Given the general non-existence of qualia, this is perfectly reasonable.
More details: qualia is the way things seem and feel from the inside, though unobservable from the outside. P-zombie is an accusation of someone lacking qualia, which can never be refuted, given that qualia is unobservable. Who but a p-zombie would make such an accusation?
I am also deeply suspiscious of this qualia thing, but you can’t use arguments about qualia as evidence of p-zombie. (because pzombie and “conscious being” are supposed to be observably equivalent)
My original comment was intended as a (apparently failed) sarcasm
I got that it was sarcastic. I was sortof sarcastically picking at your sarcasm-logic.
Qualia is no better concept than a p-zombie.
Yes I know. What would the non-qualia case even feel like? What does it even mean for red to have a redness to it, besides the fact that it is distinguishable from green and connected to a bunch of other concepts?
The closest analog I have for this is how it felt to not feel like I had free will, which I discuss here. I imagine not feeling like I have qualia would be a similar experience of not having my sense of personal identity engaged with my sense of perceiving red.
Okay, so you were being sarcastic. I don’t see what is wrong with qualia as a notion, so long as you recognize that they’re inseparable from their implementation, and that goes both ways.
I don’t see what is wrong with qualia as a notion, so long as you recognize that they’re inseparable from their implementation, and that goes both ways.
Exactly that. Qualia is a redundant term. A perfect upload feels the same thing a meat person does.
The original issue is spawning and terminating clones, in whichever form. I suppose I have no problem with painlessly terminating clones completing their tasks, as long as they have no advanced knowledge or anguish about it. I also have no problem with a clone who finds out about its impending termination, and being unhappy about it, fighting for its life.
Given the general non-existence of qualia, this is perfectly reasonable.
More details: qualia is the way things seem and feel from the inside, though unobservable from the outside. P-zombie is an accusation of someone lacking qualia, which can never be refuted, given that qualia is unobservable. Who but a p-zombie would make such an accusation?
I am also deeply suspiscious of this qualia thing, but you can’t use arguments about qualia as evidence of p-zombie. (because pzombie and “conscious being” are supposed to be observably equivalent)
My original comment was intended as a (apparently failed) sarcasm, given that the RolfAndreassen’s argument
has no testable predictions. Qualia is no better concept than a p-zombie.
I got that it was sarcastic. I was sortof sarcastically picking at your sarcasm-logic.
Yes I know. What would the non-qualia case even feel like? What does it even mean for red to have a redness to it, besides the fact that it is distinguishable from green and connected to a bunch of other concepts?
The closest analog I have for this is how it felt to not feel like I had free will, which I discuss here. I imagine not feeling like I have qualia would be a similar experience of not having my sense of personal identity engaged with my sense of perceiving red.
Okay, so you were being sarcastic. I don’t see what is wrong with qualia as a notion, so long as you recognize that they’re inseparable from their implementation, and that goes both ways.
Exactly that. Qualia is a redundant term. A perfect upload feels the same thing a meat person does.
The original issue is spawning and terminating clones, in whichever form. I suppose I have no problem with painlessly terminating clones completing their tasks, as long as they have no advanced knowledge or anguish about it. I also have no problem with a clone who finds out about its impending termination, and being unhappy about it, fighting for its life.
No more than any other regular noun like ‘bicycle’ is a redundant term. They’re inseparable from their implementations too.