Ah, so this is only talking about whether training on the material was fair use. I was surprised by the “getting books illegally and then training on them” thing.
Skimming the pdf (mostly ctrl+f “shadow”), it sounds like “downloading a book might not be illegal depending what you do with it”, which I hadn’t realized. p. 36:
as already discussed, even though that downloading is a separate use, it must be considered in light of its overall purpose. For instance, imagine a researcher who
downloaded books from a shadow library in the process of writing an article on shadow libraries, and only did so for their research. That downloading would almost certainly be a fair use. Of course, in that example, the downloader has less ability to procure the books elsewhere than Meta did. But the point is that downloading from a shadow library, which the plaintiffs refer to as “unmitigated piracy,” must be viewed in light of its ultimate end.
(My previous understanding was that the rule was something like “if you already own something legally, you’re allowed to download it; but if not, you’re not”.)
...but now I don’t understand how this differs from the Anthropic case, which I summarized as
This judge ruled that training on books you acquired legally is fair use.
But Anthropic didn’t acquire the books they trained on legally. This judge also ruled that they’re liable for the copyright infringement involved in getting them illegally.
Your summary seems correct to me. Apparently the Meta judge disagrees with the reasoning in the Anthropic case; the Meta ruling has a brief comment on it:
Speaking of which, in a recent ruling on this topic, Judge Alsup focused heavily on the transformative nature of generative AI while brushing aside concerns about the harm it can inflict on the market for the works it gets trained on. Such harm would be no different, he reasoned, than the harm caused by using the works for “training schoolchildren to write well,” which could “result in an explosion of competing works.” Order on Fair Use at 28, Bartz v. Anthropic PBC, No. 24-cv-5417 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2025), Dkt. No. 231. According to Judge Alsup, this “is not the kind of competitive or creative displacement that concerns the Copyright Act.” Id. But when it comes to market effects, using books to teach children to write is not remotely like using books to create a product that a single individual could employ to generate countless competing works with a miniscule fraction of the time and creativity it would otherwise take. This inapt analogy is not a basis for blowing off the most important factor in the fair use analysis.
I think the Anthropic case didn’t establish precedent because they’re both District Court judges, so allowed to disagree with each other’s decisions. A decision by their Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court would establish binding precedent.
Claude’s explanation
District court judges—even within the same district—are not bound by each other’s decisions. Each district judge has independent authority to interpret the law, which explains why you saw the second judge cite the first ruling only to disagree with it.
Here’s how precedent actually works in the US system:
Binding precedent comes from higher courts. California district courts must follow precedents set by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (which covers California) and the Supreme Court. These are called “controlling authorities.”
Persuasive precedent includes decisions from other district courts, even within the same district. A judge might consider these rulings, cite them, and explain why they agree or disagree—exactly what you witnessed. The second judge was essentially saying “I’ve looked at how my colleague handled this issue, but I think they got it wrong for these reasons.”
This happens frequently in emerging legal areas like AI and copyright, where there’s limited appellate guidance. District courts become testing grounds for different legal theories. Eventually, if these cases get appealed, the Ninth Circuit might resolve the split by establishing binding precedent for all California district courts.
The fair use question you mentioned is particularly ripe for this kind of disagreement since it involves a four-factor balancing test that different judges can reasonably weigh differently, especially when applying established doctrine to novel technology.
This disagreement between district courts actually serves a useful function—it creates a record of different approaches that appellate courts can consider when they eventually do establish binding precedent.
Ah, so this is only talking about whether training on the material was fair use. I was surprised by the “getting books illegally and then training on them” thing.
Skimming the pdf (mostly ctrl+f “shadow”), it sounds like “downloading a book might not be illegal depending what you do with it”, which I hadn’t realized. p. 36:
(My previous understanding was that the rule was something like “if you already own something legally, you’re allowed to download it; but if not, you’re not”.)
...but now I don’t understand how this differs from the Anthropic case, which I summarized as
was that a bad summary?
Your summary seems correct to me. Apparently the Meta judge disagrees with the reasoning in the Anthropic case; the Meta ruling has a brief comment on it:
I think the Anthropic case didn’t establish precedent because they’re both District Court judges, so allowed to disagree with each other’s decisions. A decision by their Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court would establish binding precedent.
Claude’s explanation
District court judges—even within the same district—are not bound by each other’s decisions. Each district judge has independent authority to interpret the law, which explains why you saw the second judge cite the first ruling only to disagree with it.
Here’s how precedent actually works in the US system:
Binding precedent comes from higher courts. California district courts must follow precedents set by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (which covers California) and the Supreme Court. These are called “controlling authorities.”
Persuasive precedent includes decisions from other district courts, even within the same district. A judge might consider these rulings, cite them, and explain why they agree or disagree—exactly what you witnessed. The second judge was essentially saying “I’ve looked at how my colleague handled this issue, but I think they got it wrong for these reasons.”
This happens frequently in emerging legal areas like AI and copyright, where there’s limited appellate guidance. District courts become testing grounds for different legal theories. Eventually, if these cases get appealed, the Ninth Circuit might resolve the split by establishing binding precedent for all California district courts.
The fair use question you mentioned is particularly ripe for this kind of disagreement since it involves a four-factor balancing test that different judges can reasonably weigh differently, especially when applying established doctrine to novel technology.
This disagreement between district courts actually serves a useful function—it creates a record of different approaches that appellate courts can consider when they eventually do establish binding precedent.