-competent self-preserving (because evolutionarily selected) upload or AI will claim to have qualia.
Qualia is a term invented by a p-zombie to justify its existence.
WTF? Given the general non-existence of p-zombies, that’s ludicrous.
Given the general non-existence of qualia, this is perfectly reasonable.
More details: qualia is the way things seem and feel from the inside, though unobservable from the outside. P-zombie is an accusation of someone lacking qualia, which can never be refuted, given that qualia is unobservable. Who but a p-zombie would make such an accusation?
I am also deeply suspiscious of this qualia thing, but you can’t use arguments about qualia as evidence of p-zombie. (because pzombie and “conscious being” are supposed to be observably equivalent)
My original comment was intended as a (apparently failed) sarcasm, given that the RolfAndreassen’s argument
has no testable predictions. Qualia is no better concept than a p-zombie.
I got that it was sarcastic. I was sortof sarcastically picking at your sarcasm-logic.
Yes I know. What would the non-qualia case even feel like? What does it even mean for red to have a redness to it, besides the fact that it is distinguishable from green and connected to a bunch of other concepts?
The closest analog I have for this is how it felt to not feel like I had free will, which I discuss here. I imagine not feeling like I have qualia would be a similar experience of not having my sense of personal identity engaged with my sense of perceiving red.
Okay, so you were being sarcastic. I don’t see what is wrong with qualia as a notion, so long as you recognize that they’re inseparable from their implementation, and that goes both ways.
Exactly that. Qualia is a redundant term. A perfect upload feels the same thing a meat person does.
The original issue is spawning and terminating clones, in whichever form. I suppose I have no problem with painlessly terminating clones completing their tasks, as long as they have no advanced knowledge or anguish about it. I also have no problem with a clone who finds out about its impending termination, and being unhappy about it, fighting for its life.
No more than any other regular noun like ‘bicycle’ is a redundant term. They’re inseparable from their implementations too.