My understanding is that the two contradictory theories are causal decision theory (CDT), which says to choose the action that will cause the best consequences, and evidential decision theory (EDT), which says to choose the action such that the consequences will be best conditional on the action you chose. Newcomb’s problem makes causal decision theory look bad but evidential decision theory look good. (CDT two-boxes because your choice seemingly can’t cause the prediction, but EDT one-boxes you have more money conditional on one-boxing.) But the smoking lesion problem makes evidential decision theory look bad and causal decision theory look good. (CDT gets to enjoy smoking because it doesn’t cause health problems according to the thought-experiment setup, but EDT doesn’t because according to the setup, you have health problems conditional on enjoying smoking.)
I am fairly sure that this is not the distinction being made. I think this because the FDT paper first contrasts EDT on the one hand with CDT and FDT on the other hand (saying that CDT and FDT both differ from EDT in the same way), and then goes on to say that CDT and FDT differ in some other way. And the quotes I gave in the OP were also about CDT vs. FDT, with no EDT involved.
My understanding is that the two contradictory theories are causal decision theory (CDT), which says to choose the action that will cause the best consequences, and evidential decision theory (EDT), which says to choose the action such that the consequences will be best conditional on the action you chose. Newcomb’s problem makes causal decision theory look bad but evidential decision theory look good. (CDT two-boxes because your choice seemingly can’t cause the prediction, but EDT one-boxes you have more money conditional on one-boxing.) But the smoking lesion problem makes evidential decision theory look bad and causal decision theory look good. (CDT gets to enjoy smoking because it doesn’t cause health problems according to the thought-experiment setup, but EDT doesn’t because according to the setup, you have health problems conditional on enjoying smoking.)
EDT doesn’t have counterfactuals at all, IMO. It has Bayesian conditionals.
I am fairly sure that this is not the distinction being made. I think this because the FDT paper first contrasts EDT on the one hand with CDT and FDT on the other hand (saying that CDT and FDT both differ from EDT in the same way), and then goes on to say that CDT and FDT differ in some other way. And the quotes I gave in the OP were also about CDT vs. FDT, with no EDT involved.
I never got that cause is deciding to smoke much of an update after you already detected an urge to smoke? edt looks simpler so it should be correct