I’m not trying to make progress on solving the hard problem! As I have said, there is no hard problem. There is nothing there to explain. Unless you can point at something needing explaining, you aren’t contributing anything.
If I interpret your questions as trying to point at something in need of an explanation, I still just don’t see it. When I introspect, I don’t perceive anything to be going on inside my head besides the computation. With regard to (3), so long as a computation is occurring (and empirically computations generally do occur in human heads), there couldn’t not be an “inside”. With regard to (1), it also wouldn’t make sense for a given computation to feel a different way. Can happiness feel like sadness? It’s just an incoherent question. With regard to (2), how could a computation not feel some way from the inside? Again, what you are proposing is just incoherent.
Your basic assumption seems to be that the mapping between computations and experiences is somehow arbitrary, or at least could have been different. And I don’t think that that is the case. Why would it be? That presupposes that the experience is something different from the computation, and I don’t think it is. I think the experience is just a different way of describing the same computation. Taking the English language as fixed, I feel like you are repeatedly asking “why should the integer between two and four be three?”
When I introspect, I don’t perceive anything to be going on inside my head besides the computation
Yet billions of people throughout history have introspected without noticing any computation! Are you quite sure that your introspection isn’t influenced by your theoretical commitments?
In any case, the HP is supposed to exist in relation to physics...it’s not supposed to be discoverable by pure introspection.
so long as a computation is occurring (and empirically computations generally do occur in human heads), there couldn’t not be an “inside”.
If the view from the inside is an ineffable, intrinsically subjective feeling , then there is no physical reason it should exist. The idea that physics is a complete map of reality implies that everything can be understood from an objective, mathematical perspective.
it also wouldn’t make sense for a given computation to feel a different way. Can happiness feel like sadness?
I’m not trying to make progress on solving the hard problem! As I have said, there is no hard problem. There is nothing there to explain. Unless you can point at something needing explaining, you aren’t contributing anything.
If I interpret your questions as trying to point at something in need of an explanation, I still just don’t see it. When I introspect, I don’t perceive anything to be going on inside my head besides the computation. With regard to (3), so long as a computation is occurring (and empirically computations generally do occur in human heads), there couldn’t not be an “inside”. With regard to (1), it also wouldn’t make sense for a given computation to feel a different way. Can happiness feel like sadness? It’s just an incoherent question. With regard to (2), how could a computation not feel some way from the inside? Again, what you are proposing is just incoherent.
Your basic assumption seems to be that the mapping between computations and experiences is somehow arbitrary, or at least could have been different. And I don’t think that that is the case. Why would it be? That presupposes that the experience is something different from the computation, and I don’t think it is. I think the experience is just a different way of describing the same computation. Taking the English language as fixed, I feel like you are repeatedly asking “why should the integer between two and four be three?”
Yet billions of people throughout history have introspected without noticing any computation! Are you quite sure that your introspection isn’t influenced by your theoretical commitments?
In any case, the HP is supposed to exist in relation to physics...it’s not supposed to be discoverable by pure introspection.
If the view from the inside is an ineffable, intrinsically subjective feeling , then there is no physical reason it should exist. The idea that physics is a complete map of reality implies that everything can be understood from an objective, mathematical perspective.
Can my green be your red?
Irresistable pedantry:
It can’t, incidentally, but that is due to peculiarities of human color vision, and is not of any deep philosophical interest.
So all computations feel like something—both computations on the level of head and computations on the level of countries?